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EMERGING ATTITUDES TOWARD FISCAL POLICY

PRESIDENT Kennedy's proposals for tax reform have been indicative of the period of rapid transition through which fiscal policy is now passing. Aside from the recent request for executive authority temporarily to adjust income tax rates (a proposal which stands little chance of approval by Congress), the key feature of his program has been the tax credit which, as originally planned, would have permitted business firms to deduct directly from their tax bills a variable proportion of new investment. The plan has now been altered to provide a straight 8 percent credit for all investment activity. Nevertheless the possibility of varying the deductible percentage depending on economic conditions, makes the tax credit device potentially the most promising new weapon in the arsenal of stabilizing devices since World War II. It would permit regularization of investment outlays and thereby encourage stability of the economy-at-large. Yet the proposal runs directly counter to the tenets of political liberalism which perennially have favored stimulation of consumption spending and have tended to view tax relief for business as an inequitable sop to the interests. New lines have been formed over this issue. Paradoxically, the business community has been resisting what may well be regarded as a powerful stimulus for private initiative and the free enterprise system, while the liberal movement has been split, with the unions and many liberals opposing the tax credit for the traditional reasons. The detached observer can only be struck by the sharp contrast between the extraordinary changes in fiscal practice and in-

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struments in recent years and the public discussion of fiscal policy which remains mired in the stale ideological issues of ten and even twenty years ago. A re-evaluation of fiscal policy, which eliminates the dross and winnows out the issues pertinent to contemporary realities, is now in order. It is hoped that this paper may make a small contribution in that direction.

1. The Old Debate

Some fifteen years have passed since the climax of the feverish academic debate over fiscal policy which occurred toward the close of the second World War, during the brief period of flowering plans and hopes when it appeared this evil old world might at long last be made over. Certain it was that the scourge of unemployment could be eliminated forever. Through the use of the government's tax and expenditure powers, aggregate demand or total money expenditures could be *precisely* equated to potential supply,[1] and, as a consequence, no factor of production needed to remain more than temporarily idle. This conviction, molded in academic circles especially by Professor Alvin Hansen and his supporters, had obtained widespread public acceptance. Although the Full Employment Act of 1946 did not satisfy the enthusiasts, since it failed to provide the desired *guarantee* of full employment, it did reflect the prevailing confidence in fiscal policy.

Elsewhere the hopes held out for fiscal policy had been even higher. In Great Britain such attitudes reached their culmination in the Beveridge Report[2] (1944), which may be taken to represent the high tide of enthusiasm for fiscal policy. Just prior to the Korean War a United Nations

[1] If national income (Y) is divided into private expenditures (E) and government expenditures (G), which together comprise effective demand and determine the level of national income, then to achieve full employment income, E + G must be equal to total potential supply at full employment. Fiscal policy, it is hoped, will achieve this goal by directly increasing G or by inducing a rise in E (through tax reduction) when a deficiency of demand appears, or by reversing this process when excess demand appears. Thus it is hoped aggregate demand can be controlled with precision, permitting the maintenance of full employment without inflation.

[2] William H. Beveridge, *Full Employment in a Free Society* (New York, 1945).

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study,[3] in reviewing the main ingredients of full employment policy, came to rather optimistic conclusions regarding the possibility of attaining both domestic and international stability. Yet by the time of the U. N. report, not only had the deepening antagonism between Russia and the West revealed that the world was not to be reformed and was still to be dominated by power politics, but several years of steady inflation had raised widespread doubts whether unemployment was likely to be the main postwar economic problem. For whatever reason, the ambitious proposal of the report attracted considerable attention in the academic world but was almost ignored by the governments represented in the U. N. Apparently the public's attention had been diverted to other matters.

The reaction of indifference by governments, many of which were already making use of fiscal policy for stabilization purposes, is symptomatic of the ebbing of interest in the debate over employment. So many wartime hopes for achieving a brave new world having died, it does not seem strange that the employment programs planned during the war now appear to be a form of castle-building, useful for arousing the public to greater efforts but somewhat removed from postwar economic realities.

Attitudes toward fiscal policy have reflected these changing conditions. If one were to ask what fiscal policy had achieved in the postwar period, the answer might well be: both everything and nothing. From the standpoint of its early opponents, compensatory fiscal policy has clearly conquered all obstacles and possesses the field. All administrations, all parties, and almost all politicians—some with seeming enthusiasm, some with seeming reluctance—have embraced compensatory fiscal policy. Yet the reluctance of some and the skepticism of all concerning fiscal policy would appear puzzling to the fiscal innovators of the middle forties, whose expectations had been pitched much higher. From the standpoint of the proponents, conditions have "improved" surprisingly little. In periods of recession and of inflationary pressure, the government appears strangely restrained in using the fiscal weapon. Serviceable in many respects, fiscal

[3] *National and International Measures for Economic Stability*, Report by a Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General, United Nations, 1949.

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policy has failed to provide the utopia of employment security that was hoped for a scant fifteen years ago.

2. *The Authentic Death and the Political Survival of the Annually Balanced Budget*

The case for the annually balanced budget is at its strongest when the public sector accounts for a fairly small proportion of national income, for under such circumstances it may be argued that the nation's fiscal policy will have slight effect on economic conditions and that, for psychological reasons, balancing of the budget is the most appropriate policy. As the size of the public sector increases, the case for attempting to attain an annual balancing of the budget weakens while the case for compensatory finance grows correspondingly stronger. For, in periods of recession when aggregate demand is already declining, the attempt to balance the budget either through the reduction of government expenditures or through the increase of tax rates tends to bring a further diminution of aggregate demand. Adherence to the balanced budget concept is likely to intensify the recession. Cutting government spending would reinforce the decline in private spending—hardly a sensible procedure. It would seem more reasonable to cushion the fall in total expenditures by holding government expenditures constant or even by increasing them. On the revenue side, the attempt to increase tax *receipts* by increasing tax *rates* would be equally frustrating, for the increase in rates by reducing disposable personal income and/or by weakening incentives and business confidence is likely to accelerate the decline in private expenditures and further to reduce national income.

Thus the case against the balanced budget is a two-sided one. First, it would seem wise for the government to refrain from reinforcing the contractive tendencies by its own act and, therefore, it should fulfill its expenditure commitments while refusing to increase taxes. Such action, or refusal to take action, implies the incurring of a substantial budgetary deficit as revenues sag in unison with the decline of national income.[4] Secondly, the *attempt* to balance the

[4] In the hands of its most sophisticated supporters, such as the late Sir Hubert Henderson, the balanced budget rule would never have been carried to the extreme of increasing tax rates in order to avoid a deficit in depression. Cf. his *The Inter-War Years and Other Papers* (Oxford, 1955), pp. 318–19, 322–23.

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budget is in reality quite hopeless. Industrial nations have discovered that expenditure commitments rise in periods of depression. (Despite the best of intentions both Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt discovered this to be the case.) Moreover, it is hard to find additional sources of revenue in depression and the attempt, for the reasons given above, is likely to be self-defeating. Depressions breed budgetary deficits. The existence of a deficit, if not its size, is unlikely to be affected by whether the deficit is looked upon as an appropriate method of ameliorating the recession or as an evil blot on the fiscal escutcheon which is to be both fought and endured.

Despite its survival, as a political catchword, the annually balanced budget is now dead in practice. The effectiveness of a budgetary principle can never be discovered by listening to the professions of politicians but must be inferred from their actions. Despite the lip service, no actual effort is made to balance the budget during periods of recession. On the contrary, both parties vie with each other to increase rather than reduce the size of the deficit. In the 1958 recession, to take a recent example, the actions of *both* political parties tended to increase the deficit. The differences between the two concerned the degree of response that was necessary, whether reliance should be on tax reduction or expenditure increases and so on, rather than the appropriateness of a deficit in itself.

From their pronouncements at the time, however, one would have assumed that the balanced budget remains the lodestar of both parties. The balanced budget may be dead for practical purposes but, embalmed within a glass case, it is treated with a touching respect by most politicians. The reason for this is quite simple: by and large the public continues to regard the balanced budget as the criterion of sound finance. Since political parties are institutions designed to give, or at least to promise, the public what it wants, it should not be surprising that boundless devotion to the balanced budget will be expressed in political pronouncements. Thus the Republicans, in 1958, took pride in the speed with which the economic downturn was reversed, yet were deeply apologetic about the $12 billion deficit in fiscal 1959, which was certainly in large measure responsible for the mildness of the recession. The Democrats, on the other hand, whose plans for increasing the deficit had only

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been held in check by the President's veto, simultaneously castigated the administration for failure to take more aggressive action to deal with the recession and for incurring so enormous a deficit. It was clearly implied that under a different administration so monstrous a case of fiscal irresponsibility would never have occurred.

Both parties are aware that the bulk of the voters are primarily interested in ending a recession and only secondarily in avoiding a budgetary deficit. So long as the public fails to connect the stimulative powers of the federal budget in recession with the existence of a deficit, so long will the political parties pretend that they are separable. Simultaneously, a party will attempt to take credit for any stimulative effect of fiscal policy while decrying the inevitable financial accoutrements of that policy. Plainly the budgeting deficit, produced by the automatic fall in revenues and rise in expenditures, is the chief instrument for curing recessions. In practice, all parties make use of automatic stabilization.[5] If the public wishes to hear deficits denounced, political parties stand ready to perform the intellectual *tour de force* of disassociating the deficit from the operation of the automatic stabilizers.

It is clear that the proponents of fiscal policy have obtained the substance of their desires, while leaving to their rivals only empty forms and slogans. Consequently, it would seem that the former have won a great victory, and that they would be content to see their dreams fulfilled. Paradoxically, however, this is not the case. Although the use of fiscal policy in achieving stability is universally accepted today, the hopes of those who originally formulated it have gone unfulfilled. For various reasons our method of employing fiscal weapons, our attitudes toward fiscal policy, and our experience with employment programs, have all proved to be something of a disappointment to them. In several respects cur-

[5] Any lingering hopes, doubts or fears that the Republican party might still be clinging to the annually balanced budget rule were eliminated by a final report to President Eisenhower by his Budget Director, Maurice H. Stans, generally regarded as a fiscal conservative (see *Federal Fiscal Behavior During the Recession of 1957–58*, Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, January 1961). While the report is quite critical of "deliberate (discretionary) countercyclical steps" in the recession of 1957–58, it attributes the rapid recovery to the action of the "built-in stabilizers," upon which, it argues, primary reliance should be placed in any future recession.

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rent practices and attitudes *are almost as far from those suggested in the wartime period as they are from the orthodox Treasury views of an earlier era.*

3. Economic Limitations

The goal of the formulators of full employment programs was not merely the *mitigation* but the virtual *elimination* of economic fluctuations. If, through the use of the fiscal weapon, aggregate demand could be more or less precisely matched to potential supply, then no (competent) man need be more than temporarily unemployed. And the original proponents did believe that fiscal policy might be employed so flexibly. By varying expenditures or the tax structure whenever deflationary or inflationary pressures became apparent, full employment without inflation could be permanently achieved. This attitude toward employment policy, which may be called the perfectionist view, was embodied in the Beveridge program and supplied the initial impulse for the Full Employment Act in this country. Since proponents of these policies would not be satisfied with mere palliatives, the automatic stabilizers, which could only mitigate but not eliminate fluctuations, were viewed as desirable but insufficient. To achieve a permanent state of full employment, the automatic stabilizers would have to be supplemented by discretionary fiscal policy, flexibly employed. In the view of their critics, this "attempt to drain the last dregs of employment out of the system" was likely to do more harm than good.[6] They thought that discretionary fiscal policy too ambitiously employed was characterized by inherent defects which the formulators of the programs had to perceive. Time has proved the skeptics to have been very perceptive.

Part of the difficulty of the perfectionist view lay in the economic realm. The biggest error, perhaps, was the failure to appreciate the strong upward pressure on wages, costs, and prices which would exist under full employment conditions. American theorists underestimated the strong preference on the part of individual unions to preserve their

[6] See, for example, the provocative comments of Jacob Viner, "Full Employment at Whatever Cost," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. LXIV, No. 3 (August 1950), pp. 385–96.

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autonomy rather than to observe a general wage-price formula. They overestimated the willingness of pressure groups in general to exercise self-restraint in the public interest. They overestimated both the effectiveness and public tolerability of the control of prices in "bottleneck sectors." Consequently, they failed to appreciate adequately the tendency of demand to leak off into higher wages and prices rather than into expanded output, once the sanction of unemployment was removed. One apparent effect of a full employment guarantee has been to make a steady rise in the price level inevitable.

Advocates of the employment programs failed to perceive another defect in the perfectionist view. Although it is a very powerful instrument, fiscal policy is also a *crude* one and may not be sufficiently subtle to achieve the *delicate* kinds of adjustment required in an economy which is dependent upon the *voluntary* action of individuals to achieve necessary adjustments. This type of difficulty is shown most clearly in the case of unemployment in export industries, which depend after all upon foreign buyers. An expansionary fiscal policy, by raising domestic costs and prices and making domestic goods less attractive to foreign purchasers, may actually magnify rather than diminish the problem of unemployment in the export industries—to say nothing of intensifying any balance of payments difficulties which may exist.

Even within the domestic economy, fiscal policy may be incapable of dealing with the problem of structural unemployment. When changes occur in consumer preferences or in the pattern of industrial production, the shift in the structure of output is likely to create a declining industry concentrated in a particular region. This is the problem of the depressed area about which fiscal policy can do little. Any increase in aggregate demand brought about by an expansionary fiscal policy is likely to result in continued unemployment in the depressed area, associated with a rise in the price level in other sectors of the economy. The problem in this case is that the simple Keynesian model upon which fiscal policy is based may be misleading. Aggregate supply may be equated to aggregate demand in the over-all sense, without the hoped for results, since demand may be concentrated

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upon industries in which capacity is insufficient, while unemployment continues in those industries against which consumer preferences have been shifting. In West Virginia, for example, the chief industry, coal, has suffered simultaneously from: a) a substantial fall-off in foreign demand since 1957; b) a gradual diminution of demand on the part of domestic consumers; and, c) improvements in the methods of coal-mining which have diminished the need for miners. Unemployment in West Virginia remains high, on account of the reluctance of the population to move away from their homes despite the shrinkage of employment opportunities. Irrespective of the statements of office seekers on the campaign trail, there is really very little that the federal government can do about this condition, short of *directing* industrial investment into the state. Due to the handicaps of location under which West Virginia labors, the effect of an expansionary fiscal policy on its unemployment problem will be modest at best.[7]

4. Political Realities in a Democracy

Failure to take account of its economic limitations has not, however, proved to be the chief drawback to fiscal policy in the postwar period. A far graver defect was the failure of its proponents to recognize the limits to its political workability, especially in the context of the American political system. Under *ideal* conditions, it could be expected that flexible use of fiscal policy could prevent unemployment, except for very short periods, outside of depressed areas. But such a result presupposes that the nation's fiscal machinery is controlled by rational and detached experts uninfluenced by pressures, interests, or impassioned controversies. Such is not the case, although at one time fiscal theorists

[7] The debate in early 1961 between Walter Heller, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, who argued that existing unemployment was primarily "cyclical" and could be eliminated by an increase in spending, and William McChesney Martin, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, who argued that it was "structural" and could not be, represented a revival of the controversy of the 'forties. Heller's position represented a reiteration of the faith of those who formulated the original employment programs: that unemployment was essentially a consequence of deficient demand. More recently there has been a change on the part of administration economists who are now ready to concede that in places like West Virginia or Michigan unemployment may well be structural and therefore intractable.

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naively assumed that it was. The nation's fiscal policy is decided by members of Congress subject to the strong and somewhat irrational demands of ordinary voters and of special interest groups. The practical results have consequently diverged considerably from the expectation of those who formulated the employment programs. As a result, since early in the postwar period, discretionary fiscal policy has been viewed with some skepticism by all except academic observers.

The most obvious of fiscal policy's political difficulties is its asymmetry or lopsidedness. According to the original conception, fiscal policy was intended to be a dual-purpose weapon, effective in dealing with excessive as well as insufficient demand. In times of inflation, budgetary surpluses would restrain total expenditures and ease inflationary pressures, just as in times of depression, demand was maintained by a budgetary deficit. In practice, nothing has been so hard to attain or to retain as a budgetary surplus. Paying taxes is burdensome and unpleasant to the voters, so that Congress is under constant pressure to reduce taxes. Moreover, expanded expenditures are quite satisfying to whatever groups are benefited, and Congress is under steady pressure to increase its outlays. Under these circumstances it is difficult even to balance the budget in times of prosperity, let alone obtain a surplus (which incidentally helps to explain the aura of fiscal rectitude which came to be built up around the balanced budget rule). Fiscal policy readily serves as a stimulant in periods of depression, but not as a restraint in periods of excessive demand. Whenever a surplus appears, there is a strong tendency either for expenditures to creep up or for tax cuts to be given—either action intensifying the pressure and throwing a larger burden on monetary policy.

There is a second facet to the lopsidedness of fiscal policy. If the onset of a recession brings about discretionary increase of expenditures on the part of the government, vested interests are created in such expenditures and, with the return of prosperity, it becomes difficult to reduce them. Associated with the reluctance to increase tax rates, the result could be perennially unbalanced budgets. Moreover, permanent increases in federal expenditures in recession, even if matched by an increase in taxes in prosperity, might mean that a rising proportion of national output is incorporated into the

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government sector—a condition which is not consistent with the political goals of a good many citizens. This tendency of government expenditures to creep up in recession without receding in prosperity is sometimes referred to as the "ratchet effect"—it has made political conservatives, at any rate, suspicious of the aggressive use of fiscal policy.

The assumption of fiscal theorists that the tax structure is far more flexible than conditions really warrant creates another difficulty. Theorists may view the tax structure as a technical instrument to be used for the manipulation of demand. The public, however, tends to regard the tax system as a matter of balanced rights and responsibilities, based upon justice and equity. Continued variation of tax rates may undermine the willingness to pay taxes upon which, in the final analysis, the effectiveness of fiscal policy depends. The willingness to pay taxes, particularly income taxes, is not a universal phenomenon. It could be that the attempt to overuse the fiscal instrument might destroy the delicate structure upon which it rests. At some point in the future the public may come to appreciate the desirability of viewing taxation simply as a device for influencing expenditures in the private sector. It clearly does not do so at the present time, thus making it hard to increase taxes or to reimpose them once they have been removed.

A barrier to the kind of flexibility envisaged by the theorists arises from the fact that any variation of the tax structure may mean a shift in the *distribution* of the tax burden among different classes of citizens and taxpayers. Any change in the tax structure which forces a reappraisal of the appropriateness of relative burdens almost inevitably breeds both intense political controversy and a degree of social friction which is disturbing. Each group's notion of equity in the tax structure is based upon the (tacit) belief that a larger share of the burden should be shifted to others—labor pleads for higher exemptions, while business pleads for a lower corporate income tax. It is for this reason that a wise rule-of-thumb in public finance is that "an old tax is a good tax." Avoiding changes in the tax structure means avoiding the reawakening of controversy and harmful passions. Fiscal theorists who urge continuous modification of the tax structure ignore the fact that fiscal policy is only in some respects

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a *general* control. Both tax and expenditure policies operate by directly affecting the interests of specific groups which are likely to feel resentful when those interests have been damaged. Continued modification of the tax structure may lead to social controversy, a feeling of ill usage, a decline in morale which weakens the social fabric, and, by weakening the willingness to pay taxes, may undermine the fiscal policy instrument itself.

With some notable exceptions most fiscal analysts have failed in their theorizing to appreciate the fragility of the fiscal system in a democracy, particularly under the Congressional system. Political confidence is delicate and quite easily disturbed. One way to achieve this result is to introduce continual friction over the tax and expenditure pattern. The tax system must be consistent with popular notions of equity; to be acceptable, temporary tax remissions would therefore have to be proportional or something close to it. Since under the American fiscal system frequent change is disturbing to political confidence, it would appear unwise to tamper with the system too frequently, even in the quest for continuous high employment.

Even more than the economic difficulties, the political clumsiness of discretionary fiscal policy has increased the reluctance to employ it aggressively in counteracting mild downturns, and has made it almost impossible to use fiscal policy effectively in dealing with inflationary pressures. To be sure, this defect refers only to discretionary fiscal policy rather than to the automatic stabilizers which do not require either precise forecasting or rapid and frictionless adjustments brought about through cumbersome political machinery. Only when a gross maladjustment exists between aggregate demand and supply, is it clear that discretionary fiscal policy can be employed. The tricky problems thus arise when one tries to decide what to do in in-between situations in which the automatic stabilizers have failed to prevent more unemployment developing than one would desire, yet the unemployment has not gone deep enough to warrant the risks of discretionary fiscal policy. Both the inflexibility of expenditures in the downward direction (the ratchet effect) and the political frictions generated by variation of the tax structure have made all postwar administra-

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tions loath to employ fiscal policy in as flexible a way as the academics of the 'forties hoped. The convenient theoretical assumption of *ceteris paribus,* which academicians employed in building their models of fiscal policy, has failed to provide an appropriate guide to the real world with its rapid changes of economic conditions and its combative behavior of political man.

Although in one respect fiscal policy has revolutionized budget policy, in another it has left conditions surprisingly unchanged. It has revolutionized budget policy in that as much has been accomplished from fiscal policy as could reasonably be expected. On the other hand, the early models have proved to be misleadingly simple and the gap between theory and reality has proved to be much greater than was anticipated in the bright glow of enthusiasm in the period of the war. Although the rule of the *annually* balanced budget has met its end, in fact if not in fiction, it has proved to be impossible to frame budget policy solely in terms of "functional finance" or "the economic requirements of particular conditions." Such concepts provide too elastic a criterion for budget policy, and it is for this reason that the balanced budget remains relevant as an aspiration, if not as a rule. Democracies appear to be reluctant to discipline themselves. The projected balancing of a target budget for conditions of full employment provides a disciplinary value in a society in which the public is inclined to overlook the fact that costs must be paid—a disciplinary value which the original proponents of fiscal policy may have treated too lightly.

5. *Vistas of the Future*

In two other respects attitudes toward fiscal policy have been changing rapidly. First, we have come to recognize that a given level of effective demand may be obtained through an incredible variety of fiscal devices which can be fitted together in an array of distinct patterns of tax and expenditure policies. Secondly, we have learned that fiscal policy does not exist in a vacuum; it must be effectively coordinated with monetary and debt management policies in order to achieve the nation's goals, whatever they may be.

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These two changes are closer together than one might think, for together they represent a departure from stale ideological controversy which has enormously broadened the range of the potential components of the nation's policy-mix.

The first point requires some amplification. In contrast to a widespread view of fifteen years ago that the "marginal propensity to save" was too "high" to permit reliance on the tax reduction route to stimulate total expenditures, tax reduction is today viewed as an effective instrument for stimulating not only consumption but investment as well. Peacetime levels of taxation much higher than were anticipated in the 'forties have meant that the leeway for stimulating expenditures through tax reduction is much greater than hitherto. These higher levels of taxation have meant that a large share of tax revenues has come from the lower and middle income groups; consequently a reduction in taxes may more easily stimulate mass consumption expenditures than was anticipated earlier. Moreover, upper income groups are more willing to consume out of increased after-tax incomes than was believed possible even ten years ago. The recognition of the expansibility of consumption is most vividly illustrated by the shift of the main focus of the critics of our economic system from "the mature economy" to the "affluent society"—that is, a shift from a view that the propensity to consume is too low to the view that it is too high. In addition, the abandonment of the notion that the volume of investment is "autonomously" determined has meant recognition that it is not at all difficult to stimulate additional *investment* expenditures via the tax reduction route. Particularly is this true when fiscal policies of a somewhat wider scope, including tax credits for investment expenditure or more generous treatment of depreciation allowances, are considered.

The widening range of activities which it is regarded as appropriate for the government to support has meant a similar broadening of opportunities on the expenditures side. In the depression the choice lay between traditional public works which provided tangible results and relief expenditures which did not. The inflexibility of public works and the inhibitions of Harold Ickes help to explain the insignificance of the PWA as a disburser of funds relative to the

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WPA which provided little or no direct value in return. Expenditures resulting in tangible benefits now include the housing program, slum clearance, and a greater expanded conception of resource development. With respect to expenditures for intangible benefits the government may now spend for education, for unemployment compensation and for a variety of welfare measures, without indulging in the leaf-raking fiction that there is a direct *quid pro quo*. In light of the broadened array of fiscal weapons, increasingly there are differences concerning the appropriate mixture of fiscal devices to achieve a given level of demand.

The second point reflects the recognition that monetary policy and the closely allied debt management policy can have a substantial influence on effective demand. Moreover, fiscal and monetary policies are closely associated in determining the availability of capital funds, and the allocation of resources as between consumption and investment. In the days when monetary policy was regarded as hopelessly ineffective, the problem of coordination could be blithely ignored. Now it is seen that a tighter fiscal policy permits a more lenient monetary policy, and vice versa. For effective monetary policy the problem of debt management must be under control, both with respect to its structure and its trend, and the trend of the debt reflects government surpluses and deficits, that is, fiscal policy. Thus there is a question of choice involved in the policy-mix. Accepting the goal of full employment, one can choose either to emphasize or deemphasize fiscal policy depending on whether one wishes to place a smaller or greater burden on monetary and debt management policy respectively.

Put together, both the centrifugal tendency for the scope of fiscal policy to widen and the centripetal tendency for it to become more closely intertwined with monetary and debt management policy in the over-all policy-mix have vastly increased the number of possible combinations of policy ingredients to achieve a given policy goal. Figure I illustrates this range of possibilities. On the highest level, a choice must be made between emphasizing fiscal policy and emphasizing monetary policy. Just below these two policy areas, not quite independent but not altogether dependent, is debt management, more subordinate to monetary than to fiscal

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policy but still reflecting immediate budgetary pressures. One may attempt to use debt management countercyclically or one may have the more modest and traditional Treasury objective of managing it "for its own sake."

Within the area of fiscal policy, one has a variety of choices. One may choose to rely exclusively on automatic stabilizers (accompanied by flexible monetary policy) or one may attempt to use discretionary fiscal policy. Under the latter heading there will be an opportunity to emphasize the revenue or the expenditure side (just as would be the case for automatic stabilizers, though not to the same degree). If the emphasis is placed on the revenue side, a choice will be made between influencing demand by affecting consumption, which implies variation of sales-type taxes, payroll taxes, or lower bracket income taxes, or by influencing investment, which implies changes in business taxes, upper bracket income taxes or depreciation policies. (Relying on investment changes must mean, of course, considerable reliance on monetary policy.) On the expenditure side, a choice may be made between changing expenditures for tangibles or for intangibles, or the decision might be made directly to subsidize private consumption or investment.

FIGURE I



Monetary policy, though it remains wholely discretionary at the present time, may also be subdivided. One may rely on general controls, or one may make some use of selective controls. Under the heading of the traditional quantitative weapons, a choice will have to be made between emphasizing open market operations or utilizing changes in reserve re-

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quirements in determining monetary strategy.[8]

In choosing the ultimate policy-mix, value judgments are unavoidable. As a general, if not universal, rule, the political right with its deep distrust of concentration of power, particularly in the government, has tended to favor monetary policy over fiscal policy. When fiscal policy is employed, the preference is for total reliance on the automatic stabilizers. If discretionary fiscal policy is employed, the preference is for reliance on changes on the revenue side, especially those that stimulate investment activity.[9] When expenditures must be adjusted, it is preferred that increases be for tangibles (such as roads) rather than intangibles (welfare benefits broadly construed). Curiously enough, in the case of subsidies the right has little aversion to subsidizing investment outlays, but a deep repugnance for subsidizing consumption outlays, although as a rule, subsidization of private expenditures is preferred to increased state activity.

The political left tends in the other direction. Fiscal policy, even discretionary fiscal policy, is *preferred* to monetary and debt management policies. Changes on the expenditure (that is, increases) are preferred to changes on the revenue side. If changes on the revenue side are accepted, the preference is normally toward stimulating mass consumption rather than investment (though, as President Kennedy's tax proposals indicate, this has changed in recent years as concern over the issue of growth has increased). There is no aversion to expenditures for intangibles. Subsidization of certain types of private consumption seems highly desirable, but direct subsidization of private investment is viewed with extreme suspicion. In employing monetary policy, the left, unlike the right, has some partiality for the selective controls,

8 For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the two instruments, see Joseph Aschheim, *Techniques of Monetary Control* (Baltimore, 1961), pp. 19–32.

9 A characteristic example is provided by the tax program of Secretary Humphrey during the 1954 recession. Its underlying assumption was that prosperity depended upon investment activity; its chief features were more generous treatment of depreciation allowances and an income tax cut on an across-the-board basis. The Democratic minority in Congress favored greater relief for lower bracket income tax payers, including an increase in exemptions. Under the Kennedy administration the Democratic position has shifted dramatically, with the administration sponsoring the tax credit to encourage *investment* spending, and apparently favoring substantial reduction of income tax rates at the *upper* end of the structure.

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and has a preference for higher reserve requirements with open market purchases by the Federal Reserve, while the right prefers lowered reserve requirements.

At the present time, it should be emphasized, most of the disputes superficially concerning stabilization policy are really about value judgments on issues other than stabilization. When labor unions insist that recession should be fought by lowering sales or first bracket taxes, increased expenditures or subsidies, and looser money, but also insist that *reversal* of these policies is *not* the proper way to fight inflation (but rather business and upper bracket income taxes should be increased and selective controls on spending adopted), plainly the argument is not over stabilization *per se* but rather over increased consumption, decreased income inequality, and the appropriate role of the state. Similarly, when the political right recommends diminished progressivity of the income tax in *inflation* and in *deflation,* this clearly is not a question involving stabilization policy alone. Both sides are likely to insist that failure to adopt their particular remedies will be destabilizing, but that is the merest window dressing. Any detached observer will note a variety of ways of skinning the stabilization cat. Stability can be achieved through a vast number of combinations of policy measures, each one of which will reflect a different set of value judgments. The greater variety of fiscal devices and the increased flexibility of fiscal policy, in combining it with monetary or debt management policies, has increased the latitude for controversy over issues different from, but still unhappily confused with, the appropriateness of using fiscal policy for stabilization purposes.

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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND BRITISH PARTY RESPONSIBILITY

OBSERVERS of British government almost invariably are so impressed by the extent to which party unity prevails in the legislative and executive branches of government that political scientists have come to refer to the British system as typifying responsible party government. Among the explanations given for this unity are the division of British society into two large groups based upon economic class and public attitudes that effect strong leadership.[1] Whatever its origins, the pervasiveness in British government of the doctrine of party responsibility has been criticized by those who hanker for the good old days of the more wide-open Victorian Parliament, when party lines were more loosely drawn and Governments rose and fell more frequently as the result of changing tides in the House of Commons.[2] Certainly the operation of the current doctrine requires tight, centralized control by the leaders of the majority party, who have come increasingly to dominate the legislative timetable, to exact rigorous obedience to the whip, and to absorb or eliminate many of the older functions of the backbencher. Today most Members of Parliament and the public expect that on all matters of public policy the Government will either take the lead or leave no doubt as to where it stands.

When this does not in fact happen, we usually can conclude either that the issue at stake is extremely local or minor, or that it involves some special situation in which the Government finds it expedient to play down its own respon-

1 Samuel H. Beer, "New Structures of Democracy: Britain and America," in William N. Chambers and Robert H. Salisbury, *Democracy in the Mid-Twentieth Century* (Saint Louis, 1960), pp. 34–35. For an elaboration of this view, see Beer, "The Representation of Interests in British Government: Historical Background," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LI, No. 3 (September 1957), pp. 646–648. See also Leon D. Epstein, "The Cohesion of British Parliamentary Parties," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. L, No. 2 (June 1956), pp. 367–77.

2 For example, Christopher Hollis in *Can Parliament Survive?* (London, 1949), and Lord Campion, "Parliament and Democracy," in Campion, ed., *Parliament: A Survey* (London, 1952), pp. 9–36.

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sibility for the conduct of public policy. When the latter case occurs it is often most revealing to the student of politics, for it may enable him to judge whether under the British system it is indeed possible to exclude from the scope of the Government's responsibility important questions that come before Parliament for resolution. In this paper I shall explore this possibility by looking at what to many was an important deviant case—important in the sense that the subject matter was of widespread concern to Parliament and the people; deviant in that the manner in which the subject was treated did not follow the normal pattern of law-making in a party government system.

I have chosen the controversy over retaining capital punishment for murder, an issue that aroused great excitement in Britain during the decade 1947–57 and resulted in the passage of a major piece of legislation, the Homicide Act of 1957.[3] In one sense, the controversy was unrepresentative of the kind of questions Parliament faces every day because it involved procedures seldom used in ordinary legislative matters, created unusual dilemmas for the political leadership, the parties, and the upper chamber, and embroiled the nation in heated constitutional disputes. In another sense, however, this admittedly deviant case illustrates well the typical in the British political process, for it exemplifies the strict limits of "independent" parliamentary law-making and reinforces the familiar concept of the supremacy of Cabinet leadership. It provides an opportunity for testing a number of the propositions often advanced as part of the doctrine of party responsibility.

The dispute over the place of capital punishment in British law and society goes back hundreds of years.[4] Institu-

[3] A useful summary of the two Parliamentary struggles can be found in Sydney Silverman's postscript to the American edition of Arthur Koestler's *Reflections on Hanging* (New York, 1956), and in Elizabeth Orton Tuttle, *The Crusade Against Capital Punishment* (London, 1961). A more detailed political analysis of the capital punishment controversy can be found in my forthcoming *Capital Punishment and British Politics*, to be published by the University of Chicago Press.

[4] A brief compilation of arguments on both sides is contained in Gerald Gardiner, *Capital Punishment as a Deterrent: and the Alternative* (London, 1956). Different cases for abolition may be found in Victor Gollancz, *Capital Punishment: The Heart of the Matter* (London, 1955); Sir Ernest Gowers, *A Life for a Life?* (London, 1956); and Viscount Templewood, *The Shadow of the Gallows* (London, 1951).

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tional change in Britain generally comes gradually and is not always reflected in the letter of the law. At the end of the Second World War, for instance, the penalty for murder was the same as it had been in the late middle ages: death by hanging. Solemnly donning his black cap, every judge had to pronounce the death sentence on persons convicted of this crime. Yet fewer than half of those persons upon whom the sentence was passed were actually executed—an average of twelve a year for the period 1900–1949.[5] There were, in fact, several ways by which the penalty could be mitigated, among them being a jury recommendation of mercy, the discovery of criminal insanity, and the fairly frequent exercise of the reprieve power of the Home Secretary. Nevertheless, the death penalty remained on the statute books and a dozen or more Britons suffered it each year. For centuries governments had accepted it as an essential part of their penal policies, and although the number of crimes for which hanging could be exacted was reduced markedly by the activities of nineteenth century reformers, all attempts to abolish hanging for murder, or to exempt certain kinds of murder from hanging, had come to nothing.

Several small pressure groups were dedicated to working for the total abolition of capital punishment, and during the 1920's and 1930's they had tried without avail to get governments to sponsor or support bills to this effect. Chief among these groups were the Howard League for Penal Reform, a multi-purpose organization devoted to the reform of many criminal law and penal practices, and the National Council for the Abolition of the Death Penalty, a group of persons whose sole purpose was to bring pressure to bear on the public and Parliament to rid the country of an institution they judged to be at once immoral, ineffective and unnecessary.[6] After decades of futile campaigning, two developments spurred these groups to intensive activity in the

[5] *Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,* Cmd. 8932 (1953), pp. 300–301. The *Report* gives a useful summary of the condition of the law of murder on pp. 5–15.

[6] For an excellent discussion of the origin and development of these reform groups see Gordon Rose, *The Struggle for Penal Reform: The Howard League and Its Predecessors* (London, 1961). The Howard League and the National Council are, of course, examples of what Allen Potter has termed "promotional" (in contrast to "sectional") interest groups. Allen Potter, *Organized Groups in British National Politics* (London, 1961), pp. 25–43.

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mid-1940's. The first was the declared intention of both major political parties to support an omnibus Criminal Justice Bill that would embody some reforms in the penal law. Such a bill had been introduced into Parliament by the National Government in 1938, but the outbreak of the war had prevented its passage at that time. With the end of hostilities, abolitionist groups felt that there was some chance that an abolition clause (which had failed as an amendment in 1938) might be included in the new version, especially in light of the reformist mood of the 1945 Parliament. The second development that gave cause for hope was the coming to power of the Labour Party. Over the years, Labour had shown considerably more interest in the cause of abolition than the Conservatives. For example, it was the MacDonald Government of 1929 that had appointed the Select Committee on Capital Punishment which had recommended the experimental abolition of the death penalty for five years.[7] Furthermore, the party's annual conference in 1934 had passed an abolitionist resolution, and a number of Labour MP's who now were ministers (including Home Secretary J. Chuter Ede) had supported the abortive 1938 amendment. Thus during 1946 and 1947, in anticipation of the forthcoming Criminal Justice Bill, the abolitionist groups put various kinds of pressure on Labour ministers and backbenchers to see to it that the bill contained a section abolishing capital punishment for murder.

However, the bill that was presented to Parliament by Home Secretary Ede at the beginning of the 1947–48 session made no mention of capital punishment. The abolitionist agitation had failed to move Ede or the Cabinet. Nevertheless, it aroused a number of Labour backbenchers, and as a concession to this sentiment within the party, Ede promised that if an amendment for abolition were forthcoming, the Government would permit a free vote on it at the report stage. This procedure was defended as in keeping with the tradition that divisions on "matters of private conscience" would be freed of whipping. Quickly a Labour backbencher, Sydney Silverman, proposed a new clause experimentally suspending the death penalty. When the actual debate began several months later, it turned out that

[7] *Report from the Select Committee on Capital Punishment* (1931), *passim.*

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the Government, which through Ede advised the House of Commons against the abolition bill, now insisted that the free vote applied only to backbenchers and that ministers and junior ministers must vote against the Silverman clause or at least abstain from voting. Even this last-minute rediscovery of the principle of collective responsibility did not save the Government, for the mass of the Labour backbench members supported the clause, which was carried by 245 votes to 222. Except for the position of the Labour ministers, party lines were rather firmly drawn on the issue, for of the 289 Labour members who took part in the division, the margin favoring abolition was three to one, while the Conservatives and their allies voted ten to one against it.[8]

Having agreed to accept the result of a free vote, the Attlee Government now was faced with the embarrassing prospect of having to facilitate the passage of legislation to which it had expressed strong opposition. Proponents of strong executive power were quick to point out that the Cabinet had broken the rules of party government:

> What a confession of impotence it was [said Winston Churchill] that the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, who did not dare to stand for their declared convictions of what they thought was right and necessary in the present circumstances, should have cast their duty to the wind and left this grave decision on capital punishment to the casual vote of the most unrepresentative and irresponsible House of Commons that ever sat at Westminster.[9]

When the Criminal Justice Bill (including the abolition clause) went up to the House of Lords, the Government's dilemma became every bit as grave as the Opposition leader indicated. The Cabinet now found itself forced to defend a proposal repugnant to it in a chamber where its party was decidedly a minority element, for it was well known that the heavy Conservative majority in the Lords was dead against the new clause. Thus the clause was likely to be deleted, putting the Commons and Lords in conflict. Although such an impasse would at least give the Commons a chance to reconsider its earlier vote, it would place the Home Secretary in the difficult position of having to ask

8 449 *House of Commons Debates*, 979–1103 (April 14, 1948).

9 *The Times* (London), April 22, 1948.

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the House to stand by a clause which the Government once openly opposed. Yet, if the Government were to continue to press for the abolition clause and the Lords continued to oppose it, the entire Criminal Justice Bill, with its many needed reforms, stood in danger of being lost (or at the very least delayed two years, since this antedated the passage of the Parliament Act of 1949).

Momentarily the situation enhanced the power of the House of Lords, for it was clear that on this bill, unlike most of the measures that had been sent to them by the Labour-controlled House of Commons, the Lords were actually supporting the Government against a Commons' majority. While the official spokesmen for the Government were forced to urge the Lords to approve the abolition clause, the peers could rightly claim that in voting it down (by a margin of 181 to 28) they were really carrying out the original decision of the nation's executive leaders.[10]

The nettle was back in the hands of the government, which soon had to decide whether to invoke the Parliament Act and stand fully behind a clause that it originally had condemned, or accept the Criminal Justice Bill, denuded of the abolition clause, and face the wrath of most of its Parliamentary supporters, or search for a compromise that might appease the majorities of both Houses. In the deluded hope that some formula could be devised that would satisfy both its own backbenchers and the Lords, the Government, whose responsibility was now engaged by the force of events, chose the route of compromise: they devised a new clause that would retain the death penalty only for the most heinous types of murder, such as systematic poisoning, murder committed during a burglary, and murder of police or prison officials. The formula was hastily conceived and generally viewed as anomalous, but ministers argued that it would in practice reduce the number of persons hanged and was the only practicable alternative to an abandonment of all penal reform. With whips on, they pushed through the compromise clause by a large majority.[11]

Although one of the aims of the new clause was to satisfy some of the objections raised earlier by the Lords, it got a

10 The Lords debated the topic over four days: April 27, 28, June 1 and 2, 1948. See volumes 155–156 of the *House of Lords Debates.*

11 453 *H. C. Debs.* 1417–1535 (July 15, 1948).

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stony reception in the upper chamber, whose members were well aware that there was no time left in the session for the entire Criminal Justice Bill to go back and forth once again between the two Houses. Riddled by its critics and scarcely defended by its supporters, the compromise clause went down to ignominious defeat in the Lords.[12] Once again the bill was returned to the Commons, this time without either the abolition or the compromise clause in it, and the Government now had to decide whether to acquiesce in the action of the Lords or to press the death penalty question into further stages. Concerned lest the entire reform bill should fall victim to this controversy, it finally advised the Commons not to persist in its disagreement and moved that all references to the death penalty should be dropped from the bill. Sensing the impossibility of further resistance, most abolitionists agreed, and the Criminal Justice Bill was subsequently passed in the form in which it had been introduced eight months earlier.[13] "The Lords had triumphed, but they had only restored the situation which the Government had originally desired." [14]

The implications of the 1947–48 chapter of the controversy over capital punishment are fairly clear. By permitting a free vote on the original clause, the executive opened a Pandora's box of troubles that could only be closed by its discovering its own responsibility for a policy that engaged the attention of the nation. It assumed responsibility late in the course of legislative events, and only when forced to do so by the position of its backbenchers. As a result, the executive was put in the uncomfortable position of having to support first, a clause which it had opposed earlier and, second, a compromise which nobody believed in. The see-saw developments summarized above eventually led to the point where the continued recalcitrance of the House of Lords forced the Parliamentary Labour Party to accede to the original wishes of its leadership in order to save other reforms, but this point was reached only after a prolonged interlude marked by numerous ironies. If the government

12 157 *H. L. Debs.*, 1009–1074 (July 20, 1948).

13 454 *H. C. Debs.*, 707–752 (July 22, 1948).

14 P. A. Bromhead, *The House of Lords and Contemporary Politics, 1911–1957* (London, 1958), p. 219.

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had seen from the beginning the necessity of taking full responsibility for policy in this realm, many problems—both political and constitutional—would have been avoided.

II

It should not be thought that only a Labour Government is capable of getting into such a fix. Seven years later Conservative leaders were entangled in a similar, if not identical, set of dilemmas, again over the fate of capital punishment.

The outcome of the 1948 controversy did not stop the movement to abolish the death penalty. On the contrary, in the early 1950's, a series of events—some calculated, some fortuitous—came together in such a way as to result in changed attitudes among many politicians and influential members of the public. Chief among them were the Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, several highly publicized murder cases, and the activities of a new pressure group.

As an aftermath of the legislative struggle mentioned above, a Royal Commission had been appointed in 1949, not to take up the question of abolishing the death penalty, but only to consider possible means of limiting its operation. Nevertheless, its report, which appeared in 1953, by implication cast serious doubt on the merits of the punishment itself, and a year later its chairman, Sir Ernest Gowers, announced that he had been converted to the abolitionist viewpoint.[15] At the same time public concern was aroused by three sensational murder trials (those of Bentley, Evans and Christie, and Mrs. Ellis), each of which ended in a hanging and raised the suspicion either that an innocent person had suffered an irrevocable punishment or that the rigidity of the law had required a penalty that was much too severe.[16] Finally, a new, well-financed, propaganda-oriented pressure group, the National Campaign for the

[15] Cmd. 8932. Gowers' personal testament begins his book, *A Life for a Life?*, pp. 7–8.

[16] Details of the Bentley case can be found in R. T. Paget and Sydney Silverman, *Hanged—and Innocent?* (London, 1953), pp. 89–110. The celebrated Evans-Christie murders have been frequently chronicled. See, *e.g.*, Paget and Silverman, pp. 115–253; Michael Eddowes, *The Man on Your Conscience* (London, 1955); Lord Altrincham and Ian Gilmour, *The Case of Timothy Evans* (London, n.d.); Ludovic Kennedy, *Ten Rillington Place* (London, 1961); and the Scott Henderson Report of Inquiry, Cmd. 8896 (1953).

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Abolition of Capital Punishment, was formed under the leadership of the publisher Victor Gollancz and the novelist Arthur Koestler and soon began to saturate the country with its message. Public opinion pollers began to record a strong trend away from traditional mass support for capital punishment.[17]

Nothing came of several attempts to create a new majority for abolition in the 1951 Parliament, but following the 1955 General Election it was suspected that strong abolitionist sentiments existed among the newer Conservative MP's.

In the autumn of 1955, Sydney Silverman, the leader of the Labour abolitionists, invoked the rarely used Ten Minute Rule in an effort to win the approval of the Commons for a bill to suspend capital punishment. Although the measure got no further than the First Reading, the government avoided a formal vote on the issue lest it reveal the strength of Conservative backbench feeling.[18] It was presumably to assuage this abolitionist feeling that the Cabinet brought in a bill of its own, one that retained capital punishment while modifying those sections of the existing law of murder that had been most criticized. Abolitionists from both sides of the House immediately moved an amendment to suspend the operation of the death penalty for five years. Confident of continued support for hanging, the Government agreed to a free vote on the amendment and promised to abide by its result. To its great surprise, the leadership saw forty-eight of its backbenchers troop into the abolitionist lobby, and the amendment was carried, 293–262.[19]

Two courses were open to the Government. It could follow the expressed sentiment of the Commons by bringing in its own bill embodying the principle of abolition and giving it the full weight of its authority through all stages in both Houses, or it could refuse to sponsor legislation de-

17 For example, polls conducted on a stratified sample by Mass-Observation in April 1948 and February 1956 showed that the percentage of support for capital punishment declined from 69% to 45% and approval of a trial suspension of capital punishment increased from 13% to 69%. Mass-Observation, *Capital Punishment: A Survey* (1948); *A Report on Capital Punishment* (1956).

18 546 *H. C. Debs.* 207–210 (November 15, 1955), 785–786 (November 17, 1955).

19 548 *H. C. Debs.*, 2544–2664 (February 16, 1956).

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signed to implement a policy it considered abhorrent but instead give facilities to the almost-forgotten Silverman abolition bill that was now at the foot of the Private Members' Bill queue. To choose the second option would give the House a chance to carry an abolition bill forward, but at the same time it would deprive the measure of the usual whipping machinery and, if it passed the Commons at all, leave it defenseless in the Lords. After some soul-searching, the Government finally chose the latter course, exhumed the Silverman bill, gave it Government time, and promised a free vote on all its stages. Aided by informal bipartisan whipping and the fortitude of the Tory abolitionists, the Silverman bill successfully passed through the House of Commons in June, 1956. Thus the verdict of a Conservative-dominated House of Commons turned out to be the same as that of its Labour predecessor eight years before.

The Lords replayed their role, too, by quickly rejecting the abolition bill, although the result (238–95) showed that the abolitionist forces had more than trebled since 1948.[20]

Once again the Eden Government was faced with two feasible alternatives. It could invoke the Parliament Act and give Silverman facilities to reintroduce his bill for another free vote, or it could bring in its own legislation, retaining hanging but amending the law of murder. The first course would carry out fully the Cabinet's original promise, and it would placate abolitionist misgivings over the Government's earlier behavior in the controversy. The second course, on the other hand, would please moderate reformers but expose the Government to criticism from the Opposition, from some of its own supporters, and from the country. It would also put the small band of Conservative abolitionists in the embarrassing position of having to choose between conscience and party loyalty.

It was about this time that Cabinet members awoke to the serious implications of the capital punishment controversy for their roles as executive and party leaders. The situation had gone so far that it had become essentially a question of who was to make policy in this area—the majority party or a coalition of backbenchers. Once the nation's political leaders came to see the problem in this light, they

[20] 198 *H. L. Debs.*, 563–842 (July 9–10, 1956).

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soon decided to bring in their own bill and give it top priority, and easily discovered ways to carry along the abolitionists on their side. During the summer recess of the 1955–56 session, Home Secretary Gwilym Lloyd George and Chief Whip Edward Heath worked out a strategy that would preserve the Government's general policy on capital punishment while taking into account the views and sensitivities of nearly fifty Conservative backbenchers who had remained loyal to the Silverman bill earlier in the session. First, legislation would be framed not only to make reforms in the law of murder, but also to make some change in the conditions under which the death sentence was to be levied. Secondly, steps would be taken to sell this compromise to the dissident band of Government supporters before they made trouble within the party.

Actually the two parts of the strategy were carried out simultaneously. By midsummer the government had produced a draft bill to change the existing law along the lines recommended by groups such as the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (abolishing, for instance, the ancient doctrine of "constructive malice" and bringing into English law the Scottish doctrine of "diminished responsibility," applicable to people suffering from an abnormality of mind that falls short of insanity), and to establish a formal distinction between "capital murders," which would be subject to hanging, and other kinds of murder, for which the death penalty would no longer be kept. At the same time, the Tory abolitionists were called in by the Chief Whip, shown the prospective bill, and told that to continue their opposition would be to put themselves at odds with the official policy of their party.[21] Combined with these high-level pressures were the pressures to conform put on the small group by their constituency parties and by the Conservative Party's annual conference at Llandudno.[22] They were treated to the carrot and the stick, being shown a Government bill

21 The writer's interviews with the Chief Whip and with several of the Conservative abolitionists in 1958.

22 *Programme of Proceedings*, The National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, Seventy-Sixth Annual Conference (1956), pp. 81–85. See also the report in *The Times* for October 13, 1956. The conflict between one Tory abolitionist and his constituency association on this question is described in Nigel Nicolson, *People and Parliament* (London, 1958), Chapter 4.

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that went quite far in the direction of abolition and liberal reform and, at the same time, they were subjected to pressures ranging from appeals to party loyalty to veiled threats concerning their political futures. Coming at a time when the Suez problem menaced the internal unity of the Conservative Party and when the prolonged dispute over capital punishment showed signs of boring members of all parties, the Government bill held considerable appeal for Tory abolitionists, most of whom were more moderate and pragmatic in their attitude than their Labour counterparts. By the time the Government officially announced its Homicide Bill in November, 1956, a clear majority of the dissidents had accepted the bill.

The rest was anticlimax. The effect of the foregoing decisions was to put the policy engine back on the track where Englishmen normally expect to find it. Having been pushed by the movement of events into the position of introducing its own bill, the Government assumed its natural position as the initiator and guide of legislative action. The abolitionists' faint hopes that something would still come of the Silverman bill—pinned on the possibilities that either the Tory dissidents would stand firm against their party's leadership or that they could launch a successful Private Member's Bill —were quickly dashed. Even if the government had not chosen to impose whips at all stages of its Homicide Bill, it is unlikely that the Tory abolitionists would have repeated their earlier performance, given the persuasiveness of the pressures put upon them over the summer recess. Their nearly unanimous return to the party fold left the abolitionists only the difficult route of the Private Member's Bill. Here the reformers suffered another blow when in the balloting for parliamentary time that took place at the beginning of the 1956–57 session, Labour members drew only the eighth, eighteenth, and nineteenth places. Normally, only members who draw the first six places can be assured of having their measures debated. As it turned out, the winner of eighth place did attempt to use her time to reintroduce the Silverman measure, but the chance to do so did not come until two and one half months after the Government's Homicide Bill had had its second reading. Even then the Conservatives filibustered the Silverman bill to death by using up the entire

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Private Members' day on a minor bill of their own.[23]

The effect of these actions was to clear the way for the smooth passage of the Homicide Bill.[24] Supported by a cohesive parliamentary party, the Eden (later, the Macmillan) Government beat off all Opposition amendments in the Commons, and this time the Lords—including those who previously had denounced as foolish and unworkable all attempts to establish categories of murder—quickly acceded. On March 21, 1957, the first major piece of legislation in ninety years dealing with capital punishment received the Royal Assent. It was a law that would have found little support anywhere two years earlier, and the way in which it came into being raised the suspicion that the law was less the finest flowering of enlightened criminology than the product of a search for political consensus. But of such stuff is public policy often fashioned in a democracy.

III

The preceding sections have given a review of the political events leading up to the passage of the Homicide Act. By this time it should be apparent that the capital punishment controversy raised a number of important questions about public policy and the doctrine of party government. This concluding section is concerned with the implications of these questions.

The first question involves the nature of public policy in the British system. To the casual student, the responsibilities of a Government in the areas of criminal law and penal policy seem remarkably clear. The Government is charged with the task of maintaining public order and security. It enforces the law and in most cases initiates basic changes in the character of the law. It includes a Cabinet-level ministry, the Home Office, which has vast powers over and responsibility for law enforcement and penal administration. At first blush there seem to be powerful reasons why all decisions affecting crime and punishment belong in the ambit of public

23 563 *H. C. Debs.*, 1323–1414 (February 1, 1957).

24 The Homicide Bill received an unopposed Second Reading on November 15, 1956, 560 *H. C. Debs.*, 1146–1261, and passed unscathed through its committee stages in January and February, 1957. For a critique of the bill's provisions, see J. E. Hall Williams, "The Homicide Bill," *Howard Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1957), pp. 285–299.

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policy and hence should emerge from the normal process by which such policy is created.

Why, then, did the governments examined in the foregoing account act as if they were exempted from this requirement? Why did they begin by treating the death penalty question as a special case? There are basically three explanations for this behavior, two of them openly avowed, the third quietly admitted by official spokesmen. The first explanation is that because of the high moral and emotional content of the dispute, government leaders often viewed it as a matter of private conscience and treated it as an instance of that limited category of issues which, peripheral to the main business of government (and to the class differences that separate the parties), can be freed from the ordinary claims of party cohesion and discipline. The second explanation must be seen in conjunction with the first. Abolitionists of the past had usually had to employ the path of the private member's bill to press legislation, and by continuous use of this backbencher's device had managed to build up a tradition that when questions involving capital punishment arose they were to be given special facilities, such as the free vote, which did not affect the parliamentary position of the sitting government. Finally, since party leaders have been prone to view this subject as too hot to handle and too unpredictable in its political effects, they have tended not to make commitments on it in programs and manifestoes, so that the party in power is free of any obligations to press the issue.

Such an attempt to treat an issue that was bound up with the total policies of government as if it were no more than a parochial interest of a minor fringe of MP's was bound to fail. If the substance of the policy were not sufficient in itself to engage the responsibility of the political executive, the extent of public reaction to every proposal to change the law of murder and the manner in which the question effectively divided the parties was almost certain to do so sooner or later. While the Governments tried to dodge responsibility by permitting the issue to be raised by backbenchers and by refusing to impose whips when it first came before the House of Commons, they were never able to contract out of the consequences of their ambivalent views and invariably were embarrassed into introducing official legislation and supporting it with whips. Before this occurred, however, the British na-

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tion was treated to scenes of parliamentary and political confusion scarcely equaled in recent times. It is difficult not to conclude that the source of the trouble was the inability of the leaders in question to realize that the British system of party government requires that responsibility on *all* major policy matters lies with them and cannot be left solely to Parliament as a congeries of private consciences. However high-minded were the motives for choosing the latter course, and however comfortable for the governing party might have been the outcome of such a decision, it made little sense in terms of the principles by which government is carried on in Britain today.

This very reluctance of governments to assume their customary role in the dispute provided the abolitionists with special opportunities. Unable ever to persuade the executive to introduce legislation of its own abolishing the death penalty, the organized abolitionists nevertheless were able to invoke the weapons of the backbenchers to keep the issue before Parliament. Their difficulties arose from the very weakness of these weapons—the Private Member's Bill, the Private Member's amendments and motions, the Ten Minute Rule—as compared with the powers that governments could rely upon on those occasions when they chose to view the matter as properly within their responsibilities.[25] The abolitionists were able to achieve what they did partly because governments were willing to allow some of their followers (in particular Labour ministers in 1948 and Conservative backbenchers in 1956) to abstain in the divisions or vote with the Opposition, and partly because the governments felt themselves bound—up to a point—to accede to the results of free votes in the Commons. When the governments saw that the product of these displays of tolerance and generosity (or was it irresponsibility?) was bound to be the imposition of policies of which they strongly disapproved, they backtracked, brought forth compromise bills and imposed whips. In one case the solution ran afoul of the House of Lords; in the other it succeeded with the blessing of an upper chamber politically responsive to the wishes of the party in power.

25 The comparative weakness of private members' procedures is described in P. A. Bromhead, *Private Members' Bills in the British Parliament* (London, 1956), pp. 26–42.

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The point is simply that in order to achieve their goal the abolitionists needed the positive backing of the leaders of the political party in power. This they never got, and in its place they had to depend upon a series of "outsider" procedures and bipartisan coalitions—frail reeds indeed to support their case. Even with an impressive string of victories to their credit in the 1955–56 session, for example, the abolitionists could achieve at best only compromise on a higher level than in the past, once the sleeping giant of executive power was roused to face its dilemma. Time and again abolitionist leaders emphasized the (to them) essentially nonpartisan character of the controversy in a desperate attempt to patch together a coalition strong enough to overcome the executive's support of the death penalty or to persuade it to bring in its own bill. But whenever a government realized that what was at stake was really an element of public policy for which the system required that it take responsibility, it was able to put a quick end to the bipartisan interlude, and the normal pattern of party government returned. Under these circumstances it was almost foreordained that the abolitionists could win little more than an unsatisfactory palliative.

We return to the main theme. Despite the several exceptions to the normal legislative cycle and the deviant partisan behavior that characterized this particular case, the short-term resolution of the capital punishment controversy required on each occasion a reassertion of Cabinet supremacy. The formal and informal institutions of the British political system have been developed to a point of so much coherence and tightness that it is only very localized or insignificant matters that remain unaffected by them. I am not arguing that these institutions are monolithic and incapable of further evolution; clearly this is not the case, as any history of recent British policy would reveal. I have attempted to show, instead, that whenever a subject for government activity is regarded by large numbers of people as part of the realm which we denote public policy, sooner or later it must engage that set of processes, relationships, and expectations we have come to know as British party government. Even cases that in their initial stages deviate widely from standard procedures are likely to require for their resolution the rediscovery of the familiar pattern of power.

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A quarter-century ago Harold Laski wrote: "In general, if a matter is important enough to be embodied in a bill, it is desirable that the responsibility for its passage should rest with the government." [26] There is considerable evidence that Laski's words need strengthening today. Under the present system of party government in Britain, it is not only *desirable* that the leadership of the dominant party assume responsibility for important matters that come before Parliament: it is *imperative* that it do so, because sooner or later it *must* bear responsibility for those actions which are normally associated with state activity.

An American psychologist has hypothesized in another context that "The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance." [27] The recent British experience with the capital punishment controversy serves to confirm the view that one of the prime functions of party government is to achieve consonance in the area of public policy.

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[26] *Parliamentary Government in England* (New York, 1938), p. 135.

[27] Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston, 1957), p. 3.

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REVOLUTION: A REDEFINITION

I

HISTORIANS traditionally insist that they must carry out their work without benefit of presuppositions. In spite of the shadows which Marx, Freud and Mannheim (not to speak of such American historians as Beard and Becker) have cast over "objectivity," the dominant Rankean tradition still requires the historian to enter into his subject with unsullied, if not blank, mind until such time as he is permitted to re-emerge, pure as Botticelli's Venus, clutching history "as it really happened" to his bosom. If this burlesque is unfair, it is not groundless. Although some historians are quietly making good use of concepts borrowed from the social sciences, a majority continue to frown on any schematic approach to history as fraught with prejudice and dogma.

The limitations of the traditional methodology become obvious in the study of political revolution. Aside from assessing the impact of revolution, the historian is surely concerned with a rational understanding of the dynamics of a revolution. Merely "reliving" the chaos "as it really was" is unlikely to provide such an understanding. Actually, though the advocates of Rankean detachment also want to draw conclusions and discover patterns, they feel that they can do this without bringing to their study any conceptual apparatus at all—merely a healthy curiosity and the canons by which they were trained. I believe that they are deceiving themselves. The real alternative lies between a conceptual framework which is never made explicit and therefore remains beyond the reach of criticism, and one which is open to critical inspection.

The aim of this article is to suggest a framework for studying the course of a revolutionary movement, irrespective of its ideological content or specific historical significance. This analytical framework hinges on a redefinition of the term "revolution." This is not to claim some superiority inherent in my particular definition. There is no "true" definition of an abstraction: such a term is a semantic device which may or may not be useful, not a reflection of some absolute

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Platonic prototype. A term that during the seventeenth century referred to the revolving Wheel of Fortune casting down one prince and raising up another has since been broadened to the point of hopeless imprecision. If I suggest a narrowing of the definition of revolution, it is in order to provide a useful analytical tool for the study of revolutionary politics in the west since the seventeenth century. This definition will in turn permit a schematic approach, helping the historian to distinguish the politically crucial from the insignificant, without attempting to impose the pattern, timing and ideology of one revolution on what may well be the unique pattern of another.

II

Some preliminaries must first be considered. What is the modern state? On what base does its stability rest? The sovereign state, as I define it here, is a political organization exercising, or able to exercise, a monopoly of armed force, justice and administration over a given area and population. It is true that this state monopoly is merely a tendency which may never be completely fulfilled and which does not preclude the delegation of military, judicial and administrative functions to subordinate bodies, provided the latter recognize their subordination and act accordingly. The national government of a federal state such as the United States or Switzerland may be circumscribed in its inner dynamic by a constitutional separation of powers; yet this constitutes at most a difference in degree rather than in kind from centralized states. While this expansive tendency, this inner dynamic of the state, undoubtedly varies, the variations seem to have little to do with the ideological coloring of the government. I am aware that where the influence of Rousseau or Hegel has prevailed, the definition of the state as a moral or metaphysical being has been widely accepted. The rationale of my definition is not metaphysical: it is rather, in its way, empirical. Most political historians appear in practice to accept a postulate of the state in terms of power, a postulate which I am here stating explicitly.

In addition to this definition of the state as an incipient power monopoly, I wish to submit a further working hypothesis which seems verified by experience. I maintain that

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the power monopoly of the state depends largely, not on the consent of the governed, but on their habit of obedience, whatever its motive. It is the habit of obedience that, extended to institutions like the army and the bureaucracy, makes it possible for the state to delegate vital functions without jeopardizing its own effective monopoly of military, judicial and administrative power.

To summarize: the ensuing argument will rest on a definition of the state as a monopoly of power and on the crucial importance of the habit of obedience in assuring the stability of the state. We find, therefore, that the political historian's usual assumption of an identity of politics and government makes sense just so long as such a government enjoys a power monopoly resting in turn on an undisturbed habit of obedience. From the point of view of historical method, revolution may be said to be a breakdown, momentary or prolonged, of the state's monopoly of power, usually accompanied by a lessening of the habit of obedience. The sequence of this breakdown varies: in the Russian March Revolution the withdrawal of obedience preceded the appearance of any organized blocs that challenged the power of the state and led to the creation of such para-governments. By contrast, however sullen the popular attitude toward the Batista administration may have been, most Cubans transferred their habit of obedience to the Castro regime only after its seizure of power.

In a *coup d'état* or in a revolution not directly involving large sections of the population, the transfer of the habit of obedience from the old to the new government may be virtually automatic. If this is the case, the traditional methods of the political historian are adequate. From this specific point of view, once the transfer of power is effected the revolution is over—even though drastic social changes may yet follow the consolidation of the new regime. Once again the case of the Cuban revolution may be cited. As long as Batista's power was effectively unchallenged, Cuban politics could be studied in terms of his administration. As soon as Castro established himself as a para-governmental power in Oriente province, Cuban politics became, by my definition, revolutionary—that is, the historian was faced with more than one power center. Until Castro had succeeded Batista, only

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the study of *both* power centers, in their internal development as well as in their interaction, could reveal the history of Cuban politics. Once Castro's government had gained the monopoly of power formerly enjoyed by the Batista administration, Cuban politics ceased to be revolutionary, that is, they could once again be adequately documented in terms of the activities of the central government.

III

What emerges from this discussion is a new definition of revolution which serves a clearer function for the historian than the "common sense" one, being more precise, comprehensive and relatively independent of ideological value judgments. As I define it, revolution prevails when the state's monopoly of power is effectively challenged and persists until a monopoly of power is re-established. Such a definition avoids a number of traditional problems: the fine distinction between a *coup d'état* and a revolution; the degree of social change necessary before a movement may be called revolutionary; the possibility of a conservative revolution; the uncertain differentiation between wars of independence, civil wars and revolutions. By this definition the Algerian crisis is clearly revolutionary, since the French monopoly of armed force, justice and administration has been breached.

The definition also recognizes what might be called a suspended revolution: the prolonged co-existence of two or more antagonistic governmental power centers which are unable or unwilling to eliminate each other. This situation has, for instance, prevailed in Argentina since the ouster of the Perón dictatorship: the army has exercised a veto power over the Frondizi regime without displacing it. The relationship between government and army in the Weimar Republic of the late 1920's might also be cited as such an example of suspended revolution. This is not to assert that this definition of revolution makes it automatically possible to pinpoint a revolutionary situation. It would, for instance, be difficult at the present time to determine whether the French army has regained its habit of obedience to the state or whether it continues to exercise para-governmental powers, thus creating a revolutionary situation. In this respect the

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task of the historian with access to all available sources is considerably lighter than that of the student of contemporary politics hemmed in by a curtain of secrecy.

As we have already seen, in a revolutionary change carried out with little popular participation, the population may shift its habit of obedience without much disruption. If an established government is overthrown by a massive popular uprising, the chances of a revolutionary situation prevailing long after the actual overthrow of the established government are much greater. If a broadly based insurrection succeeds in capturing power, the prior involvement of a substantial segment of the people is likely to extend the time span of revolution, that is, the length of time during which state power is dispersed among several centers. The very act of insurrection is the most drastic break possible in the habit of obedience; hence the greater the number of combatants and active sympathizers engaged in insurrection, the greater the number of people who have decisively cast off their habit of obedience. The new government, which may crown the successful efforts of the insurgents, may well command their immediate loyalty, yet the fact that this government is their own personal creation deprives it of the *mystique* of impersonal power in which an established government is clothed. Obedience based on loyalty independent of habit or fear is, as Machiavelli saw, an insecure basis of state power. Loyalty freely given may be freely withdrawn. It may be argued that the messianic expectations aroused by most revolutions are likely to lead some disappointed supporters to challenge sooner or later the government which they had helped to establish. At the very least the insurrectionists who remain outside the new "establishment" are likely to keep in abeyance some of their power in order to make their influence felt should the new government betray their ideals. In this sense the rising of the Kronstadt sailors against the Bolshevik regime is no historical accident; the bitterness of the insurgents was directed not against government in general, but against a government of their own creation which had, they felt, betrayed their aspirations.

Mass insurrection shatters the habit of obedience on a large scale and therefore tends to perpetuate revolution even after it is "officially" over. The rebel military build-up that

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made seizure of power possible also has the paradoxical effect of prolonging the revolutionary conditions after rebel victory. Lenin was quite right, though for the wrong reasons, in asserting that "the revolution" (as defined in Marxist terms) cannot take over the pre-revolutionary state as a going concern but can only destroy it to make room for its own. The new insurrectionary state cannot simply inherit what it has destroyed. While it inherits the still functioning parts of the administration—the judiciary, the armed forces—it must also bring under control its own armed adherents, a task made more difficult by the wide dispersion of weapons which a successful mass insurrection may require. Other things remaining equal, the larger the number of armed supporters the greater the likelihood of future armed opponents.

The number of insurgents is not by itself the sole criterion of the magnitude of the task confronting the successful insurrectionary government. Much depends on the state of organization or organizability of the insurgents and the degree of control exercised by an insurrectional leadership. If, as was true during the March Revolution in St. Petersburg, certain military units defected to the rebellious rioters, this was no assurance of automatic future support. The Parisian National Guard legions, which in February, 1848, refused to disperse the barricade builders, did not surrender their future freedom of action or blindly pledge themselves thereby to a successful insurrectionary government. Very clearly this collective withdrawal of the habit of obedience from an established government, while it may prove decisive in bringing victory to the insurrection, may also pose an explicit threat to the future authority of the new government.

Autonomous support is dangerous support, for the future of an insurrectionary government depends heavily on the disciplined unity of the rebels prior to their success and on the extent to which they have been conditioned to accept the decisions of a recognized leadership. It is possible that in the mid-twentieth century, the totalitarian party has succeeded in solving the dilemma of power seizure by controlling the revolutionary impetus from its very inception. The technique has involved not merely the creation of a highly centralized elite party but of a full-fledged state within a state in the very process of carrying on insurrection against

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the established regime. The examples of the Chinese Communists and the Viet Minh in Indochina come to mind—westernizing movements in an Oriental setting—though in both cases the accidents of prolonged conflict rather than deliberate policy may account for the blossoming of a full-fledged insurrectionary state with its own military, judicial and administrative powers long before final victory. In such a case the insurrection replaces the political power of the recognized state by its own within the area which it controls, thus conditioning a new habit of obedience both among its supporters and among the mass of the indifferent. the cautious and the hostile.

It may be objected that the foregoing discussion is no more than an elaborate semantic game, which, after conjuring up an artificial definition of political revolution, tests its suitability in a variety of historical settings. This new definition is not meant as a quixotic attempt to change common usage, even the common usage of historians. Just as professional economists will casually speak of capital and labor in connection with an industrial dispute, yet employ the term "capital" in a technical and much more specific meaning as well, historians may still use "revolution" in its undefinable sense, yet recognize the usefulness of a narrow and technical meaning of the word. The utility is two-fold: (1) revolution defined in terms of a dispersion of political power can be ascertained fairly readily and with reasonable objectivity; (2) once the historian has defined a situation as revolutionary, he is forewarned that he may have to shift his attention from the study of one power monopoly, the sovereign state, to two or more competing power blocs. This admonition will not, however, be very meaningful unless he has also defined a power bloc and has some idea where to look for one.

IV

By a power bloc I refer to a group, too strong to be suppressed by ordinary police action, which has usurped military, administrative or judicial power traditionally held by the state. Such a group, defined in terms of its dynamics rather than its organization, may be a highly cohesive para-military formation such as the Nazi S. A. after 1930, an inspired improvisation like the workers' councils in the Russian Revolu-

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tion of 1905 or a completely spontaneous *jacquerie*. It may be a cluster of state governments emerging as a Confederacy against a Federal Government; it may be a bureaucracy systematically sabotaging the policies of its government or a national army that has escaped civilian tutelage. Since the power traditionally held by the central government varies according to country and period, what may be a revolutionary power bloc in one instance may not be recognized as such in another. While in the context of French centralization the Paris Commune of 1871 constituted a revolutionary power bloc, similar actions on the part of a Netherlands province of the seventeenth century would have been viewed as part and parcel of the established order.

Although this definition does not eliminate all ambiguities, the historian is able to identify readily the main power blocs where power has been dispersed by insurrection. Such a situation is most likely to occur, as our earlier discussion brought out, where the violent seizure of power has been accomplished by a loosely organized mass movement. Since insurrection substitutes armed force for the gentler art of political compromise, the major power blocs emerging before or after a successful uprising are likely also to rely on force or the threat of force. The exercise of military force by a substantial group unresponsive to state influence is the most obvious hallmark of a revolutionary power bloc. To identify such blocs, the historian may well begin with the traditional agencies of governmental power—army, national guard, police, administration, judiciary—to determine whether any of these agencies have departed from their customary role of executors of state policy and become autonomous power centers. He must also survey new or revived organizations which have emerged from the insurrectional turmoil—political clubs, labor organizations, armed leagues—to assess the power at their disposal and the authority by which they exercise it.

Once several power blocs have been identified, the historian can construct a meaningful framework for studying revolutionary politics, whatever their ideological content. He should trace the internal structure and policies of each of these blocs as well as their interaction. Although among these the insurrectionary state is only one of several power centers,

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we may expect the state, regardless of ideology, to bend every effort toward reimposing obedience on its para-governmental competitors. In short, if an insurrection has been successful in toppling an established government, yet is unable to assume the traditional monopoly of power peculiar to the state, the very dynamic of the state *qua* state will prolong the contest. While stability under such circumstances is unlikely, the direction of change is by no means determined. What the historian will witness may be either the reconquest of power by the state, or the displacement of the state by one of the competing power blocs, or the disintegration of the country into smaller political units or into political chaos. The instability of revolution in the common sense meaning of the word and the tendency of most insurrectional governments to rely heavily on force even after they have come to power may thus be explained without recourse to some special revolutionary mentality or the implicit dialectics of a particular ideology. In the face of barriers to its power erected by Left or Right, the insurrectional state, regardless of program or ideology, will seek to surmount them by force if necessary.

V

The test of such a conceptual framework should be pragmatic: does it work? Does the use of such a device facilitate the historian's grasp of the politics of upheaval, or is this no more than a spelling out of what the historian does with or without conscious methodology? In the case of a revolution which has engaged the undivided attention of an army of historians over many decades, it may well be that such an approach may not provide any startling new insights. Even in the case of the French Revolution, however, it should be noted that not until very recent years has one of the decisive power blocs, the Parisian *sans-culottes,* been seriously examined despite a wealth of surviving documentary evidence. The type of attack which I have suggested would not have relegated such analysis to the haphazard inducements of Marxist piety. Where revolutions have been studied less exhaustively, an analysis in terms of power blocs may be more fruitful, if only in uncovering significant gaps in our knowledge.

By way of illustration, I would like to sketch the politics

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of the Parisian revolution of February to June 1848, in terms of the internal development and interplay of power blocs. If I confine myself to narrowly political considerations, this does not imply a disregard of economic, social, cultural and ideological influences. In any full-length study these would deserve attention, yet since they can readily be fitted into a framework of power blocs, I shall concentrate on the methodology of revolutionary *politics*. For the sake of greater clarity, I shall also omit events in the French provinces, some of which had considerable impact on the course of the revolution of 1848.

By March 1, 1848, the revolution was over; the revolution had begun. The position of the Provisional Government reflected this paradox: a product of insurrection, the government had entrenched itself without as yet succeeding to the traditional power enjoyed by any nineteenth century French government. Although there was no organized opposition to the Republic in the provinces, the new authorities did not yet govern the country. Holdover appointees, or, occasionally, locally improvised revolutionary commissions, were in charge of the departments, while the localities remained virtually untouched. In Paris the government had occupied and now administered the various traditional ministries, except for the post office, a little empire independently conquered by Etienne Arago. The routine of judicial administration was yet to be upset by the replacement of state procurators and minor modifications in the legislation of the preceding regime. While the government also controlled the mayoralty of Paris with its twelve subdivisions, it lacked armed force and effective police power within the capital. The large garrison of Paris which, together with the hated municipal guard, had unsuccessfully defended the monarchy, had been expelled from Paris under pressure from the revolutionary rank and file. The dissolution of the surviving municipal guards had left the insurrectionary government completely bereft of any professional and reliable force at its disposal. By February 27, it had struck out in two directions toward the re-creation of an effective military force. On that day there appeared both the decree organizing the *garde nationale mobile* (in practice the military enrollment of young unemployed workers), and the National Work-

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shops, also envisaged from the beginning along para-military lines.

The anomalous position of the Provisional Government is underlined by its relationship with the Paris police under Caussidière. Marc Caussidière, long an activist in republican secret societies, had literally conquered the police prefecture for himself and his friends in the course of the February insurrection. His official appointment by the Provisional Government was merely the confirmation of a *fait accompli,* negotiated between two sovereign powers. If Caussidière proved a surprisingly competent police administrator in safeguarding life and property in the capital, this did not alter the fact that his two thousand Montagnards, recruited from among militant republicans, answered to him only. Politically Caussidière pursued a policy sufficiently cautious and tortuous to baffle both contemporaries and later historians. Whatever its merits, however, this policy was his own, thus depriving the government of any automatic police support in the face of political opposition. Throughout the revolutionary period, the prefecture of police played the role of an essentially negative power bloc, withholding obedience yet without clear aims of its own.

At the beginning of March, the position of the Paris National Guard was as ambiguous as that of the police and is even less known. Under the July Monarchy, the Paris National Guard had been confined to some forty thousand taxpayers willing and able to purchase their own uniforms and equipment. During the February Days, the Guard's refusal to die for Louis Philippe had proved decisive in determining the outcome of the insurrection. If, however, there were instances of individual guards and even whole units siding with the insurgents, such active support was far from unanimous. Few, if any, guards had consciously fought for a republic and their adherence to this republic was at best qualified. While they might endorse *la république sage,* guarantor of property and order, such an endorsement was a long way from habitual obedience to a government simply because it was the government. Despite a certain *esprit de corps,* the individual legions of the guard, organized according to district, largely reflected the varying political complexion of the capital. At the beginning of March, we can only

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conclude, on the basis of our very scanty knowledge, that the National Guard's attitude toward the government was uncertain.

Both the Paris police looming on the Left and the Paris National Guard threatening on the Right constituted power blocs subordinated in ordinary times to the national government, now cut loose through insurrection. The emergence of the *corporations ouvrières,* the organized crafts, was a different kind of phenomenon since labor organizations had never led a more than vaguely recognized underground existence. Their emergence as a major power center, able to sway policy through street demonstrations by armed workers, followed almost immediately the installation of the Provisional Government, long before the establishment of the Luxembourg Labor Commission furnished the organized workers a centralized organization and a recognized leadership. Much of the early social legislation, including the admission by the Provisional Government of the "right to work" itself, were concessions exacted by craft street demonstrations.

Still another power bloc was as yet inchoate—the club movement. While Blanqui's *Société républicaine centrale* had met as early as February 25, the centralizing trend which was to see numerous political clubs agree on a common policy did not set in until the second week of March. By March 1, a number of political clubs, most of them of leftward orientation, had been founded or were in the process of organization.

VI

In March 1848, the power blocs began to move. The prerevolutionary National Guard balked at its dilution in a mass of newcomers as the number of Paris guards increased almost five-fold to nearly two hundred thousand. The discontent led to a mass demonstration on March 16, ostensibly directed against the dissolution of certain élite companies but possibly aiming for more ambitious political objectives. In the face of government firmness, the demonstrators backed down and ceased to play an independent role as a conservative threat to the government.

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The role of the organized crafts and of the gathering club movement was considerably more militant. Throughout March, these two blocs acted in concert even if they did not merge. They pursued a policy which sought to give the working class a substantial representation in the political life of the nation as well as a generally leftward social orientation distasteful to the moderates of the Provisional Government. To implement this policy, two parallel and perhaps incompatible methods were followed: direct pressure by mass demonstration and electoral organization and propaganda. The link between the two showed through the demands voiced by the monster demonstration of March 17 (which, by pure coincidence, appeared as a radical response to the conservative pressure of the previous day). The demonstrators of March 17 called above all else for a major postponement in the date of elections, which would give them sufficient time for proselytizing. It is also notable that on this occasion the Provisional Government resisted the popular pressure through its spokesman, Louis Blanc, whose ideological sympathies were with the working class demonstrators; the government's compulsion to govern was stronger than the ideological inclinations of its members. After the partial failure of March 17, both clubs and organized crafts continued to cooperate in their electoral agitation. The Club of Clubs represented essentially a political holding company embracing most of the socially oriented clubs and the Electoral Committee of the Workers of Seine organized by the *corporations ouvrières*.

By the end of March, therefore, the relative position of these power blocs had somewhat altered. The Provisional Government had succeeded in extending its rule in fact as well as in theory over all of France; its special commissioners had begun the type of purge which had recurrently thinned French administrative personnel since Napoleon's departure to Elba. The government's acceptance in the provinces, as well as its survival in Paris in the face of stormy, half-threatening demonstrations, had lent the Provisional Government a spurious air of legitimacy which belied its insurrectional origin. Its power position was improving: while the police remained firmly in Caussidière's hands, the government had begun the surreptitious reintroduction of regular

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troops into the capital. The *garde nationale mobile,* though lacking in both uniforms and discipline, was a potential military support, while the absence of the unemployed from the demonstration of March 17 testified to the effectiveness of the National Workshops as a government instrument. The police under Caussidière, on the other hand, continued its policy of political non-intervention.

By May 1, the position of the Provisional Government had improved dramatically, although its success was much less inevitable than it appeared in retrospect. Substantial units of the army had been re-introduced into the capital and if the police prefecture still played an independent role, such independence could no longer be decisive. More important, the government had survived another crisis, not as on March 17 by sheer bluff, but by successfully calling on armed support. The motives of the demonstration of April 16 remain obscure though we know that it was almost solely confined to elements of the organized crafts without much support from the clubs, which were preoccupied with political campaigning. In any case, the demonstrators, while protesting their loyalty, also sought to commit the government to a social policy more favorable to the workers. Against this pressure the government, in the person of Ledru-Rollin, called out the Paris National Guard in a general alarm. As on March 17, the Minister of the Interior's action testifies to the solidarity of the government *qua* government in the face of pressure, since Ledru-Rollin was loud in proclaiming his social sympathies on other occasions. The government's appeal hinged on the dependability of the enlarged citizens' militia. Early in April, elections for officers had placed convinced republicans in some of the higher ranks, yet a number of these high-ranking guard officers sought collaboration with the Electoral Committee of the Workers of Seine which was to be in the thick of the April 16 demonstration. The demonstration was a disaster. The organized workers found themselves hemmed in by rows of booing national guards. Within a few days the government's reconquest of power appeared virtually complete: a festival of reconciliation served also to introduce regular army units into Paris, and the general elections legitimized moderate republicanism. Discounting minor symptoms of disaffection in the *garde*

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nationale mobile and the National Workshops and the continued inscrutable neutrality of the prefecture of police, the government's monopoly of power seemed assured.

April had seen the elimination of the *corporations ouvrières* as a power bloc and the apparent taming of the club movement. The month of May witnessed a revival of club militancy and the government's gradual awareness that in the National Workshops it had bred a Frankenstein monster which was becoming harder and harder to control. The clubs' new line was to revive in rather unpromising circumstances the direct democracy of the Great Revolution by insuring progressive legislation through direct pressure on the National Assembly. The dissolution of the Assembly on May 15 by a club-led crowd of demonstrators was the unintended culmination of retaining influence by popular pressure.

The result was disastrous: with few exceptions, the top leadership of the major clubs was arrested, some of the clubs were dissolved and those that survived were subjected to semi-official harassment. While a number of the clubs had revived by the end of May and once again made common front, their leadership ceased flirting with violence and throughout June sought to restrain its restive followers. April 16 had jolted the organized crafts into non-revolutionary channels; May 15 finished the clubs as a power bloc. The crisis had also served to end the sovereignty of the prefecture of police: this time Caussidière's studied neutrality led to his removal from office and to the disbanding of his private army. While the events of May 15 had confirmed the adherence of the National Guard—or at least of those who responded to the drum-call of the *rappel*—they had pointed up the rising disaffection in the National Workshops, an estimated 14,000 of whose members had participated in the day's demonstration. During the month following May 15, the problem of how to neutralize the National Workshops became the chief preoccupation of the government. Its policy moved simultaneously toward the short-term objective of regaining administrative control over the workshops and toward the "final solution" of liquidating them altogether.

In March the government had weathered challenges from the unreformed National Guard on the Right and the alliance of organized crafts and clubs on the Left. In April it

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had defeated the crafts; in May the clubs had been broken by the National Guard. The crushing of the June insurrection by the government forces, re-establishing decisively the government's monopoly of power, marked the end of the revolution. This uprising has usually been interpreted as a class struggle—in Tocqueville's phrase, a servile war. This interpretation may shed light on the motives of the participants and their social origin, yet it does nothing to explain *how* such class antagonism could crystallize into major organized rebellion.

The June insurrection became possible, not simply because of widespread popular discontent, but because such discontent could find effective expression through armed, organized power blocs. The dissolution of the National Workshops proved the catalyst which transformed a substantial segment of this militarized institution into such an aggressive bloc. The other major insurrectional contingent emerged when the National Guard of Paris split along geographical—and, by implication, class—lines. The appearance of entire National Guard units from the eastern, working class sections of Paris behind the barricades held by the insurgents goes far toward explaining the effectiveness of their organization which mystified contemporary observers. The citizens' militia of the wealthier, western half of Paris, on the other hand, enthusiastically supported the government's cause. The *garde nationale mobile,* an incipient power bloc deemed unreliable by both sides, opted for the government, perhaps for very trivial reasons. The main direction and burden of the combat fell on the reintroduced Paris garrison whose loyalty had never come into question. Significantly, neither the organized crafts nor the clubs participated in the insurrection as coherent units, although specific industrial establishments such as the railroad repair shops, contributed numerous recruits. The government, in any case, used the opportunity of the proclaimed state of siege to suppress remaining clubs which henceforth played no more than a shadowy role. When on June 26, 1848, the smoke lifted over the Faubourg St. Antoine, last stronghold of the rebels to fall, the government had at last succeeded in eliminating all its rivals: the dissident elements of the National Guard filled the prisons to overflowing; the eastern districts of Paris were

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to be permanently demilitarized; National Workshops and political clubs had been dissolved; the *garde mobile* had been brought under control; the organized crafts were cowed and about to launch into the harmless dead end of producers' cooperatives. The government had restored obedience as well as re-establishing its monopoly of power: four months after it had begun, the revolution was over.

VII

How does this view of the French revolution of 1848, seen in terms of power blocs struggling for dominion, compare with other accounts? It avoids, first of all, some of the mystification inherent in many accounts of revolution. Since in many works, such as, for example, Gaston-Martin's *La Révolution de 1848,* the government occupies the center of the stage, forces outside the government make their appearance unannounced, having neither antecedents nor future. By tracing the genesis, emergence and development of all power blocs, the historian can dispel some of the romantic mist in which revolution is half hidden. What we may lose in romantic appeal, we gain in clarity.

Secondly, the technique which I have illustrated counteracts the historian's quest for the tragic flaw. History can and should be literature, provided the flux of events is not subordinated to a literary device, such as it is in H. Guillemin's *La tragédie de 1848.* Revolution offers a particularly acute temptation to the historian: even before he begins his work, he knows that in 1848, for example, June will follow February. It is much easier simply to work backward and to personify the revolution as the tragic hero doomed from the start to self-destruction—a fetching attention-getter, yet bad history. Once the premise of the drama is accepted, the tendency to prune the dramatically irrelevant becomes irresistible, until what was in fact an intricate process has been transmuted into the starkness of Greek tragedy. By viewing revolution as a many-centered power struggle, the historian, though he may still come to view history as tragedy, will be less likely to underrate the contingent, the dead ends and backtracks, that have no place in a well-constructed play but may be the stuff of life.

Thirdly, by analyzing the structure of revolution, the his-

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torian is less likely to impose without qualification a prefabricated, monistic pattern on revolutionary events. A Marxist historian, such as J. Dautry, would have to explain why the middle class leadership of the National Guard came so close to supporting the workers' demonstration of April 16; he would have to face the problem of why the National Workshops joined and the *corporations ouvrières* abstained from the June insurrection though both were "proletarian"; he might, in connection with the club movement, have to ask himself whether the bourgeois-proletarian dichotomy is meaningful for 1848 or whether the old *sans-culotte* amalgam of artisans, small shopkeepers and workers did not come closer to the reality of mid-nineteenth century Paris. Whatever his answers, the historian would be forced to qualify his borrowed preconceptions.

By viewing revolution as a contest for state power in which all the contestants are on show, we may succeed in keeping the great simplifiers in check. We may at the same time become aware of how little is known about significant revolutionary movements: in the case of 1848, for example, the history of the National Guard and that of the prefecture of police under Caussidière is virtually blank. We may also wish to take a second look at ideology as the motor of an insurrectionary government once we accept its drive for power as literally "natural," that is, in the nature of the state. Yet of itself this way of looking at revolution provides no answers. Though the framework may be new and even an improvement over the old, this is no guarantee that the completed structure for which we bear responsibility will be sound. What I offer is a tool, not a nostrum.

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RUSSO-GERMAN MILITARY COLLABORATION: THE LAST PHASE, 1933

ON SEPTEMBER 21, 1933, a secret dispatch arrived at the Reichswehr Ministry in Berlin. Annex I of the document stated that, "The stations were discontinued on September 15. Therewith the period of many years of German-Russian military cooperation has been terminated in its previous form." [1] The author of the report was Colonel Hartmann, the German Military Attaché in the Soviet Union. The stations referred to were the three Reichswehr military bases in the Soviet Union at which the activities that constituted the major portions of the secret Russo-German military collaboration had been conducted.[2]

At the beginning of 1933 only a very pessimistic observer could have imagined that the military collaboration which began early in the Weimar period would end so abruptly in a matter of months. Indeed, after nearly a decade of collaboration the Reichswehr and the Red Army had every reason to look with satisfaction on the results of their association.

For the German Army, the collaboration had provided a means for testing weapons and training men outside the narrow restriction imposed at Versailles. Specifically it enabled

[1] The Military Attaché in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry and the Reichswehr Ministry, September 19, 1933, U. S., Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945,* series C, I (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 820. This collection will hereafter be cited in the following manner: DGFP, C, I, 820.

[2] The Reichswehr training and testing stations in the Soviet Union were as follows: Lipetsk (aircraft), Kasan (armored vehicles) and Torski (code named Tomka; war gas). Primary military documents on the Russo-German collaboration were destroyed by the Reichswehr for security reasons. However, scattered references may be found in the records of the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Wehrwirtschafts und Rüstungsamt,* Microcopy T-77, National Archives, Washington, D. C. References to this collection will hereafter be cited as OKW/T-77, followed by the roll and frame numbers. The more important published sources on the military collaboration include: Hans W. Gatzke, "Russo-German Military Collaboration During the Weimar Republic," *American Historical Review,* Vol. LXIII, No. 3 (April 1958); Helm Speidel, "Reichswehr und Rote Armee," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte,* Vol. I, No. 1 (January 1953); and Georges Castellan, "Reichswehr et Armée Rouge, 1920–1939," *Les Relations germano-sovietiques de 1933 à 1939,* ed Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques Cahiers, No. 58 (Paris, 1954).

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the Reichswehr to forge ahead of other nations in the development of air power and armor at a time when the world was being lulled into complacency by the belief that the Treaty of Versailles had pulled Germany's military teeth.[3] German activities in Russia were an important phase of the overall secret rearmament effort and played a key role in preparing the German armored corps and air force for rapid expansion after Hitler's repudiation of the peace treaty.[4]

For the Red Army its association with the modern and efficient Reichswehr drew attention to the need for reorganization, technical perfection and the institution of new methods of warfare. As a result German methods were introduced into the Red Army and a crash program in tank and aircraft development was undertaken. Technological advances, as represented by German equipment undergoing testing in Russia, were freely incorporated by the Soviets in their own designs. Russian personnel trained by the Reichswehr in Germany as well as in the Soviet Union accelerated the spread of German methods.[5]

In January 1930, the start of the most intensive period of Russo-German military collaboration, General Ludwig, former *Chef des Waffenamtes,* stated that "the Russians had remained practically on the level of 1914 in their military preparations. . . ." [6] Little more than a year later another senior Reichswehr officer, returning from a 7,000 mile in-

[3] The secrecy surrounding Russo-German military dealings has tended to magnify certain aspects of the collaboration. Post-war research into captured German diplomatic and military documents of the Weimar period, has failed to reveal any evidence that substantial production of military equipment destined for the Reichswehr was actually undertaken in Russia. The available information suggests that a shipment of 300,000 artillery shells, manufactured by Krupp in the Soviet Union and discovered on arrival by Socialist longshoremen at Stettin in November, 1927, was the first and last consignment of war material to reach the Reichswehr from Russia. See Otto Gessler, *Reichswehrpolitik in der Weimarer Zeit* (Stuttgart, c. 1958), pp. 199–200.

[4] Files dealing with secret German rearmament efforts during the inter-war period are scattered throughout OKW/T-77. Rolls 110 through 115 of this collection are of particular value in this connection.

[5] Primary source material dealing with German technical assistance to the Red Army and the Soviet war industry is virtually nonexistent. Some information may be found in OKW/T-77, "Ausland Kommission," 1931, 306/1138407-587 and U. S. Military Tribunals, *Case X Krupp,* Prosecution Documents (mimeographed), document NIK-12376. See also Speidel, *loc. cit.,* p. 34 ff.; Castellan, *loc. cit.,* pp. 159, 193 ff., and Gatzke, *loc. cit., passim.*

[6] Quoted in Gatzke, *loc. cit.,* p. 590.

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spection tour of the Soviet Army, reported that "our views go through theirs like a red thread." [7] The exact extent of German assistance to the Soviet military machine will never be known. Much of it was of an intangible nature. But the Red Army's debt to the Reichswehr was recognized by the Soviet military leaders who on a number of occasions voiced their gratitude to their German opposite numbers.[8]

"Looked at purely as a military operation," writes one historian, "the partnership between Germany and Russia, despite some statements to the contrary, seems to have been mutually beneficial. Had it not been, there were certainly many occasions on which it could have been terminated." [9] In 1933 the collaboration was terminated, not because it was no longer mutually beneficial, but because the collaboration was no longer able to maintain itself as a purely military operation independent of the main current of Russo-German relations.

The events immediately preceding the conclusion of the Russo-German military collaboration have not yet been fully related. It is proposed here, on the basis of the published documents of the German Foreign Office for the period, to fill this gap.[10]

The collaboration between the German and Russian armies continued at an undiminished pace during 1930–1932. But towards the end of 1932 it became apparent to all concerned that something was wrong. In particular the

[7] Quoted in Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer, *The Incompatible Allies: A Memoir History of German-Soviet Relations 1918–1941* (New York, 1953), p. 207.

[8] For references to statements by Red Army leaders see DGFP, C, Vol. I, pp. 767, 822, 857–58 and 875.

[9] Gatzke, *loc. cit.*, pp. 594–95.

[10] The article by Hans W. Gatzke, based on the Auswartiges Amt files is the most authoritative and scholarly study concerning the Russo-German military collaboration yet to appear, but it does not carry the story beyond 1930. The previously cited memoir-history by Hilger and Meyer is also very valuable in this connection. Hilger, as his coauthor describes him, "was representative of an all-important group who helped to make German foreign policy in the twenties and thirties." Hilger's position at the German Embassy in Moscow gave him first-hand knowledge of the diplomatic relations between the German and Soviet governments. The book is based largely on Hilger's recollections, notes and correspondence; it is not documented. But a comparison of Hilger's statements with the German Foreign Office documents attests to the accuracy of both his memory and his personal papers.

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Russians began to display a certain reserve in their relations with the Germans. This first became apparent in the political and economic sphere, but it soon began to be felt on the military level as well.

Russian mistrust apparently arose during the Lausanne Conference in the summer of 1932, when the story began circulating that the then Chancellor von Papen had offered the French Premier, Herriot, a military alliance directed against the Soviet Union.[11] While the Germans earnestly, and as far as can be determined truthfully, denied the story, it gained credence after Herriot repeated the statement in a published article.[12] As a result, the Russians became fearful that the German Government was turning away from its Rapallo policy and seeking a rapprochement with the Western powers. In an effort to prevent or at least soften a German-French alliance, the Soviets began to develop their own relations with France. Although Russian fears were, in large part, based on mistrust and misinformation, the French were quick to take advantage of the situation. The result was to be seen in the conclusion of a Russo-French nonaggression pact which had been preceded by a similar agreement between Russia and France's chief ally, Poland.[13]

At the beginning of 1933 Russo-German relations were

[11] See telegram from Dirksen to Neurath, Feb. 23, 1933, DGFP, C, I, 87 and Memorandum by Neurath, Mar. 1, 1933, *ibid.*, pp. 91–2. According to von Papen's memorandum of the conversation with Herriot, he had offered the French "an entente between the French and the German Armies." But he had specified that "this entente must have no aggressive tendency at all directed against anyone, but would simply make possible an exchange of views and information between the General Staffs, and would bring a feeling of security about the present situation." But since Papen made the restoration of German equality in arms a prerequisite, it is not surprising that Herriot in a subsequent conversation on July 7 informed von Papen that "after mature consideration he had reached the firm decision that the Conference must confine itself to its actual task, the solutions of the reparations question." *Ibid.*, p. 91, n. 2.

[12] Herriot's article appeared in the *Petit Provençal*. *Ibid.*, pp. 43 and 87. The Russians also accused von Papen, at a later date, of making disclosures to the French regarding the Russo-German military collaboration. For details and Papen's denial see memorandum by Neurath, August 14, 1933, *ibid.*, pp. 742–43.

[13] The Treaties of Nonaggression and Conciliation between France and the Soviet Union were concluded on Nov. 29, 1932 and instruments of ratification were exchanged on Feb. 15, 1933. The Polish-Soviet Nonaggression Pact was signed on July 25, 1932, and ratified by Poland on Nov. 27, 1932. For text see *League of Nations Treaty Series*, CXXXVI, p. 41.

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in a state of flux. The Soviet Union was evidencing obvious concern with changes and inconsistencies in German foreign policy. But the attitude of Soviet diplomats was conciliatory. The USSR clearly did not want to reorient its policy in any drastic manner, nor did it desire a further deterioration of its relations with Germany.[14] It was at this unstable point in Russo-German relations that the Nazis came to power in Germany. This development filled the Soviet Government with anxiety. The Russians considered the National Socialist Party to be "strongly anti-Soviet." They feared that National Socialist views would now become the official policy of Germany. Dirksen, the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union, was well aware of the Nazi disposition in this direction. On his own initiative, Dirksen warned the Russians that if the German Communist Party (KPD) provoked the new German Government "the danger existed that the enmity of the National Socialists toward Communists would also be transferred in the area of foreign policy." [15] The Nazis did not need a great deal of provocation. Hitler's first step was to move against his greatest immediate threat, the large and militant KPD.

Despite the Foreign Office's assurance "that when they have the responsibility the National Socialists are naturally different people and pursue a different policy than they proclaimed before," [16] the Russians did not have long to wait to see their worst suspicions confirmed. In the course of their suppression of the German Communist Party, the Nazis took police measures against Soviet trade missions and Soviet companies operating in Germany. Official and unofficial depredations against Soviet citizens also began to occur with alarming frequency.

In order to be able to answer Dirksen's plaintive inquiries from Moscow, Foreign Minister von Neurath, on February 15, had a long talk with Hitler about the Russian problem. Neurath's report to Dirksen stated that "the Chancellor very definitely took the stand that a sharp distinction had to be drawn between the internal treatment of communism and international relations with the USSR, and that he would

14 See Political Report by Dirksen, Mar. 11, 1933, DGFP, C. I, pp. 140 ff.

15 Dirksen to Bülow, Jan. 31, 1933, *ibid.*, pp. 14 f.

16 Bülow to Dirksen, *ibid.*, p. 21.

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allow no change to take place in the political, economic, and military policy with respect to Soviet Russia." [17] Any improvement that might have come out of Hitler's stated position was undone by continued police action against Soviet institutions and individual Soviet citizens and press representatives. Soviet suspicion and resentment was further increased by Hitler's *Sportspalast* speech of March 2, which drew from the Soviet Government the angry protest that the "contemptuous and offensive manner" with which Hitler had characterized the Soviet Union "cannot be reconciled with the relations existing between the USSR and the German Reich." [18] Add to all this the fact that Hitler, in office for over a month, had still to receive Khinchuk, the Soviet Ambassador, and one can hardly be surprised at the sensitivity displayed by the Russians.

The evidence indicates that the new German Government had not decided on any definite long range policy toward the USSR. In the meantime an attempt was being made to maintain Russo-German relations on a pre-1932 basis. But the violent anti-Communist nature of the National Socialist regime and the absence of any concrete evidence of cordiality and goodwill toward the USSR doomed this effort to failure.

Dirksen, in mid-March, summed up the change in Russo-German relations by pointing out once more that the Soviet Government did not wish "to reorient its policy or to permit a cooling of its relations with Germany." But prompted by fear of complete isolation in the event of a German-French rapprochement, the Soviet Union desired to "develop its relations with France in a positive direction." As to what might be expected in the future, Dirksen warned that "the development of Soviet-French relations will be correlated with that of German-Soviet relations; the greater the cooling toward Germany, the greater the disposition to cordiality toward France." [19]

Towards the end of March it was clear that despite their reluctance to see a further deterioration of relations, the Russians were finding it difficult to remain impassive in the face of the heavy-handed tactics of the National Socialists.

[17] Neurath to Dirksen, Feb. 22, 1933, *ibid.*, pp. 71 f.

[18] Memorandum by Neurath, Mar. 8, 1933, *ibid.*, p. 120.

[19] Political Report by Dirksen, Mar. 11, 1933, *ibid.*, p. 145.

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With the exception of a few tentative press attacks on the new German Government late in February, the Soviet regime had practiced unusual restraint. But towards the end of March, the Soviets unleashed their own massive propaganda machine. The German ban on *Pravda* and *Izvestia* and the witholding of entry cards from Soviet journalists assigned to cover the opening of the Reichstag on March 21, was the occasion for a violent press attack on the German Government by *Izvestia*. German language broadcasts, sharply critical of the National Socialist regime, also began to beam from Moscow. Dirksen's protests were parried by Russian counterprotests over continuing attacks by the German press on the USSR, Hitler's refusal to receive the Soviet Ambassador and the lack of an unequivocal promise to renew the Berlin Treaty.[20]

On March 23, probably as a result of Foreign Ministry pressure, Hitler repeated in front of the Reichstag the conciliatory statement concerning Russo-German relations that he had made to Neurath on February 15.[21] But any chance of a strengthening of relations between the two countries was shattered by new "incidents" against Soviet offices and citizens. These events "caused great agitation" in Moscow. Dirksen warned that "the impression had been created that an organized anti-Soviet campaign was in progress in Germany." The fear in Moscow that anti-Russian forces in Germany were gaining the upper hand over the "positive attitude in official circles" led Dirksen to the conclusion that a crisis of such magnitude had been reached that unless something were done to reverse the situation, "the Soviet Government will . . . draw its conclusions for the entire area of our mutual relations and reverse its economic and military policies also." [22]

20 See telegram from Dirksen to Foreign Ministry, Mar. 20, 1933, *ibid.*, pp. 189 f.

21 The portion of Hitler's Reichstag speech which refers to Russo-German relations may be found in *ibid.*, p. 190, n. 5. The full text of this speech is printed in *Dokumente des Deutschen Politik*, Vol. I, pp. 34–37.

22 Telegram from Dirksen to Neurath, Apr. 4, 1933, DGFP, C, I, 241 f. On September 26, 1933, the Russian Ambassador left at the Foreign Ministry a protest summarizing the mistreatment of citizens in Germany. Between January and September, the Russians complained that there were 116 incidents, including 16 relating to violation of diplomatic privileges, 23 relating to actions taken against Russian economic organizations, and 74 individual complaints. *Ibid.*, p. 850.

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What Dirksen and the professional diplomats in the Foreign Ministry could not know was that "the trends in Germany opposed to good German-Soviet relations" had already gained the upper hand. These "trends" were embodied in the National Socialist movement and its leaders, who were at that very moment engaged in securing the power which would shortly make Hitler's policy synonymous with German policy.

Despite the inclinations of the National Socialist leaders, Germany's position was not yet strong enough to allow an open and official break with the Soviet Union. And this was constantly being reiterated by the military and the professional diplomats in an attempt to curb the fervor of the National Socialists. At a conference of ministers held at the Reich Chancellery on April 7, Neurath reviewed the foreign policy situation. He pointed out that Germany's foreign policy was still determined by the Versailles Treaty, and that the nation's energies must be directed towards its revision. But Germany was still very weak, particularly militarily. Five years would be needed to restore the military equilibrium with respect to Poland alone. In the meantime Germany would be safe only if the support of Russia were assured. "At the present moment," cautioned Neurath, "it is uncertain whether this can be counted on." In a still more emphatic statement the Foreign Minister warned that "we cannot do without Russia's cover for our rear with respect to Poland." In an additional argument for maintenance of good relations with the USSR, Neurath pointed out that Russia had become the largest buyer of German industrial products, and the Soviets still owed Germany "about one billion reichsmarks." [23]

By early April the campaign by the Foreign Office to restore Soviet-German relations seemed to be showing results. Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, appeared to respond favorably to Neurath's promise of an investigation of the molestations of Soviet nationals, assurance of undisturbed operation for Soviet businesses, and a promise of quick ratification of the protocol for the extension of the Berlin Treaty.[24] But Neurath still did not have the com-

[23] Extract from the Minutes of the Conference of Ministers Held at the Reich Chancellery on April 7, 1933, *ibid.*, pp. 256 ff.

[24] The Berlin Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality was signed on Apr. 24,

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plete cooperation of the National Socialists. Police action and unofficial incidents involving Soviet citizens continued. On April 14, Dirksen urgently warned that "the impending exchange of documents of ratification will also prove politically ineffective if police incidents do not cease." On April 28, Hitler finally received the Soviet Ambassador. The Reich Chancellor assured the Russian that he would continue to try "to order German-Russian relations on a permanently friendly basis." In addition Hitler promised to restore normalcy in the operations of Russian business establishments in Germany.[25]

In the meantime, however, the Russians had become even more suspicious of official German statements and promises. Shortly after Hitler's reception of Khinchuk, Dirksen was forced to report that "annoyance, distrust, and a certain embitterment are rather deeply entrenched here." In addition he had received preliminary information on April 27, that the Russians wanted to discontinue the military operations at Tomka.[26] This was the first indication of just how wide the split between the nations had grown. In the past the military collaboration had been almost totally unaffected by fluctuations in Russo-German relations.

It appears that Hitler's reception of the Russian Ambassador was the opening gesture of an official German effort to placate the Soviet Government. By the beginning of May the matter of Soviet businesses in Germany appeared to be satisfactorily settled. Orders had been issued to the police that no action was to be initiated against a Soviet national

1926; a Conciliation Convention between Germany and the Soviet Union was signed in Moscow on Jan. 25, 1929. See *League of Nations Treaty Series*, LII, p. 387, and XC, p. 219. An agreement to extend the treaty and convention was signed on June 24, 1931. Due to the chaotic parliamentary situation in Germany, the protocol on the extension had never been ratified.

25 See Memorandum by Neurath, Apr. 28, 1933, DGFP, C, I, pp. 355 f. Khinchuk at his meeting with Hitler submitted a statement summarizing Soviet grievances and suggesting actions by the German Government which would restore amity between the two nations. For complete text of the Soviet note see *ibid.*, pp. 356–58.

26 Dirksen to Ministerialdirektor Meyer, Apr. 28, 1933, DGFP, C, I, pp. 362 f. Dirksen also warned that Khinchuk's behavior should not be taken as a true indication of the feelings of top-level Soviet officials "since Khinchuk reproduces the mood prevailing here [Moscow] only in a very much weakened form; he is under increasing attack here because of his 'too soft' manner."

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without prior clearance from the Foreign Ministry. In addition the National Socialist press took a new and restrained line towards the USSR.[27]

But the German action was a case of "too little and too late." The Russians were in the process of formulating a major policy change. In the meantime the best that they had to offer was a wary neutrality. Dirksen reported that May Day passed without incident. There were no speeches attacking Germany and "the throngs of demonstrators refrained from calumniation of National Socialism or of leading Germans." [28]

On May 5, the exchange of instruments of ratification of the protocol for the extension of the Berlin Treaty took place as planned. Dirksen took the occasion to make a lengthy political report in which he noted that "the inclination of the Soviet Government toward a restoration of friendly relations with Germany is at present counterbalanced by the tendency to practice reserve and watchful waiting toward Germany in order possibly to enter the French-Polish orbit." [29]

In what seems to have been an effort to test the Russian attitude toward continuation of the military collaboration, the Reichswehr Ministry notified the Soviet Military Attaché that General von Bockelberg, head of the *Heereswaffenamt,* wanted to accept the invitation to visit the Soviet Union which had been extended to him by Deputy Commissar of War Tukhachevsky during his visit to Germany the previous autumn. The Russians agreed and the visit was scheduled for May 8–28.[30] In preparation for Bockelberg's visit the German Military Attaché, Colonel Hartmann, approached Tukhachevsky to clear up a number of matters concerning Reichswehr activities in Russia. Hartmann's visit with Tukhachevsky was a reconnaissance, the intention being that Bockelberg would take up the matters on which Hartmann received no satisfaction.

The Russians had previously indicated a reluctance to

27 DGFP, C, I, p. 290, n. 4 and letter from Dirksen to Meyer, May 2, 1933, pp. 372 f.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 373.

29 Political Report by Dirksen, May 5, 1933, *ibid.*, p. 389.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 273, n. 5.

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allow further operations at Tomka, the gas warfare center at Torski.[31] On May 10, Hartmann took this matter up with Tukhachevsky, who first tried to sidestep the issue by stating that during his visit to Germany in the previous fall, it had been his understanding that the Reichswehr was being forced, for financial reasons, to close its bases in the Soviet Union. This was not true and Tukhachevsky knew it. What had been under consideration was a possible closing of Lipetsk and continuance of a portion of its activities at Tomka. But no decision on the matter had yet been reached.[32]

Tukhachevsky made a number of statements to the effect that even if cessation of operations at Tomka became necessary it would not signify any basic change in the military cooperation. Thereupon, without further ado, he suddenly gave in and stated that if the Germans wished on their own to start up work at Tomka once more he would agree. The Russians, however, felt that they were gaining little from the Tomka operation. As a result, Tukhachevsky made it clear that the agreement was not binding beyond 1933. In any case, he felt that the Soviet Government would, in all probability, not provide funds for the continuance of the station after the end of the current year.[33]

The conversation is important because it seems clear enough from the Russian's behavior that he realized that

31 The exact location of Tomka has long been in doubt. It is generally accepted that the base was located in the vicinity of Saratov. See Gatzke, *loc. cit.*, p. 578 and Speidel, *loc. cit.*, p. 18. The exact location is often given as Trotsk. However, a top secret Waffenamt communication of Oct. 7, 1933, specifically states that the secret gas warfare camp in Russia "is *not* located in Trotzk but Torski." See OKW/T-77, 2/713990.

32 Report of the German Military Attaché in Moscow to the Chief of the *Truppenamt*, May 16, 1933, DGFP, C, I, pp. 464 f. The *Truppenamt* was actually a front for the German General Staff which had been outlawed by the Versailles Treaty. Within the *Truppenamt* a secret department designated T-3 had been created to handle the military collaboration with the Red Army.

33 *Ibid.*, pp. 465 f. Tomka, unlike Lipitsk, seems to have been used by the Reichswehr only during a portion of each year. The Germans paid for the expenses involved in the actual operations, but the cost of maintaining the base during the remainder of the year appears to have been borne by the Red Army. For Reichswehr expenses, see the bookkeeping register for the secret rearmament budget covering Richswehr expenses in Russia, OKW/T-77, "Kassen und Rechnungswesen, Bestimmungen," 1927–33, 111/839961 ff.

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the Soviet Government would soon take steps to expel the Reichswehr from its Russian installations. But in the absence of specific orders and in line with his own predisposition toward a German orientation, Tukhachevsky gave the Germans their way. After some difficulty with Fischmann, the Red Army Chief of Chemical Warfare, agreement was reached on a compromise proposal for renewed operations at Tomka.[34]

During General Bockelberg's visit the details of the Tomka operation were worked out and every effort was made to accommodate Russian desires. The Soviets specified certain items of chemical warfare equipment which they wished to see and Bockelberg promised to have these demonstrated during the impending operations at Tomka. In addition he listened to complaints that the Russian military missions sent to Germany were not being shown the latest processes for producing war gases. Bockelberg denied this, but promised to consider a list of German chemical laboratories which Fischmann wanted to visit.[35]

Bockelberg's visit was seemingly a success. He noted in his report that his reception by the Red Army was markedly friendly; it had been constantly emphasized by its leaders that they placed the greatest value on close cooperation with the German Army and German war industry. Then on a note of warning, Bockelberg stated that *"Commissar of War Voroshilov and Chief of the General Staff"* had pointed out that the armies were, after all, only servants of their respective states and *"that a close cooperation was only possible if the high policy of the Governments pursued the same goals."* This was repeated again by representatives of the Soviet Foreign Office. The Russians, Bockelberg noted, were especially disturbed by the anti-Soviet activities and speeches of the National Socialist leaders. They felt that this type of activity was an example of "double dealing" in German policy. Bockelberg concluded his report by recommending that "cooperation with the Red Army and the Soviet armaments industry is, in view of the extent of Russian plans and their demonstrated energy in carrying them out, urgently desir-

[34] DGFP, C, I, p. 467.

[35] Minutes of Conference between Bockelberg and Fischmann, May 16, 1933, *ibid.*, pp. 468 f.

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able not only for reasons of defense policy but also for technical reasons with respect to armament." [36]

As a result of Bockelberg's visit it appeared that the military collaboration would continue unhindered for at least another year. But during the time between Bockelberg's departure from Moscow and his arrival in Berlin, the Russians, suddenly and without warning, demanded an immediate liquidation of the Reichswehr bases in the USSR. On the heels of this demand came the rejection, in a discourteous manner, of participation by Russian officers in courses in Germany which had been arranged at the specific request of the Red Army. In the face of these moves, the Reichswehr had no choice but to order the deactivation of the bases. In retaliation the Germans canceled their mission to the annual Russian maneuvers, although this visit was still desired by the Red Army.[37]

There can be little doubt that the closing of the bases was a political move, and that the orders in all probability originated with Stalin himself. Months later, this was tacitly admitted by Tukhachevsky when he explained that after the Russians had become convinced "that the policy of the German Government was taking an anti-Soviet direction, the closing down of the stations had been a political consequence." How little the Red Army had to say about the decision is shown by Tukhachevsky's statement that he "had no knowledge that the form of the rejection had been improper." [38]

The Soviet leaders were not novices in the art of establishing a totalitarian state. In Hitler and the National Socialist revolution, the Politburo recognized a serious threat. The Russian leaders, unlike most of their Western counterparts, were not fooled by official statements which were intended to cloak preparation for the implementation of Hitler's long-range aspirations. Karl Radek, long a key Soviet foreign

[36] The italics are Bockelberg's. See extract from Bockelberg's report of June 13, 1933, *ibid.*, p. 467, n. 12.

[37] Report of the German Military Attaché in Moscow to the Foreign Ministry and the Reichswehr Ministry, Sept. 19, 1933, *ibid.*, p. 823; see also Dirksen to Neurath, June 5, 1933, *ibid.*, pp. 519; 859, n. 2 and Hilger and Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 256 f.

[38] The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry, Nov. 6, 1933, DGFP, C, II, p. 82.

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policy expert, clearly indicated top-level Soviet feelings about Hitler. Speaking to a German diplomat he pointed out that the Soviets knew a good deal about how political ideas are launched. "As long as one feels too weak to demand or enforce something officially, one uses such means as the press, pamphlets, books and propaganda speeches. . . ." He pointed out that *Mein Kampf* undeniably preached a crusade against the Soviet Union. Although written at a time when Hitler had little power, no changes had been made in the editions published since he had assumed the leadership of the German Government. On the contrary, even more anti-Soviet propaganda had been forthcoming from Hitler and other National Socialist figures. In reference to German attempts at reconciliation after March 1933, Radek stated that "what diplomats said and what was proclaimed from the Reichstag rostrum were things that applied to the politics of the day. But what was written in books constituted the ideas by which the long-range policy intended to orient itself. . . ." The fact that the new editions of *Mein Kampf* and the speeches and writings of the National Socialists still called for a crusade against the Soviet Union, and German expansion to the East, resulted in a deep distrust of German intentions among "leading political circles" in the Soviet Union.[39]

Further statements on the subject by Radek leave little doubt that it was Stalin himself who constituted "leading political circles." Radek made it clear that Litvinov was only an "errand boy." And that "over him there is a hard, cautious and distrustful man endowed with a firm will. Stalin does not know where he stands with Germany. He is uncertain." [40]

In the light of Stalin's uncertainty and distrust and in view of his knowledge of Germany's secret military preparations and massive industrial potential, Soviet policy toward Germany in general and toward the military collaboration in particular, becomes somewhat clearer. In brief, the Soviet

[39] Unsigned Memorandum of Conversation with Radek, probably by Twardowski, the German Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union, Jan. 1, 1934, *ibid.*, pp. 296 ff.

[40] Radek's statements were made in an interview given to a German journalist and quoted by Dirksen's successor Nadolney, memo of Jan. 10, 1934, *ibid.*, p. 333.

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Union recognized, as early as 1933, the revisionist and expansionist nature of the new Germany. Russian domestic problems plus the fear of German and possibly Japanese expansion at Soviet expense made the USSR a strong supporter of the *status quo*. This brought the Soviet Union in line with France and her allies and prompted Russian desires to join the European alliance system and the League of Nations. Once it became clear that Hitler was not a passing phenomenon on the German political scene, a Soviet return to the Rapallo policy was out of the question.

At the time that Bockelberg's visit began, the Soviet Government had not yet begun a drastic reorientation of its foreign policy. But there were strong indications that something was in the wind. Tukhachevsky's vacillation during his talk with Hartmann is a case in point. In addition, little more than a week after the extension of the Berlin Treaty, and a few days after Bockelberg's arrival in Russia, Dirksen reported that "the Soviet press had not responded to the positive position of the entire German press . . . on the contrary, the papers here have continued to expatiate on every single, meaningless incident that has occurred in connection with a Soviet citizen in Germany." Despite German attempts to create a favorable climate for a reconciliation, "nothing had been done officially on the Soviet side. . . ." [41] By the end of the month, the USSR moved from a passive to an active role in severing the ties that bound it to Germany.

Political decisions from the top do not, even in a totalitarian system, always have the complete support of those who are forced to carry them out. Despite the sudden and unfriendly manner in which the Russians had chosen to make their liquidation request, it soon became apparent that, while the Red Army was being forced to terminate the existing activities, its leaders still desired the maintenance of friendly relations with the Reichswehr. In particular, they apologized for the manner in which the notice was given and expressed, on every possible occasion, the hope that the traditional friendship between the two armies would continue.[42]

The Reichswehr leaders responded with personal politeness, realizing that the abrupt actions of the Soviet Govern-

[41] Political Report by Dirksen, May 14, 1933, DGFP, C, I, pp. 418 f.

[42] See particularly DGFP, C, I, pp. 768, 819, 822–24, 857, 860–62 and 875.

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ment did not reflect the feelings of the Red Army Command. General von Hammerstein took cognizance of this when he issued his orders, on June 26, for the carrying out of the liquidation. These orders indicated to *Zentrale Moskau* and the station chiefs that nothing be done during the course of the liquidation that would prejudice further friendly relations with the Red Army.[43]

In the absence of the existing basically friendly attitude in both army high commands, the evacuation of the bases could have turned into a nasty business. Russian officials began creating difficulties immediately by attempting to refuse visas to members of a Reichswehr liquidation team on their way to Russia.[44] At the same time local police officials clamped a cordon around Lipetsk, literally putting the German contingent under siege. At the time there were a number of the latest German experimental aircraft at the field and since the Russians refused to allow any outgoing flights, it was feared that they might be seized. In the absence of clear orders for either side, the tension increased.[45]

The situation was finally clarified during the course of high level negotiations in Moscow. In the case of Lipetsk, it was the intervention of the Soviet military which ended the siege. An agreement was reached which called for the evacuation, by the Reichswehr, of all movable equipment, while all permanent fixtures were to be turned over to the Red Army.[46] After this the liquidation proceeded smoothly. At Lipetsk, the largest and most elaborate of the German facilities, all transportable equipment was crated and sent by rail to Leningrad and thence by ship to Germany. The experimental aircraft were flown out along with some of the personnel, the rest going by train. In addition to the physi-

[43] The original order has not been found but is referred to by Hartmann in his report of Sept. 19, 1933, *ibid.*, p. 822. See also Hartmann's report of Sept. 26, 1933, *ibid.*, p. 857. *Zentrale Moskau* was the administrative center for German military activities in the Soviet Union. For information concerning this organization see Speidel, *loc. cit.*, p. 19 and OKW/T-77, "Kassen und Rechnungswesen, Bestimmungen," 1927–1933, 111/839961 ff.

[44] Hilger and Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

[45] Speidel, *loc. cit.*, pp. 41 f.

[46] The material turned over to the Red Army by the Reichswehr was valued at 2.9 million marks. See memorandum of a conversation between Col. von Stulpnagel of the Reichswehr Ministry and Counselor of Legation von Tippelskirch, Sept. 29, 1933, DGFP, C, I, p. 875.

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cal plant, the Russians also inherited 50 old Fokker aircraft which were in such poor condition that they could not be flown to Germany.[47]

While the liquidation of Lipetsk was under way, General Lutz, Inspector of Motorized Troops, arrived to supervise the closing of the Reichswehr's operation at Kasan.[48] The work required here was not as great as that at Lipetsk and the liquidation was completed by August 20. Before leaving for Germany, Lutz paid a formal farewell visit to his Red Army opposite number, Khalepsky, and his staff. He was received cordially but the Russians made a point of avoiding any serious discussion about the future of the military collaboration. A farewell dinner for Lutz given by the German Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, and another given the following day by the Russians, were attended by high ranking members of the Red Army General Staff and both dinners took place in an atmosphere of friendliness. While the Russians avoided any political conversation, they stressed several times that the collaboration "was remembered with great pleasure and gratefulness." [49]

By September 12, Lipetsk had been liquidated and a similar dinner was given for its German commander. The top Russian guest was Khiprin, Chief of Staff of the Red Air Force. By this time the Soviet attitude had thawed even more. Khiprin did not avoid discussion as had been the case with Red Army leaders previously. He stressed the fact that the "Russian Army looked back with satisfaction on the joint work in the field of aviation and that it hoped to continue the reciprocal exchange of experience in another form." Smagin, a key member of the Foreign Liaison Department of the Red Army, stated that the particularly skillful conduct of the negotiations and the subsequent friendly

[47] Speidel, *loc. cit.*, p. 43. The Reichswehr had secretly purchased 100 Fokker D-XIII airplanes in Holland during the Ruhr occupation in 1923. They arrived after the crises had passed and were subsequently used by the Germans in Russia for training purposes. See *ibid.*, p. 24 and Walter Goerlitz, *History of the German General Staff* (New York, 1957), pp. 254 f.

[48] For existing information on Reichswehr activities at Kazan see Castellan, *loc. cit.*, pp. 180 ff. and Nuremberg Documents NIK 11542, 12376, 7353, 10202 and 11518. Scattered bits of information may also be found in OKW/T-77 rolls 112 and 113.

[49] Memorandum of General Lutz's visit by the Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, Aug. 24, 1933, DGFP, C, I, pp. 767 f.

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spirit in which the liquidation was carried out had "dispelled all misgivings that had existed on the Russian side at the start of the liquidation . . . and this . . . had contributed toward creating a foundation on which friendly relations could be newly based in another form to the benefit of both armies." [50] Similar views were again expressed by top Red Army leaders at the farewell dinner given for the director of *Zentrale Moskau*.[51]

By the end of September there were no longer any nonaccredited German military personnel in Russia. The collaboration of more than a decade was over. It had ended on a note of hope for renewed contact. But neither army any longer possessed freedom of action. Neither Stalin nor Hitler desired a genuine connection between their respective nations. In the final analysis both leaders were forced to extreme measures in order to wipe out the last vestiges of the collaboration spirit which remained in the higher echelons of the German and Soviet armies.

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50 The Military Attaché in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry and the Reichswehr Ministry, Sept. 19, 1933, *ibid.*, p. 822.

51 See Hartmann's report of Sept. 26, 1933, *ibid.*, pp. 856 ff.

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MULTIRACIALISM AND POLITICS IN ZANZIBAR

WITH the establishment of a British Protectorate in 1890, Zanzibar was swept up with the rest of Africa into the imperialist hat while the European powers scrambled for the biggest prize. And today, Zanzibar is again with the rest of Africa as the forces of nationalism propel it toward self-government and independence. Representatives of Zanzibar's political parties have attended the Pan-African and Pan-Africa Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) meetings. World powers cast interested eyes toward Zanzibar. There are Zanzibar students in England, the United States, Egypt, India and recently Peiping. Radio Cairo and Radio Peiping beam into Zanzibar every day. And the United States has established a rocket tracking station there.

There is one factor which makes Zanzibar different from many of the African countries which are bent on nationalism. The population of Zanzibar is heterogeneous. There are Arabs, Indians, Africans and Shirazis (descendants of ancient Persians), each of whom plays a particular part in the economy of the island and has a particular social status. In this multi-racial context nationalism takes on a far more complex character than in an area where the struggle for power is only between the colonial government and a homogeneous indigenous population.

A new constitution has recently been drawn up for Zanzibar, providing for responsible self-government, and political parties have been increasingly active for the past four years. The parties have formed along racial lines. The element of race, which has always been present in the social and economic spheres, has now moved into politics, and multi-racialism promises to be the most important factor in the development of a nationalist Zanzibar.

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The Racial Communities

1. There are three main groups of Arabs in Zanzibar: first, the families who have lived there for many generations and who are the land-owning class in the Protectorate; second, the Arabs who come down with the monsoon each year from Oman, some of whom settle as traders; and third, the Mshihiri Arabs from the Hadhramout who usually become engaged in town trades. The position of the Arabs in Zanzibar is preeminent socially. Economically, the Arabs have given way to the Indians. Politically, the Africans have significantly challenged both the Arab and the Indian races at the ballot box.

The Arab aristocracy has a real fear, not unlike that of the whites in Kenya, of being swamped by illiterate African masses. A letter from an Arab leader to Sir Hilary Blood, when he was preparing to draw up his constitutional report [1] bears this out. Hamyan Khalfan Nassor, Secretary of the Arab Association in Pemba (Zanzibar's sister isle), wrote:

> . . . the principle that Zanzibar citizenship should be safeguarded receives our full support. We in this country have our tradition that we cherish. Our loyalty to the throne [Sultan] is very great, and we have many other traditions which have been handed to us from generation to generation. To give a chance to half-baked immigrants [Africans] to have any say in our political life is only to disrupt our heritage.[2]

The Arab fear of being swamped is different from the fear of the whites in Kenya—or in the American South for that matter—in that it is rooted in a concern for Arab culture and power and not for racial purity. There is scarcely an Arab in Zanzibar who does not have some African blood.

Many of the Arabs in Zanzibar still dream of the golden days of the nineteenth century, when the Sultanate was the

[1] Sir Hilary Blood, at the request of the British Government, went to Zanzibar in April, 1960, and prepared a list of recommendations for a new constitution, which included proposals for an elected majority in both the Legislative Council (LEGCO) and the Executive Council (EXCO). The first elections under the new constitution took place in early 1961, and are described below.

[2] Sir Hilary Blood, C.B.E., *Report of the Constitutional Commissioner, Zanzibar 1960* (Zanzibar), p. 37.

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dominant power and richest trade center from Arabia to the Cape.[3] Despite the protestations of the Arab politicians, many also hope that political power will remain permanently in the hands of the Arabs.

2. The Indian community in Zanzibar is composed of three main religious groups: the Moslems, Ismailis, who are followers of the Aga Khan, and Hindus. As a group, the Indians on Zanzibar prefer to remain apart from the other races. They engage in some social mixing with the Arabs; little with the Africans.

The Indians, who have long held a monopoly of the trade and finance in Zanzibar, have also become landowners. Many of the Arabs' plantations are now mortgaged to the Indians, which naturally does not enhance their popularity with the Arabs.

The Indians fear political rule by illiterate Africans but would also be loath to have an independent government dominated by the Arab aristocracy. The economic stake of the Indians in Zanzibar is great, and they have no desire to have it jeopardized by an unstable government in the hands of ill-trained or self-seeking men. The Indians have done very well during British rule. They are in no rush to see the British Government take its leave.

3. The Africans in Zanzibar can also be classified into three main groups: the Shirazis; the ex-slaves; and the recent immigrants from the mainland. The Wahadimu, the Wapemba, and the Watumbatu are descendants of the ancient Shirazis. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the Shirazis lived apart from the other races, especially on Zanzibar. When slavery was abolished in 1897, the Shirazis moved onto the Arab plantations as squatters and tenant farmers. Today, the Wapemba and Wahadimu live throughout the islands. The Watumbatu still remain virtually isolated in outlying areas.

The Shirazis have a foot in both camps. They claim both Arab and African blood and although, as Africans, they are grouped at the lowest point on the racial scale, economically and socially they are a good step above the descendants of slaves and newcomers from the mainland. Some Shirazis owned slaves themselves, and today there are a few important Shirazi landholders, mainly on Pemba.

[3] The bulk of the income was derived from the re-export of slaves—roughly 20,000 per year passed through Zanzibar—and the developing clove industry. Today Zanzibar produces more than 80% of the world's cloves.

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The mainland Africans come generally from Tanganyika, Moçambique, Ruanda-Urundi and the Belgian Congo (now the Republic of the Congo). The most recent immigrants are attracted to Zanzibar by the island's clove industry and by the fact that there is no individual tax in the Protectorate. The mainland Africans can often be distinguished from the Shirazis both by their darker color and by their religion—they are either Christian or pagan, whereas the Shirazis are Moslems. The Africans greatly fear the return of Arab domination and rule. Many believe that should the Arabs gain political control of an independent Zanzibar, slavery would be reinstituted. The wealthier Shirazis have some social intercourse with the Arabs but it is mainly superficial. The other Africans have very little.

The racial groups of Zanzibar are faced with a paradoxical situation. Socially, the "thing to be" is a non-African. Even the ex-slaves on Zanzibar have taken to calling themselves Shirazis rather than Africans, although they are at best regarded as 'second-class' Shirazis. A man with any Arab blood, regardless of the blackness of his skin, will call himself an Arab.

However, when politics are involved the "thing to be" is an African nationalist. Therefore, the politicians must campaign on the platform of 'Africa for the Africans.' Sheikh Ali Muhsin, the leader of the Arab-dominated Zanzibar Nationalist Party, successfully used this line of attack during the elections of 1961.

The Zanzibar Nationalist Party

The political parties developed out of the various racial organizations, which had grown up as much as fifty years ago. The first to move into the political arena were the Arabs. The Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) was formed out of the Arab Association in December, 1955.

The leader of the ZNP is Sheikh Ali Muhsin Barwani. He is a member of a long-established and highly regarded Arab family in Zanzibar. He is well educated[4] and lives in a spacious house on the outskirts of Zanzibar Town. He is a charming and most hospitable man, in true Arab tradition, and is an astute politician. His deputy is a young man,

[4] A graduate of Makerere College, Uganda.

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Abdul Rahman Mohammed, popularly known as Babu. Babu is as dark as any African but is regarded as an Arab. In 1957, Ali Muhsin called Babu back from England, where he had been studying, to reorganize the ZNP after its disaster in Zanzibar's first elections. (The ZNP won not one of the six contested seats for the Legislative Council. The Afro-Shirazi Party won five and the Muslim League won one.) Babu is the leader of the most radical element of the ZNP, and has been engaged in a flirtation with Communist China for the past two years. This will be discussed later.

The leaders of the ZNP, and of the Arab Association before it, have been the most vociferous in demanding the withdrawal of the Colonial Government from Zanzibar, and the establishment of self-government and independence for the Protectorate. The ZNP also has led the fight for elected representatives in LEGCO and voting by common roll, as opposed to communal roll. It might seem, at first, that a communal roll would be more to the benefit of the Arabs who are in the numerical minority in Zanzibar, and Ali Muhsin had considerable difficulty in persuading many of the Arabs to agree to the idea of a common roll. However, Ali Muhsin is both an astute politician and a gambler. He realized before the first election in 1957 that democratic majorities were a virtual certainty as the basis for all emergent independent states and that the governments of areas which had become independent since World War II founded their support upon a majority of *all* the people and not upon a particular racial community. Ali Muhsin, therefore, gambled on winning a majority of votes cast on a common roll and establishing his party as the democratically elected government in an independent Zanzibar. The gamble did not pay off in 1957, but it did in 1961.

The ZNP, for all its protestations that it is non-racial and purely nationalistic, cannot escape the fact that many of its leaders are Arabs, that it is supported by most members of the Arab community, and that it was formed out of the Arab Association. The Afro-Shirazi Party makes these points continually in its attacks on the ZNP.

Had the Arabs succeeded in throwing off the colonial yoke more than six years ago, they might have been able to reinstitute Arab rule in Zanzibar. They unquestionably were

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(and still are) the most experienced of the races in the work of government, their educational level was superior to the others, and they were traditionally the most powerful group economically and socially. The situation of the Arabs, in this respect, is not unlike that of the white settlers in certain parts of Africa. In Kenya, for instance, the white settlers fought a battle for many years for internal self-government, which would, of course, have put them and not the Africans in control of their government. That they wanted to rule themselves, which they felt was their right, was certainly a part of it, but the white settlers—and the Arabs—had a definite interest in seeing that the early murmurings from the British Government, that ruling African majorities might eventually come to power, would never become fact.

This comparison is only valid up to a point—the point when the ZNP, under the guidance of Ali Muhsin, allied itself with the cause of African nationalism to win support from a majority of all Zanzibaris.

As an able politician, Ali Muhsin has realized that the best way to win control of Zanzibar away from the British Government is through professional, well-organized, mid-twentieth century nationalistic methods. The ZNP has used such methods as the formation of youth and women's leagues, large political demonstrations, long harangues to public rallies, the painting of "Uhuru" (Swahili for 'freedom') on all the doors around Zanzibar Town and even backing "votes for mothers."

Outside interest in Zanzibar has been considerable during the past few years. In July, 1954, Radio Cairo extended its beam to East Africa. Propaganda from Radio Cairo has accused British policy in Zanzibar of widening the differences between the races and has stressed the racial intolerance of all European and Christian nations.[5] Ali Muhsin has visited Egypt on a number of occasions and his three children have been at school there. Further, he has been instrumental in getting scholarships for Zanzibari students to study in Egypt.

Nasser was, at one time, a very popular figure among the Arabs in Zanzibar. His photograph appeared in the homes of the people, and many girls carried handkerchiefs with his picture imprinted on them. Nasser's interest in promoting pan-Arabism, with Cairo as the focal point, led him to make gestures of friendship and support to the sizable Arab popu-

[5] *The Times* (London), February 29, 1956.

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lation of Zanzibar. Muhsin was agreeable to this attention, and he had a keen eye to the advantage that such a powerful friend and mentor could be to him at home.

The Arab community has rather mixed feelings about Nasser today. Many believe that he has, in fact, split the Arab world rather than unified it. African nationalism, not Arab nationalism, is now the winning ticket.

By 1958, Muhsin had achieved the support of the leading African nationalist leader, Kwame Nkrumah. In spite of the defeat suffered by the ZNP at the polls in 1957, Nkrumah invited Muhsin and not Abeid Karume (leader of the Afro-Shirazi Party which won five of the six seats in the 1957 election) to attend Ghana's first anniversary celebration in March, 1958.[6]

Muhsin, realizing the inherent weakness of his political situation in a democratic Zanzibar as a representative of the Arab Minority (despite his frequent pronouncements that he is first and foremost a Zanzibari and for *all* the people) has been quick to accept support from outside powers which may be able to strengthen his position. The newest, and certainly the most dangerous, direction in which he has looked for approval is Communist China. Peiping has been working very hard at getting a toehold on the African continent. Zanzibar is, at present, the main target of its attempts at penetration in East Africa. The Peiping Radio broadcasts 70 hours a week to Africa.[7] On Zanzibar, large amounts of Communist Chinese literature are openly sold. The Red Chinese Government has given a number of scholarships to ZNP members to study in Peiping and has also offered free trips to members of the Nationalist Party.

In 1960, Babu and his wife made a trip to Peiping, Moscow, Egypt, England and European countries. As noted before, Babu heads the extreme left-wing element of the ZNP. It is possible that he is forcing Ali Muhsin along a path that is not altogether to Muhsin's liking. It is certain that Babu is making some of the Arabs very nervous by his flirtations with communism, and the ZNP has lost the support of some leading Arabs because of this. Whether Babu is, in fact, a

[6] However, in the 1961 elections, Nkrumah threw his support to the ASP, as did Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika.

[7] The USSR broadcasts only 42 hours a week to Africa.

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communist is difficult to say. It is more likely that he is enthralled by the attention he is being given by the Chinese and Russians, and also is pleased with the worry he is causing the British Government. On June 23, 1961, in London, Babu denied that the new Zanzibar Government was communist, and stated firmly, that it was "positive neutralist."

Chinese Communist influence in Zanzibar, working through the ZNP, in the summer of 1960 forced the United States Government to alter its plans for a satellite tracking station in the Protectorate. The United States received permission from the British Government to establish on Zanzibar Project Mercury, a tracking station for its projected manned satellites. Allied with Project Mercury was a military enterprise, Project Courier. The United States Government gave the communists an ideal situation in which to launch a propaganda attack. The Chinese used the ZNP to stir up mass demonstrations in Zanzibar and Tanganyika against Project Mercury on the basis of its allied missile project. The ZNP issued a resolution to the British Resident and the Colonial Secretary demanding that the project not be established, citing the U-2 incident and the "danger of Zanzibar being made a tool for the destruction of the human race and of itself being annihilated in any future nuclear conflagration." [8] The chairman of the Chinese Communist Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, Liao Cheng-chin, praised the ZNP for its stand in a broadcast over the Peiping Radio, as did Radio Cairo. As a result of the furor, Project Courier was withdrawn to Southern Rhodesia, but Project Mercury was built as planned.

When Muhsin was questioned recently about the members of his party traveling and studying in Communist China he denied that he was in any way connected with International Communism.

> We are positive neutralists and Pan-Africanists, not part of the Communist or the Western bloc. . . . In 1957, we sent students to Egypt and we were called Nasserites. We send people to China and we are called Communists. If tomorrow we are offered 50 bursaries in the USA, we shall accept them—and shall no doubt be called Imperialists' Lackeys.[9]

[8] *Samachar*, June 12, 1960.

[9] *The Tanganyika Standard*, July 28, 1960.

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The Afro-Shirazi Party

The Shirazi Association and the African Association were established some years ago mainly for the protection of squatters and laborers. They were, in fact, incipient trade unions and grew up in answer to the Arab Association.

The two associations did not work together and there was often open hostility between them. Unlike the Arab Association, they played little part in politics until just prior to the election in 1957.

Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika visited Zanzibar in February, 1957, and succeeded in effecting an understanding between the African and Shirazi Associations. This opened the way for the formation of the Afro-Shirazi Party.

Upon the announcement of the first election to be held in Zanzibar, the ZNP became extremely active in putting up candidates in the various constituencies. The rumor was started that only Nationalists would be allowed to vote in the election. It was also rumored that the Arabs would reinstate slavery if they came into power. These rumors catapulted the African and Shirazi Associations into the political field to retaliate against the Arabs by forming the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP).

The ASP was eminently successful in its first appearance in the political arena, winning a sweep of five of the six contested seats. The main purpose of the ASP at the time of its foundation was simply to win the election. Abeid Karume, the leader of the African Association and then leader of the Afro-Shirazi Party, is quoted as saying in 1957, "We want the British to stay—for a time—because we will learn something from the British; the Arabs are backward just like us, and they try to make slaves of us." [10]

In the summer of 1959, Karume stated that his party was working for independence as was the Nationalist Party. After independence, he said, the two parties would split into a government and an opposition. The Nationalist Party, asserted Karume, is capitalistic, wealthy and Arab; the Afro-Shirazi Party is for the working people, the Africans.

Abeid Karume has been described by one Britisher in Zanzibar as "the Ernie Bevin of the Zanzibar workingman's movement." He is the son of a slave woman from Ruanda-

[10] "Happy Island," *Time*, August 5, 1957, p. 18.

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Urundi who came to Zanzibar shortly before he was born. Karume was technically born free, as slavery had been abolished in Zanzibar a few years before, but he lived his early years little better than a slave in the rough and tumble life of Zanzibar's streets. He spent twenty-two years as a merchant seaman and eventually ran a syndicate of motor boats in Zanzibar harbor. Karume has a tremendous following among the African people, and he is the one leader in Zanzibar who may be said to have the spark of charisma.

Karume's demagogic quality made it virtually impossible for the Shirazi leaders to trust him or to work with him effectively. His relations with the leaders of the Shirazi Association were tenuous from the beginning of their alliance. The ASP was never strong in Pemba, its main strength being in Zanzibar. The leaders of the Pemba Shirazi Association, Muhammed Shamte and Ali Shariff, did not formally join the party until after the election, early in 1958. The distrust between Karume and the leaders of the Shirazi Association was played down during the first eighteen months of the party's life, but it was clear that the rivalry between the leadership of the two groups would eventually split the party apart. This happened in due course in December, 1959.

The Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party

For several months prior to the final break-up of the ASP, relations between Karume and the leaders of the Shirazi Association, characterized by threats, intimidations, and openly hostile acts between the two camps, had been deteriorating. Muhammed Shamte, the Shirazi leader of the group which broke away from the ASP, states that he had always felt uneasy about Karume and his type of leadership. He believes that Karume has not outgrown the ways of his early life, that he is a rabble-rouser and that he uses methods which are not straightforward. Shamte is an educated man who has spent many years as a teacher and as superintendent of primary schools in Pemba. He comes from a well-to-do Shirazi family and owns a clove plantation in Pemba. He resigned from the government in 1957, after many years of service, to stand for election in South Pemba, where he won easily.

In late 1959, Karume began using all the slogans of the ZNP and demanding "Uhuru now!" This was contrary to

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the policy of the Shirazis at the time, which policy was to achieve considerable advances in the field of education and economic development before seeking complete independence.

Consistency has not been a strong characteristic in Zanzibar politics. Ideological positions have changed 180 degrees a number of times, and hated enemies have been known to become staunch allies.

When Shamte bolted the ASP he took with him Ameri Tajo, a Shirazi and the elected member to LEGCO from South Zanzibar, and Ali Shariff, the Shirazi elected member from North Pemba. Together they formed the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP) which was formally proclaimed on December 23, 1959. The new party then had in LEGCO a plurality of the elected members with three for the ZPPP (Shamte, Tajo and Shariff), two for the ASP (Karume and Daud Mahmoud), and one for the Muslim League (Chowdhary). Karume remained leader of the ASP with Thabit Kombo as General Secretary. (Karume's deputy is now Othman Shariff.)

The ZPPP is supported primarily by Shirazis, although it, like the other two parties, claims to be non-racial and welcomes members from any of the communities.

The split of the ASP was, of course, very welcome to the ZNP. With their opponents divided, the Nationalists rightly saw greater hope for success in the next election. As a result of the ASP split Karume and Shamte interchanged positions. Shamte began demanding full independence immediately as the ZNP had always done, while Karume again took (as he had in 1957) the much more moderate view of gradual steps toward independence and reliance on British guidance. Karume, having found himself with half a party, decided it to be to his advantage to stick close to the British Government. The Shirazi leaders, in their haste to disassociate themselves from Karume, moved rapidly toward the Nationalist camp, and took up a more nationalistic line, for which they had been condemning Karume only a short time before.

The Indian National Association and the Muslim League

The Indian community is far less active politically than the other racial groups. In fact, the Indians have, as yet, formed

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no political party. The position of the Indians in the economy is probably the major reason for their reluctance to take firm sides in the politics of the Protectorate. When one is engaged in trade it is unwise to risk boycotts by an opposing political group.

Of the six members elected to LEGCO in 1957, one was an Indian, Mr. Chowdhary of the Muslim League, and two of the six appointed, unofficial members were also Indians. They tended to be conservative in their political views. No independent Indians were returned in the June, 1961 elections. One Indian was elected on the ZNP ticket.

The Muslim League is made up of all Indian Muslims except those belonging to the Ismaili Sect of the Aga Khan. The Indian National Association consists of Ismailis and Hindus. The split between these two groups came at the time of the partition of India and Pakistan. In 1956, both the Indian and Pakistani Commissioners proposed to their people in East Africa that they forget that they are either Indians or Pakistanis and let themselves be known as Asians, Zanzibaris, Kenyans, and so on. They advised that this common outlook would be in the best interest of all. However, it is unthinkable that in the foreseeable future the Indians in Zanzibar will forget their religion or race, any more than will the Arabs or the Africans or the Shirazis.

The Position of the British Government

It has been said that the favored policy of the British Government toward Zanzibar, until very recently, was *haraka haraka haina baraka*—or, hasten slowly (Swahili). However, under Iain Macleod, Colonial Secretary from the autumn of 1959 to the autumn of 1961, Zanzibar made rapid strides toward self-government, culminating in the achievement of responsible government as a result of the elections in June, 1961. The British Government has during the past five years worked to prepare her colonies and territories for self-government at a greatly accelerated rate; but in the multi-racial areas the policy has been to progress more slowly due to the presence of conflicting racial interests, for all of which the British Government recognizes a responsibility. Rule by an elected indigenous government is envisioned, but two potential traps must be avoided: first, that one of the minorities

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should usurp the power of the majority; or, second, that the majority should subject the minorities to a loss of all rights and privileges. The British Government will not want to withdraw from Zanzibar until it can be certain that these dangers will be avoided. The results of the 1961 election have only confirmed and served to compound the fears of racial disunity.

1961–1962

As a result of the investigation and report made by Sir Hilary Blood in the spring of 1960, Zanzibar received a new constitution, and elections (Zanzibar's second) were planned for January, 1961, to establish responsible government in the Protectorate. The twenty-two elective seats in LEGCO were contested by the ASP, the ZNP and the ZPPP. By a peculiar twist of political fate, the election was stalemated by a single vote. In Chake-Chake, on Pemba, the vote was 1538 for the ASP and 1537 for the ZNP. This vote gave the ASP ten seats in LEGCO, the ZNP nine, and the ZPPP three. The ZPPP members split—two for the ZNP and one for the ASP—thus causing an even (11–11) division between the ASP and the ZNP.

LEGCO approved a bill on February 23, 1961, empowering the Civil Secretary to act as Chief Minister for the next six months, and new elections were called for June. In order to avoid another deadlock, a new seat was created on Pemba raising the number of elective seats in LEGCO to 23. The ZPPP formed an alliance with the ZNP for the elections, but a number of the ZPPP candidates on Pemba broke away from this alliance and supported the ASP.

The ASP received aid, mainly in the form of moral support, from both Tanganyika and Ghana (this was a switch from 1957 when Nkrumah had supported the ZNP), and accused the ZNP of being Arab-dominated and against an East African Federation. The ZNP denied these accusations, protesting that only four of its candidates were Arabs, and accused the ASP of the use of widespread intimidation during the campaign. The ASP also accused the ZNP of Communist influence and infiltration.

The bitterness of the pre-election campaign erupted on election day into bloody racial rioting and political murder.

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It started at Darjani, where people who were suspected of voting twice or of voting from other districts were attacked with stones and knives. The rioting quickly swept over the island. A state of emergency was declared, and British troops from Kenya and the Middle East were called in. When a tense calm was restored by June 8, 67 people were dead (all except 2 were Arabs), 320 injured and 1,205 arrested, and several thousand Arab refugees had fled to Zanzibar Town from the outlying districts. Both main political parties condemned the atrocities, but during the formal inquiry each blamed the other for starting the violence.

The riots have greatly compounded the racial distrust and disunity in the Protectorate, making it more difficult than ever for the racial communities to work together effectively in, or out of, Zanzibar's government.

Ninety-four per cent of those eligible to vote in the June elections cast their ballots. The ZNP won ten seats, the ASP ten seats, and the ZPPP three seats. With the alignment of the ZPPP with the ZNP the division was thirteen to ten, and the ZNP-ZPPP alliance was called upon to form a government. All the ministers of the new government are members of the ZNP with the exception of the Chief Minister, Sheikh Muhammed Shamte, who is the leader of the ZPPP. Sheikh Ali Muhsin, head of the ZNP, stepped aside to become the Minister of Education and Welfare, but it is accepted that he is the effective Chief Minister. Mr. Juma Aley (ZNP) is Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Ibuni Saleh (ZNP) is Minister of Works, Communications and Lands, and Mr. Achmad Abdulrehman Balaawy (ZNP) is Minister of Health.

The ASP bitterly denounced the election outcome as the result of vote fixing and gerrymandering. There is considerable evidence for the latter accusation, as the ASP received 1,092 more popular votes than the ZNP and the ZPPP combined. Othman Shariff, Deputy Leader of the ASP, declared a policy of non-cooperation with the new government and demanded new elections before the introduction of self-government. The ASP members have, in fact, attended LEGCO and have generally taken part in the business of the legislature since the election.

However, the truce is tenuous at best. Racial disunity ex-

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tends far back into Zanzibar's history, into the separate social and economic communities, and down to the political parties which sprang from them. The last elections brought the most violent racial conflict that Zanzibar has seen in years. New violence lies just below the surface calm.

Conclusion

An independent Zanzibar faces a number of trials and tribulations, as does any new state in the world today. For instance, there will be increased attempts at penetration by Communist China and Russia, and Zanzibar's leaders will find it a difficult task to keep their country out of the icy waters of the cold war. Zanzibar also is faced with enormous economic problems, despite the fact that she is self-supporting in everything but her welfare and development schemes. The economic position of the Protectorate has the inherent weakness of any one-crop economy. A bad storm or a sudden drop in the world market in cloves (which, incidentally, has been going steadily down since 1957) can throw Zanzibar's entire economy into chaos. The people will have to enter into new economic projects (such as diversification of agriculture or the establishment of a first-rate hotel and tourist trade) with more enthusiasm and ability than they have done in the past if they are to ensure Zanzibar's economic viability in the future.

With respect to an East African Federation, Zanzibar's leaders will have to decide on the place which Zanzibar should take in this group. Zanzibar's attitude toward an East African Federation will depend largely upon a solution to the problem of the Kenya Strip. The ten-mile wide Strip on Kenya's shore, extending from the Tanganyika border to the Tana River and including the port of Mombasa, is leased by the Sultan to Great Britain. As Kenya approaches independence, African demands in Kenya for the outright annexation of the Strip are becoming clamorous. It was proposed in late 1961 that Zanzibar be paid a sum of roughly $1,000,000 for the Strip. The Strip has long been a matter of national pride to Zanzibaris, and they will not easily give it up for a flat sum of money.

Of all the problems which beset Zanzibar, the greatest and

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the most difficult to overcome is racialism. In a multi-racial area the force of nationalism diminishes in ratio to the increase of dissension among the various racial communities. Where racial and cultural bonds are stronger than the ties to a geographic area (as in Africa) and where the race and culture are *not* homogeneous (as in Zanzibar) the cause of nationalism is weakened and often becomes a partisan tool rather than a united movement.

In Zanzibar, nationalism has become the goal vaguely strived for by all the people, but it is also the means used, or avoided, by a particular group to further its own political ends.

An independent Zanzibar faces the future without the two main unifying forces which it has had for the past fifty years —the Sultan Khalifa II, who died in the autumn of 1960, and the British Government. Seyyid Khalifa II, during his long and very popular reign, was a symbol of unity for all of his people. But the new Sultan, Khalifa's son, Abdulla, does not exercise the same degree of influence and has actually added to racial disunity by tacitly supporting the ZNP. When the British Government withdraws from Zanzibar, the other main source of balance in the racial situation will be gone.

The various racial communities of Zanzibar provide the virtual certainty of at least one opposition party within the country. But opposition based upon racial bitterness rather than upon responsible criticism and cooperation could topple an independent Zanzibar into chaos. It would be in the best interest of Zanzibar if the political parties and racial groups would unite for the time being and pool their limited resources of leaders and administrators to form a coalition government. But this, as was seen in the election and riots of 1961, is seeking the improbable, if not the impossible.

Racial divisiveness runs deep in Zanzibar politics. It has diffused the strength of a nationalist movement in Zanzibar and has slowed the Protectorate's development toward self-government and independence. It is certain to affect the politics of Zanzibar for a long time to come.

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REVIEWS

Between Past and Future. By HANNAH ARENDT. New York, The Viking Press, 1961.—246 pp. $5.00.

Most writing concerned with the history of ideas may be expected to add something to what we think of as our stock of knowledge; some discovery is divulged or some neglected feature of the intellectual landscape is lighted up, and appropriately we appraise such writing in terms of the specific contribution it makes. Now and again, however, writers appear who illuminate the whole landscape from some new direction, changing the appearance of even its most solid conformations. This, for example, was the achievement of those writers who, in the last century, explored the hypothesis of social evolution. Here, what falls to be appraised is not the new appearance of things but the validity of the hypothesis itself; and, regrettably enough, what seemed to be light often turns out to be a new sort of darkness. But there is a third kind of writer whose work is distinguished by no single hypothesis but which, by its profound observation of a number of what are already recognized to be prominent features, and by bringing these observations together, succeeds in imposing a new pattern of light and shade upon the whole landscape. Hannah Arendt is a writer of this sort.

She has taught us to look for a certain quality in her books, and now that we have learned our lesson she always fulfils our expectations. It is a quality of intelligence in which great and ready learning, the skill of always 'cutting between the joints' and brilliant powers of generalization combine to make each piece of her writing not only a profoundly thought-provoking composition but also a dazzling performance. This virtuosity does not depend upon choosing few and simple themes or upon the avoidance of the drudgery of thinking, nor is the pleasure it generates derived from a continuous encounter with the unexpected; there is magic in it, but no deception or trickery. But it is so great, and so unusual in a didactic writer, that it is something which the reader has almost to overcome if he is to avoid being submerged in a wave of intellectual excitement. It is a style, not so much of writing as of thinking and handling ideas, and its brilliance may arouse suspicion; but since there can be no question of its general validity or invalidity, this must remain (if

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it does remain) the suspicion not of being sent on an unprofitable journey but of being unduly beguiled by an exceedingly gifted, learned and original guide.

Between Past and Future is a collection of six essays whose central theme is "the crisis of our time." Occasionally Dr. Arendt seems to think of this as an event which has happened and in virtue of which we have come to inhabit a world different from that of our ancestors and in many respects different from that of our parents. And in this mood I think she is guilty of some exaggeration. More frequently, however, and properly, she interprets it as a disposition of our thoughts and habits of action, often qualified, by no means inescapable, which has been growing upon us since the sixteenth century. And the modern writers in whom she is interested—Hegel, Marx, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Burckhardt—engage her attention because it is they who began to diagnose (not always correctly) the character of a movement which had been largely imperceptible. As she understands it this crisis is "political"—that is, it is a disposition of our thoughts about what Hegel called the world of objective mind. In its most general character it constitutes an alienation of ourselves from this world which we have made for ourselves; but this general character is reflected in our present detachment from our past, in the disappearance of a sense of tradition, in the desuetude of the notion of political authority and in the confusion of our thoughts about human freedom, about the education of children, and about culture.

To other writers this theme would be primarily an opportunity for reproof and possibly prescription, but while she observes our impotence to deal with questions which were successfully handled by our ancestors, Dr. Arendt's design is preeminently explanatory. In elucidating this crisis, she is unavoidably led to explore the Greco-Roman-Christian sources of our culture. If the notion of political authority has disappeared from our world, what (she asks) are the essential features of this idea, with whom was it (both in theory and in practice) a compelling idea, what were the circumstances of its disappearance, and what the entailments? If we have lost a sense of tradition, what precisely is it that we have lost? If we are accustomed to think of political activity in terms of an analogy of fabrication, whence did we get this idea and what effect has it upon our conduct? The scale upon which she is obliged to consider these and the many other questions which her theme suggests to her forbids any detailed account of the mediations of the change which has overtaken us, but in place of this Dr. Arendt gives us from her great store of learning a multitude of insights—about the differences between our notions of

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history and those of the Greeks, about the importance of the idea of authority in Roman politics and its unimportance in Greek, about religion and politics at the beginning of our era, about the emergence of the secular world, about the analogies in terms of which political activity has been made intelligible, about the emergence of the public world of politics and its relation to the private world and to the "social" world, about the different attitudes towards the natural world which have conditioned and been conditioned by our thoughts about the political world, and about the transformation which the hierarchy of human activities has undergone during the last four centuries of our history.

In all this Dr. Arendt draws upon the evidence of the popular meanings of words and upon the writers who most closely reflect common ways of thinking: the historians, the orators and the poets. But it has often happened that what we have fastened upon in our intellectual inheritance is not some residue of earlier political experience, but an analogy or a manner of thinking derived from reflective writers such as Plato or Aristotle or St. Augustine, and some of the most illuminating pages in this book are concerned with what popular thought has taken (not always to its advantage) from the philosophers. Many of the general ideas which Dr. Arendt uses in these "excursions in political thought" as points upon which to take bearings and in relation to which to "fix" historical situations will be familiar to readers of *The Human Condition,* and, for me at least, these essays remove some of the obscurities of this most remarkable intellectual apparatus which she has constructed for herself.

Since the virtue of this book lies in the profoundly observed distinctions and the brilliantly observed connections which fill its pages, and in the learning which informs every turn of its argument, it is not surprising that an occasional note of exaggeration should intrude. Writing at this level of generalization, the peaks are apt to appear higher and the valleys deeper than they are; the differences between Greek and Roman and between ourselves as we are and ourselves as we were larger; and the degree to which a disposition of thought has managed to impose itself greater, than it really is. But in a book of this kind, which touches the history of European civilization at so many points and touches nothing without adding to its intelligibility, there is something to be learned from these exaggerations and, indeed, from the puzzles which remain.

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The Levellers and the English Revolution. By H. N. BRAILSFORD. California, Stanford University Press, 1961.—xiii, 715 pp. $10.00.

The author of this book, Henry Noel Brailsford, died on March 23, 1958 at the age of eighty-four. Thus passed away with the years of a patriarch upon him one of the greatest journalists of his time, a writer of fine style, excellent scholarship, and wide interests and knowledge. Brailsford was famous as an editorial writer for several distinguished English newspapers and journals. He was also among the chief proponents of British socialism between the wars. His book, *The War of Steel and Gold,* published in 1914 shortly before the outbreak of the first great war, was a prescient discussion of international relations at the fate-laden moment when Europe and the West were about to enter their Time of Troubles. It is probably the most important of his numerous works devoted to political topics and still worth reading.

Brailsford had a natural sympathy for the rebels, the skeptics, and the defiers of convention. Though he did not overlook their faults, he admired them and wrote some of his best things about them. His *Voltaire* is a splendid account of the great Frenchman's witty and probing mind and his interventions against injustice, while *Shelley, Godwin, and Their Circle* is unsurpassed as a concise rendering of the extraordinary intellectual milieu of the poet and his father-in-law.

The reviewer had the privilege of knowing Brailsford while he was at work on this book on the Levellers. He was then in his late seventies and could be seen three or four afternoons a week at the British Museum. There, in the undersea light of the North Library, he used to sit at a table in the last row, invariably attired in a suede lumber jacket over a sweater, taking notes from the Thomason tracts which he entered in a series of composition books. He was the kindliest of men and it was easy for an American scholar to meet and talk with him. We often discussed our studies and were sometimes able to give each other assistance. His deep absorption in the English revolution was a common bond, for as he says in his first chapter, he regarded the revolutionary period as the most exciting in the history of England. Unhappily, Brailsford did not live long enough to complete his work. But the task of preparing the book for publication has been well done by Christopher Hill. Despite a certain repetitiveness and jerkiness and the lack of a conclusion, it is relatively complete and contains most of what Brailsford wished to say.

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A great deal has been written about the Levellers in recent years, particularly by American scholars to whom Brailsford pays generous tribute. It cannot be said that he has added much to what is already known about the radical movement that contributed so much to the political ferment of the 1640's. Nevertheless, his book ought certainly to be read not only by students of the seventeenth century but by everyone interested in the history of modern political thought. He provides a comprehensive and detailed account of Leveller party activity and of its political and social program. There are excellent characterizations of the Leveller leaders. His analysis of Lilburne's personality is particularly interesting, and he makes the ingenious but plausible suggestion that there was something like a son-father relationship, with all its ambivalence, between Lilburne and Cromwell. He also has valuable things to say about Leveller propaganda. His story of *The Moderate,* which was a Leveller newspaper for a time, breaks fresh ground. Here and there he discusses profitably the authorship of some important anonymous pamphlets. I am surprised to find him attributing *Tyranipocrit* to William Walwyn. This communist tract, one of the most remarkable in a century of great pamphleteering, is certainly not Walwyn's. We discussed the subject on one occasion and seem to have agreed on this. Would that the writer were known!

Brailsford believed that in the development of the English revolution, the Levellers often gave the lead which Cromwell subsequently followed. In this, his main thesis, he is surely right. Cromwell, who was no doctrinaire, broke with the Levellers because he thought their desire for a democratic republic dangerously visionary. But the idea of a written constitution as the foundation of the political order and the creation of a parliamentary republic *sans* a House of Lords were but some of the measures he and his political associates had to embrace. Both were proclaimed in the program of the Levellers, from which others took and adapted them.

Brailsford himself was an heir of the dissenting tradition in English life of which the Levellers were some of the greatest representatives. His book is a work of rich understanding and just affection, for in the skeptical Walwyn, the satiric Overton, and the militant Lilburne he found kindred spirits whose outstanding traits were, like his own, a hatred of intolerance and a passion for liberty.

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Political Influence. By EDWARD C. BANFIELD. New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961.—vi, 354 pp. $6.00.

Here is a good book on metropolitan government with a disturbing ending. It falls into three parts: a set of six excellent cases of political conflict and decision, a useful theoretical portion on the nature of influence in a decentralized system, and a final chapter coming to a set of serendipitous conclusions which hardly seem justified by the data and analysis which preceded them.

The cases, informative, packed with insightful and "insideful" detail, moving swiftly with narrative power, tell the stories of "virtually 100 per cent" of the important city-wide Chicago controversies in the two year period 1957–58. They report on: a controversy over the location of a branch hospital and the stalemate which frustrated almost all sides of the issue, the achievement of a merger of welfare agencies subordinating a very good city one to a state wide agency more for political than professional purposes, the failure of a proposal to refinance the Chicago Transit Authority so that it might take certain needed steps to improve its downtown Chicago services, the failure of a real estate development designed to "save" the downtown area, the failure of a proposal to build a new branch of the University of Illinois in or near the city of Chicago, the final success of a project launched by the *Chicago Tribune* for a new Exhibition Hall.

Banfield's theory of influence, emerging from the cases as it does, has the virtues and defects of specificity: since it is not a "general theory" it avoids the rather bloodless abstraction which makes some such theories hard to use, but it has a somewhat limited application to situations like that of Chicago in 1957–58. I prefer it that way—it can and probably will grow by marginal extension and exclusion. Dealing first with the formal situation of multiple and decentralized power Banfield likens it to "a great governing committee each member of which has, in matters affecting it, an absolute veto" (p. 235). This situation is relieved only by a strong political machine, but since the Governor and the Mayor can check each other, and each may be checked by blocs of voters, a process of reciprocal trading takes place. It is in the description and analysis of this process, the circumstances of strength and weakness, the accumulation and disbursement of power, that the theory makes its contribution. A final theoretical chapter proposes a more or less abstract model and a set of hypotheses which follow therefrom.

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Since so few books today, or ever, embrace, as this one does, good data, even modestly original theory, and style, I must criticize this one as a friend of the enterprise it represents. It suffers, I think, from these serious defects: First, there is implicit in the argument a kind of "influence fund" assumption—there is just so much influence available for a mayor or governor or other political leader which he can save, invest, or spend. Yet anyone who has observed a strong political leader create instruments of support, organize people for new purposes, devise programs with political appeal, and shape the public mind, must know that the missing ingredient in the Banfield picture is political leadership. He misinterprets Chicago in 1957–58 as a microcosm of the urban world. The particular circumstances which make it possible for a "broker" to be political boss of Chicago at one time are not immutable.

In the second place, Banfield, like the rest of us, is struggling with serious problems of the development and use of empirical theory. His solution is a good one, but it would have been improved by integrating his theory with his data somewhat more —that is, by using it. An array of possible elements for a possible set of relationships offers something for those who wish to go on from here, but how much better it would have been if he had shown his categories, his classes, his variables, his nomenclature in action, that is, not merely illustrating but *explaining* something.

And in the third place, there is the matter of the conclusions. Banfield concludes that "the Chicago political system . . . in its general features . . . is a reasonably close approximation of the logical model that is preferable" (p. 339). To him it combines that degree of central decision making and decentralized political and social choice which suffers least from the evils which each alone exhibits. No hospital! No transit system improvement! No Chicago branch of the university! Patients are not politically organizable, nor are passengers, nor are future students—they hardly count in the scales which Banfield says should be used in Chicago. Even if they organized, the play of politics in the circumstances he describes (where the *Tribune* wins but welfare clients lose) offers little hope. One can only infer that the concluding chapter of this otherwise excellent book is a vote for minimum local government.

ROBERT E. LANE

YALE UNIVERSITY

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Tojo and the Coming of the War. By ROBERT J. C. BUTOW. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961.—vii, 584 pp. $10.00.

It is now fourteen years since the International Military Tribunal for the Far East found Japan's wartime leaders guilty of a vast conspiracy to wage wars of aggression over the period from 1928 to 1945, and sentenced the seven—Doihara, Hirota, Itagaki, Kimura, Matsui, Muto, and Tojo—to be hanged in the little whitewashed room in Sugamo Prison. "An animal circus," Tojo had called the trial. "A victors' judgment," he said on another occasion. And to most Japanese ever since it has seemed unfair that so few were made to bear the responsibility for the common efforts of so many.

Inevitably as the years have gone by, a revisionist sentiment has grown in Japan. Purged leaders like Tojo and Shigemitsu have written voluminous memoirs. Former staff officers, like Hattori and Satō, have written new military accounts. Groups of scholars have searched the archives and conducted lengthy interviews. Some of these men seek to clear the names of themselves and their friends. Others are engaged in a national effort, a search for a verdict of history more understanding of the Japanese people, more sympathetic with their tragedy, and more reassuring as a basis on which to build the future. It remains to be seen what verdict they will eventually accept.

Meanwhile, scholars in the West also have begun a serious reexamination of those fateful years. One comprehensive review was that of F. C. Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia, 1937–45* (London, 1954). Using the trial records and western language materials only, this British historian took serious issue with the judgment of the Tribunal. "The foreign policy of Japan during 1937-41," he concluded, "did not represent the steady unfolding of a master-plan, aimed at securing the hegemony of Eastern Asia and devised by a coolly calculating and united band of conspirators." Instead, it was "a mixture of opportunism and blundering." And while responsibility for it lay chiefly with the "short-sighted mediocrities" who ruled Japan, it was perhaps shared in part by western policy-makers, chiefly American, who responded too rigidly and too formalistically to Japanese pressures.

Now another review has been undertaken by a leading American specialist on Japan, Robert J. C. Butow, associate professor of history at the University of Washington, and author of the fascinating study, *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (Stanford, 1954). In *Tojo and the Coming of the War,* he presents a biography of General Hideki Tojo, Japan's wartime War Minister and

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Premier, as part of the story of the rise to power of the Japanese military and their leading the nation to Pearl Harbor.

It is an absorbing book, based on the latest published Japanese language as well as western language materials, together with the Trial and other unpublished materials; and it is written with style and point. As a biographer, Professor Butow was faced with the same problem that has frustrated most biographers of Japanese, a paucity of materials on his subject's private life and personal views. Most of Tojo's personal papers are thought to have been burned in a bombing raid on Tokyo late in the war. The result is that except for his trial and last days Tojo is presented more as a symbol of the times than a man through whose personality the times can better be understood. He emerges as a "simple man," honest, loyal to his Emperor, but with "limited knowledge of men and deeds outside the Army." Unquestionably, he supported the general trend of policy, but he was "not so much an initiator of policies as a promoter of them and a propagandist for them."

Who then were the initiators, the policy planners, whose will could not be thwarted even by the highest officials, military as well as civilian? They were, Butow suggests, the *chūken shōkō*, the "nucleus group within the supreme command," made up of "the majors and lieutenant colonels of the key sections of the War Ministry and the Army General Staff." He suggests that they began their rise to power with the assassination of Chang Tso-lin in 1928 and had consolidated their position by 1936 to such an extent that thereafter the "nominal" leaders of the government became little more than "robots." This is a challenging view, convincing in those few cases where the evidence is full enough and attractive as conforming more to Japanese understanding of their own social and administrative relations than does the western concept of individual responsibility of the top leaders. It should provide a fruitful hypothesis for further research directed at trying to identify more specifically the members of this "nucleus group" and to analyze their activities and influence.

In tracing the major decisions which led to Pearl Harbor, Professor Butow presents a wealth of new information both on the decisions themselves and the process of their formation. Like F. C. Jones, he does not find them to fit into a pattern of long-range, premeditated conspiracy; they represent rather the stumbling efforts of irresponsible men to deal one by one with crises of their own making, but which they never understood. Trapped, says Butow, by an addiction to conformity, optimism and personal indirection, by an irrational, ultra-nationalistic

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view of the world, and by the inadequacies of the political system in which they operated (army-navy rivalry and the independence of the supreme command), these men understood neither the requirements of modern warfare nor the implications of their own acts. They were ignorant of reality.

That Tojo and his colleagues failed tragically, is readily agreed, but this reviewer at least cannot escape the feeling that the war was something less than a complete vindication of western, particularly American, policies in those years. Was it realistic for Americans to suppose that, given the choice of evacuation from China or war with the United States, the Japanese would choose the former? Was it realistic for Americans to suppose that the evacuation of Japanese forces, either by agreement or by defeat, would be followed by the establishment of a stable, open, and friendly China? or a united, independent Korea? or a peaceful, cooperative Soviet Union? Our "reality" was different from that of Japan's war leaders, but there seems to have been no monopoly on either side.

JAMES WILLIAM MORLEY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Japan Subdued: The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific. By HERBERT FEIS. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961.—v, 199 pp. $4.00.

This complement of *Between War and Peace* displays the meticulous scholarship and discerning judgment that have distinguished each of Herbert Feis' previous publications on the diplomatic history of World War II. Unquestionably, *Japan Subdued* is the most lucid narrative of the major events, circumstances and decisions leading to the termination of the Pacific War and will serve as a basic reference for scholars and laymen. Of particular interest are the "analytical reflections" on the decision to use the A-bomb and the timing of the explanation of the meaning of unconditional surrender. These welcome evaluations were prompted by the author's conviction that the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has left "eternity imperiled."

Concerning the A-bomb decision, Feis judiciously concludes, "the only score on which the American government can be fairly criticized is that it did not let the Japanese know the nature and destructive power of the new weapon to be used against them if the Potsdam Declaration was rejected." On the timing of the statement, Feis believes the Japanese would not have surrendered before July, "either in response to such statement of policies in explanation of our call for unconditional surrender as the State

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Department urged the President to make, or such a statement about the dynasty as Grew had in mind." Justifiably, however, Feis is deeply troubled by the belated fashion in which the American government announced that "unconditional surrender" would not mean the end of the Imperial dynasty. Would an earlier assurance have induced the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration before the utilization of the A-bomb? Feis retreats from this conjecture and thereby, for this reviewer, invites a serious reservation concerning one aspect of his narrative of the process culminating in the Potsdam statement.

Specifically, Feis discusses three separate policies on how to end the war as being given serious consideration at the highest levels of the American government between April and August—namely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged an assault on the home islands; Acting Secretary of State Grew advocated an inducement in the form of a guarantee of the preservation of the dynasty; and, Secretary of War Stimson favored a shock treatment, the employment of the A-bomb in conjunction with a statement embodying Grew's ideas. Yet, as Feis carefully indicates, Grew was not a decision-maker and both of his superiors, Stettinius and Byrnes, were at best unsympathetic to his advice. It would seem, therefore, that inducement was not a particularly viable element in policy-making between April and August. If, as recent Japanese sources suggest, the Potsdam Declaration was initially rejected because it implied the end of the dynasty and the final decision to capitulate was less of a "decision to surrender" than a "decision to preserve the throne," the substance of the declaration is as historically significant as its timing. Feis' failure to analyze this matter in a way comparable to his evaluation of the timing of the Potsdam Declaration and of the decision to use the A-bomb is regrettable.

If diplomacy, or inducement, occupied a secondary role to "the impetus of the combat effort and plans, the impulse to punish, the inclination to demonstrate how supreme was our power, the dramatic tension of the new promised weapon . . ." was this not a deficiency that imperiled eternity as much as the mission of the Enola Gay? In view of his forthright analytical reflections on the A-bomb decision, one can but hope that Feis subsequently will evaluate the attitudes and assumptions within which American policies were formulated. Certainly, no one is better qualified for this difficult task.

JAMES B. CROWLEY

AMHERST COLLEGE

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India and the West. By BARBARA WARD. New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1961.—256 pp. $4.50.

India and the United States. Edited by Selig Harrison. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1961.—xii, 244 pp. $5.95.

Miss Barbara Ward's object in writing her book on India has already been partly achieved. President Kennedy has shown that he agrees with many of her arguments, and has taken steps which ensure that the Third Indian Economic Plan does not founder for lack of foreign finance. But the book is not in consequence superfluous. It is a beautifully lucid study of the Indian economy, how it has developed in the past, and its need at the present. It will serve to strengthen our purpose at times of flagging interest. It may lead us to concentrate on India's economic plans even when its political intentions are not according to our liking, as over Goa.

Miss Ward's theme is that the West has unfinished business in India; it must not interrupt it now. By the political subjugation of India, Great Britain brought India through the first stages in economic modernization. But it was only a first stage; it did not carry India far enough. It had to abdicate its authority before India had been carried decisively through to modernity. Since then the Indian government has enlarged its plans and dwarfed entirely the effort which went before. But it has been handicapped by lack of finance. Shortage of capital to make the plans possible is, or was, the principal bane of the country.

Capital is indeed, for Miss Ward, the key to progress. It gives her book its apocalytic sense. It will be a disastrous day for the world, she says, if we let the plan collapse for lack of backing. It is not only India which experiences this acute need. Britain—the country whose economic history she knows best—was faced at the start of its industrial revolution with a similarly acute need to compel society as a whole to save capital, which meant postponing its enjoyment of its immediate labours. It forced the revolution through by means which now excite horror. They are described by Dickens, Disraeli, and the social novelists of the nineteenth century. We are all the beneficiaries of classes which a hundred years ago were made to live in hovels and to work under the incredible conditions of labour. But India must look in part to a different means. For one thing the standard of living is already so low that it could not be greatly depressed; for another thing, Marxism and Leninism make the British methed no longer possible. They breed revolt at their mere suggestion.

One of the most interesting sections of the book is in fact the

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analysis of the legend of Marxism, and above all of Lenin on imperialism. The legend is coherent; but it is false. It bears singularly little relation to the actual events of economic exploitation. The critique in thirty pages is very brilliant. Yet, though it is a legend, it is nonetheless powerful in moving men to revolution. If India is to be saved from a movement of protest, an easier way must be found for it to acquire an economy like other modern states.

That way must be the mobilization of resources from the free world. It is not charity from the West; it is mere prudence. India's Congress leaders are right to point this out. If they can demonstrate that, with resources, they can transform India, then they can pose the alternative. Either the resources are made available, and Congress completes its work, or they are starved of adequate funds and the plan collapses. It is a kind of blackmail, but one which can be pursued honestly.

The other book, which is edited by Mr. Selig Harrison, is a kind of symposium upon a variety of problems which lie between India and America. Mr. Harrison makes use of the proceedings of two conferences, and has cleverly regrouped the transcript of conversation. As a result he has obtained statements by most of the men who have made American thinking on India, and a few of those who make thinking in India. Those who want a resumé of American thought will find it here, but the same cannot be said for those trying to piece together the Indian standpoint. The Indians are too much of one mind; they speak too diplomatically; the communists and the communalists are much underrated. Mr. Selig Harrison, who is the author of the principal work of prophetic doom about India to appear in America, seems rather uneasy about this in his foreword.

GUY WINT

ST. ANTONY'S COLLEGE, OXFORD

The Anglo-American Predicament: The British Commonwealth, The United States and European Unity. By H. C. ALLEN. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1960.—xiv, 241 pp. $6.75.

This well written tract for the times is by no means out of date even though the British Government has done what its author obviously did not anticipate: apply for membership in the Common Market. The Anglo-American predicament, as H. C. Allen envisages it, is that the four principal areas of Western civilization—the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth (or at least Canada, Australia and New Zealand), the United States and Western Europe—need to establish closer and, in his view, constitutional

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bonds both for the sake of their own development and to present a unified front to the Communist world. Unless they establish what he calls Atlantic Union, the author fears that the pulls and counterpulls towards one or other of these groups will distort the purposes and policies of the two most significant countries within this complex: the United States and the United Kingdom. But to build so great a structure out of such varied countries would be no easy task. The purpose of this book is to argue the case why it should be attempted.

Professor Allen is unusually well equipped to present such an argument to both the British and the American people. Since 1955, he has been Commonwealth Fund Professor of American History at the University of London, the only permanently tenable chair of American history in the United Kingdom. A fellow at Harvard University in 1946, he spent the next nine years as fellow at Lincoln College, Oxford; since then he has held three visiting posts in the United States and one in Australia. Both from study and from experience, he knows much of the countries of which he writes, and he is as frank in bringing out the problems involved in Anglo-American partnership as he is in describing its benefits. Whatever happens, he clearly feels that this partnership is the chief essential for the maintenance of a relatively stable world.

The particular circumstance which gave rise to this book, however, was the pre-1961 reluctance of the British Government to accept the close economic relationship, with its marked political overtones, which would be entailed in joining with "the Six"—France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg—in the European Economic Community or, as it is better known, the Common Market. The first part of the volume is devoted to justifying this reluctance, and to documenting the fact that the United Kingdom has such worldwide economic, political and strategic ties and commitments that it would be peculiarly difficult for that country to tie itself irrevocably to its European neighbors, particularly in a constitutional relationship in which it would no longer have the determining voice. In the light of the British Government's decision in 1961 to apply for membership in the European Community, it is particularly interesting to learn that as late as 1958 only fourteen per cent of the United Kingdom's trade was with the six countries of the Common Market, while in 1952 when the first stage of European economic unity was launched with the Coal and Steel Community, Britain's total trade with free Europe was twenty-eight per cent of its commerce as compared with twenty-two and one half per cent with the Western Hemisphere, twenty-five and one half per cent with Africa and Asia, and twelve per cent with Oceania.

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Having regard for the facts which Professor Allen marshals so competently, how can one explain the change in the attitude of the British government to membership in the Common Market? The striking degree of prosperity of the Common Market countries provides part of the answer. But it is also significant that the American government, far from resisting the new British move, has not only endorsed it but is also throwing its weight behind the development of more liberal American trade policies so as to add a further dimension to the acceleration of the flow of trade which an enlarged Common Market can be expected to produce. Interestingly enough, and again in opposition to Professor Allen's expectations, it has been the governments of Commonwealth countries—in particular, Canada among those most developed, and Ghana and Nigeria among the less developed—which have most strongly criticized the British decision to seek a close relation with "the Six." Ghana and Nigeria declare that association with the Common Market savors of "quasi-colonialism," fearing that it would limit their development of industries but disregarding the fact that it would enable their primary products to compete on even terms in the European market with those from African countries which were formerly or are still associated with France and Belgium. The Canadian government has seemed fearful for its industrial exports to the United Kingdom as well as for its agricultural exports, a shortsighted view if Common Market membership should increase British prosperity, as one would expect, and therefore long-term capacity to absorb overseas goods. In any case, the British are attempting in their negotiations to safeguard the position of Commonwealth agricultural exports as well as of their own farmers, thereby creating for themselves the only serious difficulties in reaching a mutually satisfactory arrangement with "the Six."

While on so many counts Professor Allen's argument has not been borne out by events, his basic thesis remains unimpaired, and most of his material relevant to an understanding of current developments. The United Kingdom is still committed to the broad concept of interrelating its ties with Europe, the Commonwealth and the United States for precisely the reasons he describes. British objectives have not changed but only the considerations about how best to achieve them.

It is true that if Common Market membership is secured the emphasis within British relationships will inevitably change. Western European rather than Commonwealth countries will form the inner circle of British relations. Such a change befits a period when strategic relations are inevitably regional in character and

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economic ties must to some degree reflect strategic realities. Yet, because the United States is the most powerful of Western countries with strategic responsibilities in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, the three original overseas Commonwealth members—Canada, Australia and New Zealand—are tied into any relationship resting on Anglo-American partnership. It is perhaps also this fact that the United States would become a still more significant factor in Commonwealth relations that has led to the surprisingly critical reaction of some Commonwealth countries to the British overtures to the Common Market. Yet of all countries they should be the first to realize, particularly in the perspective of the events of World War II, that their security and prosperity depend on the closest possible relations between a prosperous United States and a prosperous United Kingdom. Indeed, although the process and the formal results would be different, the American government's enthusiastic support of British participation in an enlarged European economic community might conceivably lead to something not very different in basic concept from the Atlantic community which Professor Allen hopes so fervently will one day be realized.

GWENDOLEN M. CARTER

SMITH COLLEGE

The European Common Market: An Analysis of Commercial Policy. By ISAIAH FRANK. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1961.—324 pp. $8.50.

Good civil servants are not necessarily good scholars and authors. Even when they are, they rarely have a chance to write substantial works on matters they know at first hand, especially if these matters are recent, controversial, and still highly relevant to policy. We should be grateful, then, for the Rockefeller Public Service Award that gave Isaiah Frank the time to work on this book, for his determination and ability in writing it, and for the State Department clearance processes that permitted the former Acting Director of the Office of International Trade to publish it. This is no inside story but a scholarly analysis that benefits greatly from the author's firsthand experience with much of his subject matter over a long period. Mr. Frank's example should encourage us to find more ways of persuading able government officials to write and of letting them publish.

As the subtitle indicates, this is a book about tariffs and quotas, inside the European Economic Community and between the Community countries and the rest of the world. "In . . . com-

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mercial policy terms," says Frank, the Common Market "is already the most important event of this century." Between the writing and the reviewing of this book events have moved on. Inevitably, some matters of great current interest are not discussed but the main lines of analysis are distinctly not outdated. Frank has a good eye for the continuing problems. For instance, his discussion of the breakdown of the free trade area negotiations emphasizes disagreements about how much freedom a member country should have in its commercial policy toward the rest of the world. The issue is still relevant to the new negotiations between Britain and the Six and to the less-discussed question of how British membership would affect the Community. It is highly pertinent to any negotiations that may take place between the Community and countries that wish to be closely associated with it without becoming members.

One of the book's major contributions is the examination of the relations between the Common Market's external tariff and the rules and procedures of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The account of the negotiations, in which the author participated, and his analysis of the difficulties of matching the concrete arrangements worked out among the Six with the largely untested general criteria laid down in the multilateral agreement are the best we have. One might well conclude that if regional trading arrangements have come to stay, the GATT rules should be reviewed and made more precise. At the same time, Frank's careful analysis raises doubts whether any general—and generally acceptable—formulas could be expected to deal adequately with all the cases that would arise.

Another especially notable chapter concerns the quota provisions of the Treaty of Rome. After showing how many potential difficulties were avoided by Western Europe's advance to convertibility, Frank goes on to explore the still unsettled problem of what will happen if one of the members of the Community runs into balance of payments difficulties. He makes a strong argument for the view that it will be very hard for a country to impose import restrictions without applying them to members as well as non-members and shows how these circumstances create pressures for monetary integration. "Meantime various halfway houses offer promising possibilities for strengthening Community influence over independent national financial policies . . ."

Frank devotes relatively few pages to United States policy, but these are trenchant. The 1958 renewal of the Trade Agreements Act, he reminds us, was supported by arguments about the need to bargain with the Common Market before its tariff was too

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firmly set. The 20 per cent cut in the external tariff tentatively offered by the Six was largely scaled to the bargaining power granted in the American legislation. Frank foresaw that the inability to use the full legal bargaining power would make the GATT negotiations of 1960 and 1961 very difficult. (He has little to say about the problems of agricultural trade, which arose in an especially difficult form after his book was written and contributed substantially to blocking the negotiations.) Looking ahead, Frank suggests that to bargain effectively with the Common Market the United States needs power to cut tariffs more broadly than traditional item-by-item negotiations permitted. He proposes reduction in the average tariff level, perhaps by broad categories, which would still leave a government some flexibility in determining how much each rate should be cut. If this approach were adopted, peril point and escape clause provisions would have to be modified and Frank is led, like many others, to the conclusion that some form of adjustment assistance should be offered to domestic industries and workers affected by import competition.

This book has a special attraction for former practitioners of commercial policy who appreciate the professional mastery with which long, firsthand experience is joined to sound economic analysis. But by any standards this is one of the best books we have on the Common Market, and a substantial addition to the literature of commercial policy.

WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR.

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
NEW YORK CITY

Europe at Sixes and Sevens: The Common Market, the Free Trade Association and the United States. By EMILE BENOIT. New York, Columbia University Press, 1961.—xxi, 275 pp. $5.00.

In general, since World War II, issues, policies, and institutions of "international finance" have been more conspicuous than those of "commercial" relations. Payments problems have scarcely been eradicated, but they have been sufficiently modified and moderated to make it both feasible and desirable to give additional weight to considerations of trade. The "Common Market" (European Economic Community)—based on a March 1957 treaty which became effective January 1, 1958, with the first trade concessions effective January 1, 1959—is an experiment in commercial (and political) regionalism which is interesting and may ultimately prove to be momentous.

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The EEC is intended progressively to eliminate trade barriers among the members, while maintaining a common tariff (lower than the average previously prevailing) against the rest of the world. The "community" is more than a customs union, providing for free movement of labor and capital, restraints on certain discriminatory and competitively restrictive measures, coordination of various economic and social policies, and establishment of an Investment Bank, an overseas Development Fund, and other common agencies. The Free Trade Association (FTA), quickly "thrown together" for the purpose largely of bargaining with the EEC (pp. 79–80), is a simpler organization, characterized by scheduled reduction of internal trade barriers but no common external tariff.

On the nature and prospects of the EEC "inner Six" (France, West Germany, Italy, Benelux) and its relations with the FTA "outer seven" (Britain, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, Portugal) and the rest of the world (notably the United States), Professor Benoit gives us a useful, small encyclopedia of considerable history, much descriptive, statistical, and legalistic matter, a commonsensical approach, and a smattering of formal economic analysis. (As a supplement, one may consult Bela Balassa, *The Theory of Economic Integration* [Irwin, 1961].) In a book which ranges from contemplation of broad trends of modern world history to summarization of how to do business in Europe, the political scientist, the business analyst, the economist, and the student of recent history all will find portions of substantial interest—but perhaps none will be equally attracted by all portions.

The first half (approximately 120 pages) could almost constitute a separate monograph. It encompasses a review of the economic characteristics of the EEC region, the governing institutions and the various economic policies and plans of the EEC, the history and the prospects (generally as of early 1960) of EEC integration with the FTA. The latter part then analyzes the balance of payments and the international competitive position of the United States, trading and investment opportunities in an "integrated" Europe, and, more briefly, the world setting and broad significance of European integration.

In scope, the book is bold. It is bold also in consistently attempting to suggest concrete and quantified answers to questions which can be fully answered only in the future, if ever. Economic projections and political predictions and prescriptions are obviously (and admittedly) hazardous; there is room for much controversy on such matters as the United States payments situation. But boldness is matched by optimism. Benoit not only

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wishes a high degree of European integration, centered on an enlarged and elaborated EEC, he largely *expects* it. And in all this, Benoit, like the EEC founding fathers themselves, is more fundamentally enamored of the *political* aspirations and potentialities of the integration movement than of the strictly economic. Although the experiment, which "may well be a turning point in history . . . is being applied first of all in the realm of economics and business," it has an "essentially political purpose," namely, "to transcend nationalism" (p. xiii) and attain "political unification" (p. 4).

Benoit often and candidly notes difficulties to be met in implementing integration and making it a force constructive for both Europe and the rest of the free world, but he is generally confident that the difficulties—including the status of Britain (and the Commonwealth) vis-à-vis the EEC and the treatment of the United States by the EEC—will be satisfactorily met. Only rarely are fundamental doubts expressed on the basis of long-standing European diversities and of jealously reserved national powers. Yet, one may be dubious of the more glowing anticipations, requiring substantial and abrupt changes in historical evolution, partly on the premise that, for good or ill, tomorrow is likely to resemble closely the extrapolation of yesterday and today.

WILLIAM R. ALLEN

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (LOS ANGELES)

The Political Foundations of International Law. By MORTON A. KAPLAN and NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH. New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1961.—viii, 372 pp. $6.95.

The title of this book raises great expectations. To the student of international politics interested in the role of law and to the student of international law concerned about the impact of politics, hardly any problem appears more exciting than that concerning the factual, "sociological" bases of international law. It is on the proper assessment of the relations of these "foundations" to the norms that the answer to the old and vexing question concerning the "nature" of international law depends.

It is the great merit of this book to prove abundantly that both the cynical and the idealistic extremes of the answers are wrong and that there exist "normative constraints on political behavior" as well as "substantive constraints on international law." In order to "relate the norms of international law to their political foundations" the authors use a "systems theory of international politics." One of the authors being a well-known systems

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theorist, one is not surprised to find much emphasis placed on the impact which two systems above all—the classical balance of power system, and what Mr. Kaplan had already analyzed previously as the "loose bipolar system" of the present—have had on the emergence and character of international norms. The entire volume is organized on this basis. Ranging in subject matter over the customary fields, from "international persons" and recognition through problems of jurisdiction and sources to war, neutrality, and organization, its chapters are arranged throughout in such a manner as to contrast the impact of the balance system with that of bipolarity. Balance involves "flexibility of alignments," bipolar blocs involve "rigidity of alignment," and it is primarily these factors which, according to the authors, account for the nature and changes of norms. Such disparate things as rules on military occupation and standards of recognition are tied up with them.

This reviewer has no quarrel with a previously much neglected emphasis on international systems and their effect on the development of legal structure; it makes sense in numerous instances treated in this study. But he questions just how much it explains. In part, systems analysis seems not to go deep enough to really show "foundations"; in part, on the contrary, it may not be proximate enough. For example, are not most norms delimiting jurisdictions somehow connected with the very nature of states as territorial entities whose spheres they circumscribe? On the other hand, the more specific character of these and other rules frequently is determined by extremely concrete political circumstances and interests (for example, fears of the possibility of submarine hiding and their impact on recent debates over the width of coastal waters). It would appear that solving the problems of "foundations" requires the most intensive research into often minute details of situations as they affect each specific complex of norms (such digging as can be found in Otto Kirchheimer's recent *Political Justice* anent rules on asylum and extradition). The most glaring omission, however, is that of any discussion, indeed, any mentioning, of political ideologies and systems, and their impact on international law. Can one meaningfully discuss present attitudes on "statehood" or "sovereignty," on war and aggression, on the role of international courts or international agencies, or, more concretely, debate the legal status of East Germany or Algeria, without taking into account Soviet theory on international law? Indeed, can one understand changes in the law of military occupation without reference to the emergence of totalitarian

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systems, such as the fascist ones, and their policies during World War II? Can rules and policies of recognition be analyzed without reference to clashing ideologies and systems in combat?

This omission furnishes one reason why the authors' analyses of today's blocs are often revealing when they deal with intra-bloc relations and law (for example, with new supranational structure in the West), and very meager on inter-bloc relations. Yet much in the field of policy depends on correct assessment of the opponent's views, including his legal doctrine (the present conflict over the legal status of Berlin is a case in point). Instead, large stretches in the later part of the book deal with international organization in the fashion of any ordinary treatise on the League of Nations or the United Nations, describing, for instance, how their constitutional developments have been "products of the political situation" (p. 299). This is a far cry from analysis in depth of political "foundations." Especially in the first part, the authors have approached many problems with courage and skill, and the book is highly stimulating. But the volume (or, more likely, a series of volumes) on the foundations of international law remains to be written.

JOHN H. HERZ

THE CITY COLLEGE OF NEW YORK

Quest for Survival: The Role of Law and Foreign Policy. By JULIUS STONE. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961. —104 pp. $2.75.

This little book is a distillate of the thoughts of the eminent Challis Professor of International Law and Jurisprudence at the University of Sydney on the central problem of our time—the threat to the survival of mankind posed by general nuclear war. He starts out by effectively demolishing the notion, currently cherished in some quarters, that the solution lies in the adoption of the "rule of law"—that is, in the submission of all international disputes to adjudication by international tribunals. The nations of the world, and particularly the two super-powers, cannot be expected to submit the most important of their disputes to arbitration. Attempts to settle all disputes on the basis of existing law would tend, moreover, to freeze rights and interests and prevent adjustment to rapidly changing conditions unless new law could be explicitly made by legislation binding on all states. It is utopian to hope that states would agree in the foreseeable future to submit themselves to binding international legislative authority. In this connection, the author rightly reminds us

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that the concept of state sovereignty is not just "abstract fanatical lunacy," but that it corresponds "to certain interests on which peoples, rightly or wrongly, continue to insist, if necessary at the cost of life."

The weakness of law in international affairs is not the cause but the effect of the crisis in world politics. Well-meant efforts to establish an effective "rule of law" among nations are not only presently doomed to failure, but are harmful because they create expectations based on illusions and draw attention and energy away from the more feasible tasks of minimizing the threat of nuclear war by reducing the conflicts and tensions between the nuclear powers through forbearance and accommodation. International law does have a role to play, but only as an instrument for implementing feasible policies aimed at increasing the chances of survival. More specifically, Professor Stone outlines four groups of "feasible tasks": Promotion of third-party settlement of disputes (without expecting *all* disputes to be submitted to such settlement); cooperation for human welfare; creation of certain new techniques (outlined in some detail) to deal with international crises; and, the establishment and maintenance of emergency channels for personal communication between the heads of the nuclear powers in the short period (probably not more than thirty minutes) during which they might have to decide whether to unleash the nuclear deterrent or retaliatory forces, since only such personal last minute communication may prevent a fateful decision based on error, misunderstanding or miscalculation.

Most of Professor Stone's book is written with persuasive logic and lucidity. There are, however, some assertions—not essential to his central thesis—which are of questionable validity or are inadequately supported. Is it really true that with some exceptions the newer Afro-Asian states "have manifested an attitude toward third party settlement no less negative than that of the Communist States"? It so happens that all three of the cases pending in the International Court as this review is being written have been brought by African and Asian states—in two instances against "Western" states. How serious is the "dilution" of the content of international law resulting from its expansion to the non-Western world? What actual (instead of hypothetical) proof can the author adduce for the view that the prohibition of the use of force between states has undermined international law? Is it, indeed, true, as is somewhat equivocally suggested, that the prohibition of resort to force "is *the only* really effective rule" of today's international legal order? And why did the rule

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come into being and become effective? The deeper roots of the phenomenon—if it exists—are not explored by the author. Indeed, there is still much spadework to be done if we are to deepen our understanding of the relation of law to international politics and of the forces behind the growth of and change in the law.

OLIVER J. LISSITZYN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Foundations of Freedom, Law and Government in Southern Africa. By D. V. COWEN. Capetown, London, New York, Oxford University Press, 1961.—258 pp. $7.00.

Of all the problems posed by contemporary Africa, perhaps the racial question in South Africa is the one least susceptible to an easy solution. The criticism outside the Union of the apartheid policies of the government have become constantly more vehement; to this criticism the Nationalists have retaliated by retreating more deeply into their shell of isolation. Much of the comment on South Africa today lacks any constructive element, yet it has been made only too clear that simple condemnation can accomplish little or nothing toward encouraging the Union government to revise its policies.

It is refreshing, therefore, to read Professor Cowen's volume which, although it restates most of the rational arguments against apartheid, nevertheless seeks to suggest a course of action through which the author feels that the inevitable catastrophe of continued apartheid might be averted. Professor Cowen, who is Professor of Comparative Law at Capetown, has written a deeply thoughtful work which, in its discussion of the constitutional aspects of the question of civil liberties, has a much wider application than to South Africa alone.

The author's thesis is essentially that a constitutional remedy for South Africa's racial dilemma can be found in a Bill of Rights whose provisions are entrenched in the constitution and enforceable in the courts. Such a Bill of Rights can, in the last analysis, however, only be effective if there exists a full understanding of the philosophy upon which these rights rest and an appreciation of the nature of the rights themselves. Moreover, Professor Cowen insists, "Committal to a Bill of Rights in a true democracy must carry with it committal to the values which such a democracy must serve. And if we would know how . . . those values are to be understood . . . then, as I see it, there is only one satisfactory answer. There must be a com-

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mittal to the natural law." The author believes that today, after a long period of decline, natural law is again acquiring the respect it bore in past centuries and that only through natural law can we in the West rediscover the bases of the philosophy for which we stand. Without this foundation, the constitutional safeguards of the courts and a federal system against the unfettered powers of either the government or the people can have little real meaning.

Professor Cowen's arguments for the necessity of constitutional safeguards in the field of civil rights are closely reasoned and conclusive in their presentation. But there is real reason to question their applicability to South Africa and, indeed, to the most of the African continent, at least at the present time. He recognizes that the prerequisites for genuine democracy—a minimum of economic security, freedom from fear and confidence in the integrity of government—are only too rarely found in the new African states. For the great majority of Africans in the Union today, none of these conditions exist and there is little prospect that they will. Moreover, the conflicting nationalisms of South Africa make almost impossible any rational argument for the acceptance of real democracy on the part of the present government. Professor Cowen comes closest to the heart of the problem in his own admission that, "The issues in South Africa are rapidly moving out of the sphere of rational argument and electoral appeals into the field of naked power. . . . The legally recognized instruments for a peaceful settlement are still in the white man's hands. . . . But the sands are running out for the white man all over Africa."

Logical and persuasive as Professor Cowen's arguments for a constitutional solution in South Africa may be, the fact is that today the Union government is committed to an illogical and irrational course which ignores not only centuries of Western history but the political fact of African nationalism. Under these circumstances the possibilities for a non-violent solution of the South African situation can only be regarded as remote. Professor Cowen's excellent statement of the desiderata for the preservation of the democratic forms in the Union may well fall on deaf ears, both African and European. For the Nationalists the time has passed when democracy is more highly valued than the preservation of a privileged position; it can scarcely be expected that Africans will be concerned about preserving forms which for them have never existed.

L. GRAY COWAN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century. By PAUL Y. HAMMOND. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961.—xi, 403 pp. $7.95.

The purpose of this study is to "contribute to understanding defense administration problems as they are raised and argued currently." To provide a basis for such an understanding, the author discusses the key organizational developments in the military establishment of the past sixty years, from the creation of the War Department General Staff in 1903 to the more recent changes made in the Defense Department and its component Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force during the Eisenhower administration. It will probably surprise most readers to discover that by 1960 the "Army," "Navy," and "Air Force" were no longer independent (and non-cooperating) fighting units, but primarily recruiting, training, equipping, and supply agencies for the various inter-service field commands which operate directly under the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In addition to perceptively describing the evolving organizational pattern, the author uses his book to argue a thesis: that an Army-style general staff under a single chief should be seriously considered for the over-all Defense Department since the past sixty years' experience has shown that such a staff would neither reduce "civilian control" (a term the author leaves undefined) nor run a greater risk of making strategic mistakes than the existing Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. This thesis rests explicitly on a reading of history which I find unconvincing. For example, the author's view that the traditional War Department organizational scheme has been a "firmer base" for "civilian control" than the Navy Department pattern is, in the light of both the evidence presented and the conclusions of existing studies (such as Samuel P. Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*) questionable, to make a definite understatement of it. Similarly, the author's very harsh evaluation of the World War II Joint Chiefs who, he writes, "evidently . . . functioned effectively as a joint strategic planning and direction agency only in the European theater from early 1943 until the German surrender" and "never did function with much success" in the Pacific (pp. 161, 162), is not actually as "evident" as all that. The Joint Chiefs' papers are still closed to scholars, and the author's main authority appears to be a single paragraph in a short study of the Chiefs' operations done near the end of the war by a relatively junior naval officer (then Lt. Cdr. C. Douglas Dillon), probably without access to the records.

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Despite its questionable major thesis, the book still has real value as a comprehensive organizational history of the military establishment and can lead future researchers to the various relevant documents, all of which, so far as I can see, have been cited and used. It does suffer somewhat, however, from what appears to have been a hasty editing job: some of the sentences are too long and ambiguous and a number of minor (and a few major) factual errors remain sprinkled throughout the text. Indeed, some of the key proposals of the 1945-1946 unification conflict are so inaccurately or "selectively" summarized, as to make the author's account an essentially misleading guide to what actually took place. (To mention two major factual inaccuracies: neither General Marshall nor the Collins Plan proposed that the Secretary of Defense be included in the membership of the U. S. or "Joint" Chiefs of Staff [pp. 213–4], the War Department proposals in fact restricting the civilian Secretary to housekeeping functions and prohibiting him *by law* from even making changes in the military Chiefs' budgetary and strategic recommendations to the President; the Thomas-Hill-Austin Senate subcommittee did not think that a Secretary of Defense—an official included in the bill they drafted—would be a "military dictator" [p. 223], that term being used by Senator Austin before the Senate Naval Affairs Committee to refer to a rejected alternative concept of a "Coordinator of Common Defense" with authority to issue orders to any part of the Executive Branch in pursuance of national security policies.) Nevertheless, if one is interested in the myriad study groups and proposals concerned with military organization since the turn of the century, this is the most complete and up-to-date book available.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

BARNARD COLLEGE

The Politics of Totalitarianism: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1934 to the Present. By JOHN A. ARMSTRONG. New York, Random House, 1961.—xvi, 458 pp. $7.50.

A mere decade ago anyone who referred to the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" was assumed to have in mind one work alone: the official Party history attributed to Stalin. Published in more that forty millions of copies in some sixty-seven different languages, read (if not always voluntarily) by more people than perhaps any book in the world except the

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Bible, that fantasy-history was a staple of indoctrination among the citizens of the Soviet empire and an untrustworthy guide for many readers elsewhere. Today, when Stalin's history of the Party has been superseded in the Soviet Union by the equally propagandistic volume of Ponomarev and his colleagues, the audience beyond the Soviet borders may fortunately turn for ready comparison to the one-volume surveys of Party history by John Reshetar and Leonard Schapiro, as well as to other treatments in greater detail.

This improved situation is due in part to the Ford-financed Research Program on the History of the CPSU, based at Columbia University and run by a committee under the chairmanship of Philip E. Mosely. It was this Program which invited John A. Armstrong to write the segment of the Party's history from 1934 to 1960, assisted him in the collection of research materials for it, financed his travel to research libraries in the United States and abroad, and above all enabled him to lay aside for eighteen months his duties at the University of Wisconsin, where he is Professor of Political Science. Armstrong in turn has richly rewarded his sponsors and the public by producing an outstanding work of synthesis.

For the scholar, a principal difficulty inhering in this subject is of course the secretiveness of the CPSU, especially about its own inner operations. Armstrong was admirably equipped to cope with this obstacle, thanks to the research that underlay his books *Ukrainian Nationalism 1939–1945* and *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*. For his Party history he has again made extensive use of scholarly studies in European languages, of German and Soviet documents which came into our hands through World War II, of the Soviet press, of the memoirs of émigrés, and also of a number of unpublished Soviet dissertations—a not always accessible source. At points where the evidence is inadequate he frankly says so. While giving us the benefit of his speculations, he makes clear what degree of certainty he attaches to his statements. It would be unrealistic to expect all of his interpretations to be unassailable. I would question, for example, his view (pp. 223–225) that Stalin, in his *Economic Problems of Socialism*, made the goal of complete Communism more remote than before. I believe that on the contrary Stalin brought the carrot closer—so close that its falsity was in danger of becoming too conspicuous and its power of attraction destroyed. Yet I cannot find serious fault with Armstrong on this score, for in his footnote he has duly cited a source from which the reader may obtain a statement of this contrary view. Armstrong's han-

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dling of scores of disputed questions is so judicious that few challenges are likely, and so fair toward dissenting opinions that no challenge could be made with heat.

The other chief difficulty Armstrong faced was that of focus, for while the totalitarian ambitions of the Party have led it to penetrate most aspects of Soviet life, the book would fail if it became simply a general history of the USSR. His solution was to devote close attention to the shifting constellations at the apex of the Party hierarchy and to major changes in Communist doctrine, but to limit his treatment of most economic, social, cultural, and international questions so as to concentrate on considerations of political power. His application of this principle is not always faultless. In depicting the Party's treatment of Soviet minorities during World War II, for example, he describes in moderate detail (pp. 149–154) the fate of the Chechens, Ingushes, and Karachais, yet neglects the more numerous and politically significant German colony along the Volga and elsewhere. Or again, while describing the Vlasov movement fairly comprehensively (pp. 147–148), he fails to be explicit about the magnitude of the defections and their significance for the question of the Party's control over the Soviet populace. Yet when one considers the multiplicity of topics he succeeds in covering, one stands in admiration of his breadth and perspicacity.

The chronological proportions of the work are excellent. Combating the temptation to linger over much-studied periods, Armstrong moves briskly yet systematically through the 1930's, skilfully deriving a comprehensible narrative from the abundant secondary materials. His account of the war years is significantly enriched by his own previous explorations in the primary sources for that period; yet he maintains his pace, and the midpoint of the book finds him already probing the obscurities of the postwar *Zhdanovshchina*. The last third of his study is devoted to the post-Stalin era. In his analysis of the various stages of the struggle for succession (pp. 250–320), the recurring theme is Khrushchev's enhancement of the role of the Party's line officers in the territorial apparatus, as opposed to the staff functionaries of the central apparatus. After June 1957, however, when Khrushchev used the territorial element in the Central Committee to defeat Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich, Armstrong discerns a strengthening of the staff at the center.

In his thoughtful comments on the various tensions in the Soviet society of the late 1950's (pp. 321–333), Armstrong stresses the continuity of the elite since 1938. He points out that most of the high Party leaders, despite their long service, are well

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under the age of fifty-five and have a decade or more of vigorous service in prospect. While he anticipates some friction between that emotionally calloused leading element and the ambitious and better-educated young generation, he thinks oligarchic tendencies are now firmly enough rooted so that mass purging is unlikely.

Although the book's eighty pages of reference notes abound in suggestions for further reading, every owner of this volume should also possess Armstrong's "An Essay on Sources for the Study of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1934–1960," issued by the External Research Division of the Department of State. Perhaps that meaty forty-one-page essay can be included as an appendix when the book goes into another printing.

RALPH T. FISHER, JR.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study. By GEORGE LICHTHEIM. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1961.—xx, 412 pp. $8.50.

This is to my knowledge the most adequate and most lucid presentation of the development of Marxian theory and the Marxian movements from 1848 to the time of the first World War. Concentrating on German and Austrian history, the book succeeds in tracing and analyzing within the framework of the changing society, the various Marxist schools—revisionist, orthodox, centrist, etc.—the issues which divided them, and the gradual transformation of the original theory in this process. The chapter on Engels, which shows the beginnings of the codification of critical theory into a universal "system," is the high point of this analysis. The following critical remarks do not minimize the achievement. They refer mainly to the last part of the book, entitled "The Dissolution of the Marxian System," which deals (in fifty pages) with the development from 1918 to 1948, and which does not sustain the level of the preceding discussion.

In the Preface to his book, the author states that his study "represents no commitment to anything save the critical method inherent in the exercise of rational thinking" (p. vii). In the Introduction he says that:

> to take a historical view of his [Marx'] work . . . presupposes a vantage-point made available by developments beyond the stage reflected in the Marxian system—in other words, it assumes that the Marxian categories are no longer quite applicable to current history (p. xv).

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But "the historical view" does not imply any such assumption—and the phrase "in other words" seems to cover up a *non sequitur*. It may well be that the Marxian categories are no longer applicable. This is a perfectly legitimate thesis—but it has to be demonstrated. Lichtheim has not done so, and he could not do so because such a demonstration requires an analysis of advanced industrial society and of the structural changes which the development of this society in coexistence with the communist societies has brought about—an analysis which is outside the scope of his book. Its last part is no substitute for it. Here, Lichtheim gives hardly more than a repetition of familiar cliches and accusations; the presentation of Marx' theory of the state is very inadequate and in itself contradictory, and the transfiguration of Karl Marx into some kind of John Stuart Mill is almost complete.

The last chapter bears the title "Beyond Marxism," but I could not discover even the outline of such a Beyond, except the statement that the Marxian system has been dissolved, *because* it has not become reality, and is entirely perverted in Soviet society as well as in the other communist states. I have no quarrel with the statement of fact that present-day communism is not the realization, and is perhaps even the perversion, of the Marxian conception, but I do not see any justification for the "because" which makes the statement of fact into a verification of the thesis. It is worthwhile quoting the last sentences of this chapter:

> [Marx' critical theory] stands and falls with the claim that human action can bring about the end of 'pre-history'. Unless this claim is made good, the socialist revolution cannot be regarded as a radical break with the past. To the pragmatic outlook of the modern labour movement this conclusion may come as no great surprise, but it spells the dissolution of the Marxian system and the end of the eschatological hopes embodied in it (p. 400).

Accepting the premise that the socialist revolutions which have occurred do not constitute a "radical break with the past" (there might be questions on that at least in the case of China and Cuba), the only conclusion at which a "historical view" could arrive is the all too obvious one that pre-history has not yet come to an end. Why this conclusion spells the dissolution of the Marxian system is not clear—mainly because (as Lichtheim himself has convincingly shown) Marxian thought is not a "system" but a critical theory, and because this theory is not an "eschatological" speculation. Lichtheim here abandons the "historical view" to which he has committed himself. It would have required treating the Marxian categories as what they are: historical categories which try to define tendencies and counter-tendencies within an antagonistic society.

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There is another thesis in Lichtheim's book, one that is well argued and demonstrated with a wealth of material. It stresses, once again, the contrast between the young and the mature Marx; the latter has shelved the radical revolutionary politics of his earlier writings (until about 1850) and adopted "the long view," accepting the growth of democratic institutions and the rising legitimate power of organized labor as the framework of his analysis. According to Lichtheim, this trend culminates in the Inaugural Address of 1864 and finds its codification in Engels' writings. There is no need here to reopen the familiar controversy between Lenin and Trotsky on the one hand, and Bernstein, Kautsky, *et al,* on the other. Lichtheim's discussion is by far the most thorough and even the most convincing effort along this line. I only wish to raise the question whether Lichtheim, in arguing his thesis, does not underrate the revolutionary content of the economic analysis in *Capital,* of the *Critique of the Gotha Program* and of the *Civil War in France.*

HERBERT MARCUSE

CENTRE UNIVERSITAIRE INTERNATIONAL, PARIS

Russians as People. By WRIGHT W. MILLER. New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., 1961.—205 pp. $3.95.

The Future Is Ours, Comrade: Conversations with the Russians. By JOSEPH NOVAK. Garden City, Doubleday & Company, 1960.—286 pp. $3.95.

In an era when virtually all interest in the Soviet Union is political, when all attention is on the confrontation between Soviet Communism and the West, it is important to recall that the Bolshevik regime was built on Russian history which predated Lenin and his followers by nearly a thousand years. In his lucidly-written *Russians as People,* Wright Miller places the Soviet present in the context of Russia's past. He reminds his readers that despite their ideological wrappings, many of the basic features of Soviet society are to be understood by a closer look at Russia's pre-revolutionary history. Basing his presentation on over two decades of continuous and sympathetic observation, Mr. Miller suggests, for example, that the collectivism which characterizes Soviet Russia today is not the invention of the Communist regime but, rather, is deeply rooted in the traditional Russian spirit of community fostered by the Orthodox Church and the peasant *Mir.* "The fact is," he points out, "while Russian history has always been strong in forces tending to preserve the traditional collective life, it has always been weak in forces

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which could develop the status and rights of the individual" (p. 107). This collectivism is, to be sure, an important aspect of the Communist political system. However, its effectiveness in no small measure reflects the continuing influence of Russia's past, a past much closer to the average Russian than one would think, for, as Mr. Miller reminds us, "the countryside, for nearly all Russian townspeople, is at most only one generation away" (p. 62). Close to the land and its traditions, the Russian is still very much molded by his history. With insight, Mr. Miller discusses the basic pattern of Russian attitudes, loyalties and character as shaped by this common experience. The result is a wonderful medley of judicious observations and well-informed remarks which greatly enlarge our knowledge of the enigmatic Russians.

Neatly complementing Mr. Miller's book, *The Future Is Ours, Comrade,* by Joseph Novak, is a highly-perceptive impressionistic account of life in Russia as seen by one who obviously has had intimate contact with the Soviet regime. An East European with access to situations usually denied a visitor from the West, Mr. Novak has painted the realities of Soviet existence in their most fundamental terms. The major characteristic of Soviet society, he suggests, is the responsibility of the individual to the collective. While, as noted in *Russians As People,* this is not new, the dimensions of Soviet collectivism are far broader than ever before. The average Russian is continually responsible to collective controls—in his job, his apartment house, his union, his school and even to some extent while walking on the street. Personnel files are maintained and continually cross-checked. As one official declared, ". . . we can recreate [the average citizen's] professional, social and political silhouette at a moment's notice." Giving us a good "feel" for the typical life situation—the problems, some humorous, some tragic, of living in very close quarters, Soviet hospital routine, life in the Red Army, the fate of the consumer—the author repeatedly returns to the problem of collective control. Subject to continuous scrutiny, the Russian grows to realize that "a man knows himself the least. Other people know the most about him. It cannot be otherwise. A man can't live and at the same time calculate what other people think of him and how they see him from all angles." Perhaps the major thrust of Novak's presentation can be revealed by the following anecdote. Seeking to test the facilities of a special information office in Moscow, he submitted the name of a friend he had not seen in years. Five minutes later, the clerk returned with the exact address of this friend in

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Thilisi, many miles from Moscow. "Five minutes to find a man . . . in a country with two hundred million people," he gasped. " 'Find?' laughed the girl. 'But he was never lost.' "

MORTON SCHWARTZ

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Communism in Czechoslovakia 1948–1960. By EDWARD TABORSKY. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961.—xii, 628 pp. $12.50.

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia emerged from World War II with a series of impressive advantages in its drive to power. It was not identified with Munich. It could borrow prestige from the wartime performance of the Soviet Army and cultivate the historic Russophilism of the nation. It had traditionally been a legal and a major party in prewar Czechoslovakia. It capitalized on an intensified Slovak nationalism and turned to its own advantage the turmoil, patriotic fervor, and patronage opportunities (under a Communist Minister of the Interior) created by the wholesale expulsion of the German (and to a lesser extent the Magyar) minorities. It also enjoyed solid, though not exclusive, support in a working class alienated from "bourgeois society" less by economic misery than by rigid social barriers.

These advantages encouraged the Czechoslovak Communist leaders to attempt an electoral conquest of power rather than an illegal seizure of it. This initial reticence toward a *coup* suited (and may have been dictated by) Stalin's diplomatic policy in the immediate postwar period when many Western liberals and socialists regarded traditionally democratic Czechoslovakia as a test case of Soviet intentions in Central Europe and when Stalin did not wish to embarrass the Belgian, French and Italian Communist parties during the period of their promising participation in their respective governments.

Taking their chances on achieving a majority, the Czechoslovak Communists permitted the elections of May 1946 to be free and emerged as the largest party with 38 per cent of the vote. Though impressive, this appeared to be a Pyrrhic victory as the other parties concluded that this point marked the crest of the Communist tide. They became bolder in exposing and prosecuting Communist abuses and intimidation. New members enrolled *en masse* in the Czech Socialist and Catholic Populist parties and public opinion polls confirmed that Communist popularity was ebbing. Late in 1947 the Social Democrats, who had polled 13

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per cent of the 1946 vote, replaced their fellow-traveling chairman by a leader less amenable to Communist manipulation. The Communists thus feared that even the joint majority with the Social Democrats (38 per cent + 13 per cent = 51 per cent)—not to speak of their erstwhile hopes for an exclusive majority—was unraveling. Since the Cold War had already erupted in 1947, and Communist participation in the West European governments had ceased, there were no longer any international reasons for the Czechoslovak Communists to hesitate to seize power before it evaded them altogether. They accordingly staged their famous *coup* in February 1948, with the unwitting aid of their inept opponents who foolishly chose the device of resignation from the cabinet as a showdown weapon.

The Czechoslovak Communists thus came to power in 1948 under conditions far more favorable than those which had confronted the Russian Bolsheviks in 1917. With three years (1945–48) of governmental experience behind them, they inherited a state apparatus which they did not need to smash, as Lenin had found necessary, but could harness to their own aims. The looming power of Soviet support had averted civil war. Not only was the country already intensively industrialized, but much industry had earlier been nationalized.

Drawbacks also existed. The *coup* had aroused bitterness and the Communists' obvious dependence on Soviet support and their shameless readiness to assign higher priority to Soviet over Czechoslovak interests elicited contempt. In a series of mass recruitment drives between 1945 and 1948 the Party had ceased to be an elite and had opened its gates to a flood of opportunists (only 1.5 per cent of current members had joined before 1945) who had subsequently to be screened and occasionally purged. Yet the periodic screenings always tend to be frustrated by nepotism and cliques, while people in the categories from which the Party would prefer to recruit members—workers, technicians, scientists—know that the regime needs them anyhow and choose to remain aloof rather than to subject themselves to the risks and boredoms of membership. Government officials and office-seekers wishing to bolster their chances of promotion and eager to guarantee themselves against undesirable transfers are thus the principal aspirants to membership.

Not only has the Party failed to keep itself sociologically proletarian, but it also finds difficulty in recruiting youths and collective farmers. Slovaks are also underrepresented thanks to their more intense religiosity, greater victimization by Red Army depredations in 1944–1945, and Communist sabotage of Slovak autonomy since 1948.

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In its formal organizational pattern as well as its political style, the Czechoslovak Communist Party imitates the Soviet one. "Free and businesslike discussion" is a myth and "fearless criticism," though rhetorically requested, becomes a manipulative device. The Czechoslovak Communist leaders apparently consider their hold on the masses to be too weak to permit more than a pale imitation of the post-Stalinist thaw. For a time, in fact, they even jammed the Polish radio to protect their subjects from contamination. During Stalin's last years they were among the most ferocious heresy-extirpators in the Soviet camp. "Titoism," "cosmopolitanism," "Masarykism," "bourgeois nationalism," "Social Democratism," were some of the charges leveled at purge victims in the early 1950's. Today they have little to fear from "revisionism." It lacks a potential leader (the likeliest one, Clementis, having been hanged in 1952), which is here a serious weakness thanks to the Czechs' unfortunate tendency to act only on a signal from a leader and only if the chances of success are high. Czechoslovak Communists are also too opportunist and indifferent toward their ideology to be concerned with "revising" it.

This is but a partial survey of the many interesting facts and speculations presented in this massive and scholarly book. Its comprehensive structure is indicated by the four subsections into which its twenty-one chapters are divided: The Communist Party and its National Front Partners; The Transmission Belts of Formal Government; Outproducing Capitalism; The Making of the New Communistic Man. I have but two minor criticisms to make of this admirable study. Its author tends to belabor to excess the well-known fact of Czechoslovak domination by the Soviet Union and to sprinkle his text too profusely with jazzy and picturesque, but inept, metaphors.

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Inside Europe Today. By JOHN GUNTHER. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1961.—xiii, 376 pp. $4.95.

This interesting, impressionistic volume on present-day Europe is generally superior to its predecessor, published by Mr. Gunther a quarter-century ago, in 1936. There is reflected in the later work a greater maturity of judgment, and there is considerably less tendency to sacrifice precision for the sake of a clever phrase. As has come to be expected from this author, the book is highly readable—indeed, in spots it is almost "chatty."

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The viewpoint is reasonable throughout, being neither alarmist nor sensational. Much of the information obviously was acquired through direct conversation with most of Europe's political leaders, and much of it from newspapers. When in doubt, or when faced by conflicting interpretations, Mr. Gunther seems regularly to give greater credence and ascribe greater wisdom to European Liberals and Laborites and American Democrats than to the respective Conservative and Republican elements.

Following four brief but incisive chapters on West Germany and East Germany, there are stimulating sections on France, the Benelux countries, Iberia, Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Austria. In each case—and this is equally true of the succeeding material—there are interesting biographical sketches of the main characters and there is enough background information to satisfy the general reader; at the same time there is an air of freshness and up-to-dateness about the material that relates it directly to the day's news events. Sympathetic attention next is centered on Great Britain, the Common Market, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the problems of the limitation of nuclear armaments. Finally come three chapters on the U.S.S.R. (largely on Nikita Khrushchev) and the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. There are several simple, clear maps and the index is adequate.

In conclusion and by way of overview, Mr. Gunther makes some thoughtful and optimistic observations: Most European leaders today are "oldish men," ranging in years from Khrushchev's sixty-six to Adenauer's eighty-five. Aside from the general question of arms control, the most difficult and urgent problem in Europe is the future status of Germany. The Western alliance system, though it has suffered some serious setbacks, as in the Suez Canal dispute, is still "intact." An evaluation of the comparative strengths of the Western and Soviet blocs is "not altogether comforting," for the Communist group is becoming stronger at a rapid pace; the decision in an eventual test of strength may well lie with Europe's former overseas dependencies, now enjoying a so-called neutralist status.

Western Europe, moreover, in the author's opinion, has moved much closer toward economic unity in the past twenty-five years than it did in several previous centuries, and some form of political integration is "almost sure to follow." The swing still seems to be away from totalitarianism, with "democratic impulses" in the "ascendant." Finally, a general war seems unlikely in the near future because it would not at this time "suit

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Russian or Communist interests" to seek by force what Moscow assumes will gradually be accomplished through a continuing "cold war."

Inside Europe Today does represent, as the dust-wrapper proudly declares, "American journalism at its adult, superbly readable best."

WALTER C. LANGSAM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

The Destruction of European Jews: A Documented Narrative History. By PAUL HILBERG. Chicago, Quadrangle Books; London, W. H. Allen & Co., 1961.—x, 788 pp. $17.50.

Whether the time has already come to write the full history of this gruesome act of Nazi savagery is a moot question. Such an undertaking would involve the consideration and analysis of at least the following factors: the Nazi regime in all its manifestations; the reactions of the local population in the areas of persecution and extermination; the reaction of the Jewish population affected by these "activities" and of their coreligionists outside the countries under Nazi impact; the attitudes of the anti-Nazi coalition and of the neutrals. A provisional answer to that question should not be given without careful consideration of the three tests which should be used in such contingencies: the test of availability of material, the test of lack of bias, and the test of historical perspective. The author has wisely confined his narrative to practically one factor only and thus evaded the pitfalls inherent in a many-sided study of this catastrophic event. His protestation, however, that "this is not a book about the Jews" makes the eyebrows rise: if the story of the "administration" of the greatest mass murder in history is not the history of the victims (at least as much as the history of the "people who destroyed the Jews"), what is? The impression gained from this approach is that the victims were selected for their fate by accident (as, for example, in bombardments of open cities). But this was not the case: they met their fate because of their race, because they were Jews. To underplay this stark fact is a disservice to the historical truth.

The book consists of three parts: the introduction, in which the author discusses precedents of persecution and extermination in Jewish history and what he calls "the state of readiness (of Germany) for anti-Jewish action in 1933"; an analysis of the "Destruction Process" in two stages; and the conclusion, which contains the author's reflections on the perpetrators and the

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victims, a survey of the "consequences" and "implications" of the Jewish Catastrophe.

The bulk of the book is the "documented narrative history" of the destruction of European Jewry by the Nazi regime (pp. 18–635). The story is told in great detail and is based on painstaking research in all available primary sources of *German* origin and in some of the writings on the epoch. The hundreds of footnotes, the dozens of tables, the geographical maps—all bear evidence to the author's conscientious effort. It can be said without hesitation that this part of the book is superior to other attempts in the same direction.

It is, however, to be presumed that Dr. Hilberg was not unaware of a certain weakness in basing his story almost wholly on German official documents without comparing them with official sources of at least Germany's satellites. To take one example: Had the author compared the German documents on the destruction of Slovakian Jewry (pp. 458–473) with Slovakian sources (of which a selection was recently published by Livia Rotkirchen in Jerusalem) the picture would have been somewhat different. However, the author cannot be reproached for the fact that, having completed the book before the Eichmann trial, the numerous new facts and insights gained therefrom are not considered or that he relied on Dr. Lösener's affidavit NG-1944-A for the history of the crucial Nuremberg laws. As recently as July 1961, Lösener's "Aufzeichnungen," written in 1952, were published in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* and threw new and important light on the process of drafting the laws.

This reviewer does not intend to indicate errors of the author except for three examples. On page 262 the author quotes in English translation Göring's order on the final solution of July 31, 1941. In the third paragraph the German *Endlösung* (final solution) is translated by "desired solution." A look at the proceedings of the trial of the major war criminals in Nuremberg will reveal that the American prosecution was deeply embarrassed by this wrong translation. Indeed: *traduttore traditore*!

The use of the expression "bureaucracy" for those directly responsible for the destruction of European Jewry is misleading. A crime extending over years and perpetrated not by easy-going bureau methods but by a fiery dynamism, limitless fanaticism and mostly with ferocious enthusiasm, involving (as Hilberg himself indicates) the Führer, the Government, the Army, the Party, is not a "bureaucratic" affair.

Finally, the author has overstepped the limits of "objectivity" in the table "The Cost of Destroying the Jews," where on half a page the "receipts, gains and savings" are listed in the left

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column and the "expenditures and losses" in the right one. I admit that I was shocked by this exercise in bookkeeping.

This reviewer has reservations both in regard to "Precedents" (pp. 1–17) and to large parts of the "Conclusion" (pp. 639–765), but to explain them would involve him in a discussion of matters not directly connected with Hilberg's imposing achievement.

JACOB ROBINSON

NEW YORK CITY

Germany Between Two Worlds. By GERALD FREUND. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1961.—xx, 296 pp. $5.75.

The German problem has assumed new dimensions. The erection of the Wall in Berlin, Khrushchev's intention to sign a peace treaty with his puppet regime in East Germany, and tactical differences among the Western Allies have contributed to a heightening of tension. Can East and West negotiate an agreement which will maintain a modicum of peace in the area?

Gerald Freund, the author of this important book, published before the latest Berlin crisis but nonetheless timely, advances the thesis of disengagement as the key solution to breaking the stalemate among the Great Powers. Currently a consultant to the Rockefeller Foundation, he was also at one time assistant to George F. Kennan at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton.

The author primarily assesses the foreign policies of the Federal Republic of Germany, and discusses at length the advantages to be derived from a policy of disengagement. If the reader agrees with his basic premises, he will probably be convinced by the logic of the arguments, and the thoughtful critique of the critics of disengagement.

The author briefly dissects the formulation of foreign policy, for which clearly Chancellor Adenauer has been most responsible, having often ignored the views of the foreign ministry and of important leaders in his party. Freund warns that since the successor to Adenauer probably will be unable to act in the same autocratic manner, the Western governments now should understand these suppressed views which may be adopted in the future. In reviewing the attitudes of political parties in the foreign policy realm, he finds that despite areas of disagreement, all are in accord on the necessity of establishing a close alliance with France (a chapter is devoted to it) and the other Western countries.

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As to military problems, West Germany has been determined to achieve equality with her NATO partners. Her strong desire to acquire nuclear weapons and a nuclear weapons producing capacity may make it difficult to exclude her from the nuclear club, the author asserts. Once a member of the club, Germany's bargaining position within the western alliance will increase, as well as her freedom of action vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Direct West German negotiations with Moscow, "with or without prior consultation in NATO," may lead to a deal between the two countries, which could be inimical to the interests of the United States. To prevent such a deal, West German forces should only be provided with conventional weapons, to be backed by a deterrent-retaliatory force on the periphery.

A highly critical view is taken of the "unimaginative" Bonn policy toward Eastern Europe. Attempts should have been made to enter into diplomatic relations with East European countries in order to create an atmosphere of détente and to gain their eventual approval for German reunification. Polish fear of Germany, for instance, could be eased by a West German renunciation of all claims to the Oder-Neisse territories, and of the principle that expellees be repatriated as a legal right only.

An equally critical view is taken of the Western (including Bonn) policy toward the Soviet Union. In the past, the West should have explored the alternative disengagement proposals to bring about reunification, since a maintenance of the status quo will not solve its interests in the long run. Instead of insisting, unrealistically, that a reunited Germany be a member of NATO, the West should propose an arms—and troop—level freeze with an exchange of inspection teams in both Germanies, to be followed by a reciprocal withdrawal of foreign troops. An East-West agreement would provide for the "re-engagement" of the two Germanies over a number of years, culminating in a "dual-state association." Freund argues that such a reunited Germany would pose less of a threat to the world than the present dangerous partition of the country.

Many of these provocative and challenging ideas have been presented before, but they assume more significance during the current East-West dispute over Germany. They may, after all, contribute to a re-evaluation of the current "hard" line in which the prospects for a reunited Germany are dim indeed, and they may lead to a long over-due agreement on the first stage of disarmament.

GERARD BRAUNTHAL

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

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Schizophrenic Germany. By JOHN DORNBERG. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1961.—ix, 301 pp. $4.95.

Although one could not be expected to know from the title, *Schizophrenic Germany* is a report on neo-Nazism, fascism, anti-Semitism and militarism in postwar Germany, in particular the Federal Republic. The account shows that while there has been no widespread moral self-judgment for the National Socialist past, there have been highly creditable efforts to ferret out and bring to justice persons guilty of Nazi crimes (almost 6,000 cases in Bavaria alone since 1945) as well as impressive payments of financial restitution to Nazi victims. It describes the strength and programs of neo-Nazi parties and groups and contains a conjectural account of the possibility that an underground group exists which helps ex-Nazis to escape legal justice. It shows the efforts that have been made to establish the new army along less authoritarian lines on the one hand, and the general failure of the schools to acquaint students with the Third Reich and its atrocities on the other. It further describes the outstanding record (which is not so unsullied as the author makes out) of the press, radio, publishing and film industries in maintaining their independence from governmental influence and in becoming, in fact, "Germany's strongest bulwark for democracy." The composite picture is a far from discouraging one. Mr. Dornberg is fair and understanding toward the Germans, and his account is usually balanced, if often painfully superficial. The value of the book, however, is very seriously marred by inexcusable carelessness in some parts. Those sections of the book specifically concerned with "ex-Nazis" are virtually useless since the author lumps together everyone connected with National Socialism, from purely nominal members to the most fanatical party workers. Undoubted fascists and neo-Nazis are discussed in the same breath with mere right-wingers; such organizations as the *Stahlhelm* (the veterans' organization) and the B.H.E. (the refugee party) are—however one may disapprove of their aims and activities—improperly included among neo-Nazi groups. For this reason it is difficult to evaluate, for example, the author's charge that "thousands" of ex-Nazis have re-entered public service and that "hundreds" are receiving pensions and other benefits (the seriousness of this charge makes it all the more regrettable that no source is cited for the figures). When, in the same context, the author condemns the granting of pensions to all generals and admirals, the confusion becomes fairly complete. But worse than this is Mr. Dornberg's occasional completely inept handling of evidence. This is particularly true again with respect to

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former National Socialists now in influential positions in public life. For instance, in a section about ex-Nazis in the West German government, he begins his list of names thus: "Although Dr. Adenauer himself was a victim of Nazi persecution, being under constant Gestapo surveillance and arrested twice, he was banned from political activities in October, 1945, by British occupation authorities on grounds of 'obstructionism and non-cooperation.'" Even to mention Dr. Adenauer in what purports to be a catalog of ex-Nazis is monstrous enough, but does Mr. Dornberg seriously mean to suggest that the notorious British blunder had something to do with the Chancellor's being tainted with Nazism? Fritz Schäffer receives treatment similar to that given Dr. Adenauer; Professor Erhard and Dr. Seebohm are also on the list but with no indication of any connection with the Nazi Party.

General von Manteuffel is labeled as one of the ex-Nazis in the Bundestag, apparently on the ground that he was found guilty of manslaughter (in 1959) for the execution of a soldier in his unit on the Russian front in 1944. (Dornberg's account of the trial and his treatment of von Manteuffel are, moreover, egregiously unfair.) Ministers in the Hessian and Bavarian governments are labeled Nazis because they "have been accused of" association with Henlein fascists. East Germans receive scarcely better treatment: thus one prominent person is "reported to be," another "alleged to be," still another "has been tagged as" and a fourth is "reputed to have been" at one time connected with Nazism. This sort of writing undermines one's confidence in the author's reliability and detracts from those portions of the book which are genuinely good.

FRED N. SPOTTS

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mussolini's Enemies: The Italian Anti-Fascist Resistance. By CHARLES F. DELZELL. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961.—ix, 620 pp. $12.50.

That there should have met in Milan, in March, 1961, the second congress of the History of the Resistance is evidence of the place that the movement at one time filled; it was indeed a large place in the annals of Europe, for the Resistance was the focus on which centered high hopes of profound social reconstruction, a movement that some would compare with the expectations that briefly dawned in 1848. Just as a hundred years ago, these hopes were fated to frustration.

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The control of the major part of Europe by Nazi Germany for a time gave opposition to that control a clear focus of union, and many saw in the circumstances an opportunity for launching, beyond the negative phase of opposition, a positive movement of social and political rejuvenation. It was perhaps symbolically fitting that the sessions of the Milan congress should not have been devoid of some recrimination: fundamentally disparate and centrifugal forces had only momentarily cohabited.

The sources for the study of the Resistance are numerous and varied, but they are also scattered and their pursuit presents the historian with an onerous task. The present study addresses itself to the Italian aspect, which was different from others, for Fascism preceded Nazism in control of the state by ten years, and the general outbreak of war by almost twice that length of time. Consequently, although "Resistance" is especially associated with the war, it seems fair, for Italy, to extend it back to 1922. Moreover, while Italy was formally engaged in war as an ally of Germany, anti-Fascism must inevitably assume an anti-national character, an impeding factor that confined much of it to a passive stance. Worse still, after Italy had concluded an armistice with the Allies in 1943, and even gone the length of changing sides in the war, it is not surprising that a measure of diffidence toward her should have persisted on the Allied side. But this was often hard for the Resistance to grasp, especially that part of it primarily concerned with the future; so also was the relative demotion of the Italian theatre and the consequent slowness of the Allied advance in the peninsula. Naturally, and quite properly from their point of view, the Allies took an overall view of the war; for them the Resistance often tended to be no more than a secondary, and minor, adjunct to military operations. Finally, in so far as the Western Allies took politics and the future into consideration, the large content of radicalism in the Resistance, more concretely the often preponderant role of the Communists, was rather a source of concern than of elation.

It is among these intricate complexities that the author, with both scholarly thoroughness and judicial calm, unfolds his tale in the second part of his book, "The Armed Resistance." The first, "The Clandestine Resistance," deals with the period from the advent of Fascism to the 1943 armistice. Though, as indicated before, the situation was simpler in this period, especially until 1940, we have here also a record of divergent tendencies, often suspicious of each other, whose cooperation was apt to be short-lived. The tale is tangled, not devoid of an element of pettiness, and the details of it at times burden attention.

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But of the usefulness of bringing some sort of order into a welter of material there can be no question. If, from the point of view of many resisters, the forces of conservation have triumphed, robbing them of their hopes and the rewards of their sacrifices, considerable change has nonetheless occurred; in the causing of it, the Resistance, often small in terms of the number of its adherents among the mass of the people, played the highly significant part of a leaven, which is why attention to it is still worthwhile.

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

BARNARD COLLEGE

Historians of China and Japan. Edited by W. G. BEASLEY and E. G. PULLEYBLANK. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1961.—viii, 351 pp. $8.00.

In the essay which gave the title to his *History in a Changing World,* Professor Geoffrey Barraclough counseled the Western historian to cease devoted contemplation of his European navel and to seek a new approach to history, critical and comparative in style, universal in spirit. The European historical tradition stemming from Greece and Rome should, he suggested, be supplemented by assessment of other major traditions, such as those of Islam and China, which evolved independently. *Historians of China and Japan,* stemming from a 1956 study conference sponsored by the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, represents a major contribution to Western understanding of non-Western history. Two groups of papers discuss dominant themes, writers, and techniques of historiography in China and Japan, ranging from the earliest chronicles to the new types of work which have emerged under Western influence during the past century. A third group reviews aspects of Western historical writing on China, Japan, and Mongol nomadism. Taken together, these eighteen papers present a solid survey of the underlying assumptions, predilections, and prejudices of past writers, especially those whose work comprises the traditional approach to history in East Asia, and possess both intrinsic and comparative value for the Western historian.

Not the least important product of the culturally fecund civilization of China has been its historical writing, unequaled by any other country before modern times, outstanding for its amplitude, accuracy, and continuity of documentation. Both as recording of the past and as major intellectual activity, historical writing in China has been overwhelmingly culture-bound, intimately involved with the Confucian heritage, deeply conditioned

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by the nature of traditional Chinese society. The symposium's chapters on Chinese historiography stress two dominant facts. First, the standard dynastic histories, at least since T'ang times, were produced by salaried government bureaucrats primarily and professionally concerned with the compilation of accurate chronological and other records. The result has been the preservation of a vast corpus of data regarding the actual working of a complex governmental mechanism through a period of some two millennia. Second, as with any writing, the motivation underlying production exerted a decisive influence on the result. The Chinese historian was above all compiling a body of precedents to guide future generations of Chinese bureaucrats in the theory and practice of public administration as it should be conducted in accord with Confucian ethical standards. By tradition and intent, history was didactic, "*guide de la pratique gouvernementale,*" in the tidy phase of Professor Balazs. Ultimately, history was regarded, not as a composite portrait of an age, but rather as a mirror of political behavior; and the very term "mirror" (Chinese *chien,* Japanese *kagami*) is a recurring image in the titles of both Chinese and Japanese historical works.

The bureaucratic bias, the utilitarian orientation, the solemn ethical pretensions: all these gave Chinese historical writing both its virtues and its shortcomings. Despite these factors, the papers nevertheless confirm that objective accuracy has been at once the commonest and the noblest inspiration of historians in China as in other cultures. Major historical writing and criticism require, however, not only erudition and acumen, but also a felicitous pen (or brush, in East Asia) and a large historical vision capable of blending synthesis with detail. Of the many Chinese historians discussed in this volume, three stand out. Liu Chih-chi (661–721), an independent scholar of imagination and sensitivity, composed the *Shih-t'ung* (Generalities on History, completed in 710), the first treatise on historical methodology in China—or, perhaps, in any language. Ssu-ma Kuang (1019–86) in the eleventh century, applying strict critical standards to the writing of history, produced one of the highest achievements of traditional historiography, the *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* (Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government), presented to the throne in 1084. A third scholar, Chang Hsueh-ch'eng (1738–1801), was the dominant historical theorist of the eighteenth century during the apogee of early Ch'ing rule. Chang's devotion to history (against the intrusions of excessive philosophy and philology) and highly original views on the nature and meaning of history accord him a place in China comparable, in Professor Demiéville's view, to Ibn Khaldun in the Arabic tradition and to Vico in modern European historiography.

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The extraordinary continuity of Chinese literary culture inevitably laid its impress on Japanese historical writing. Indeed, from the eighth to the mid-nineteenth century, Japanese historical works may be classified on a linguistic basis: those written in Chinese and those in Japanese. The former, corresponding generally to periods of heaviest Sinic influence, followed Chinese canons, models, and techniques; the latter, starting with the eleventh century "historical tales" and continuing until the Tokugawa period, were marked by indigenous style and by concern with problems essentially Japanese. Like Japanese society as a whole, traditional historiography underwent radical transformation following the Meiji restoration of 1868. During Japan's "modern century," and especially since World War I, Japanese historical writing has been increasingly preoccupied with the problems and potentialities stemming from Western intellectual influences, both non-Marxist and Marxist.

The symposium's final papers deal with Western historical writing on Asia: European writing from 1500 to 1800, when the learned Jesuits dominated the field, and British writing on Japan during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Until very recent times, most Western works were produced by non-professionals, by men who lived and worked in Asia and whose writing was generated by direct knowledge of the area. Loosely labeled as amateur, this work (some of enduring value) was of major importance as a channel of communication serving to introduce Western readers to the subject. Since about 1930, still more since 1945, this situation has changed drastically. The standards of Western academic training and research have risen, new "contributions to knowledge" have mounted, clinical precision has grown apace. The critical monograph—detached, detailed, and dutifully documented—has replaced *The Chinese and Their Rebellions, Chinese Characteristics,* and *Things Japanese.* Yet, as professionalism has developed, the element of personal experience and human feeling has been expunged, and the possibility of communication with those outside the guild decreased, if not destroyed.

Professors Beasley (of London) and Pulleyblank (of Cambridge) deserve high praise for editing *Historians of China and Japan* and for providing a trenchant and literate introduction to the volume. More important, they deserve commendation for their long-range concern, not only with the production of "new knowledge," but also with another major responsibility, fulfilled by some earlier Western writers but often neglected in our frenetic age: that of interpreting East Asia to the Western reader.

HOWARD L. BOORMAN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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Sakamoto Ryōma and the Meiji Restoration. By MARIUS B. JANSEN. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961.—xii, 423 pp. $8.50.

In an age when titles of scholarly books were less eye-catching but more informative, this study might have been called "A History of the Japanese Imperial Restoration of 1868, With Special Attention to the Role of Sakamoto Ryōma and Other Men of the Tosa *Han*." Professor Jansen's subject is the Restoration itself, and he has made a masterly job of its complexities —the ideology that motivated its planners, the forces mobilized to aid them, the tensions which divided them and the negotiations through which these tensions were resolved, and the final show of arms by which the goal was accomplished. Sakamoto's career is a conspicuous thread in the narrative, but the fabric as a whole is broader and of greater importance than one could expect from any man's biography.

This dual subject matter and the author's method of using it are unusual, but here they are justified by success. In some ways Sakamoto is ideally suited to be the center of interest in a history of the Restoration movement. He was involved with it for more than ten years before its consummation, first as a hot-headed direct actionist, and then step by step in increasingly responsible roles. He was from neither of the great feudatories, Satsuma and Chōshū, which allied to overthrow the regime of the Tokugawa shoguns, but his independence of those *han* made him a suitable middleman in negotiating the alliance. Later he helped to propose the settlement between the ascendant Satsuma-Chōshū forces and the beleaguered Shogunate which made it possible for the old government to expire in a relatively graceful and bloodless manner.

Sakamoto's life story is in another interesting way an epitome of his country's history in those years. The most noteworthy feature of his character was his extraordinary ability to mature with his experience and progress from a naive and uninformed idealist whose ethical code was simplistic in the extreme to a statesman of considerable political knowledge, realism, and responsibility. Many of his confederates pursued a similar course, which might even be taken to symbolize the progress of Japan's national conscience and consciousness in those years. The author is at his best when he describes these developments in detail. For example, he traces with great precision the changes in meaning of the loyalists' battlecry "*jōi*" ("expel the barbarians"). Starting as a simple call for strengthened national defenses, that catch phrase came to mean quite literally to rid

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Japanese soil of foreigners by any means however violent, and then its content came gradually to be moderated until by 1868 it connoted little more than the restoration of national autonomy and dignity.

The author's treatment of imperial loyalism, the other great rallying point of the Restoration heroes, is also excellent. Perhaps he oversimplifies the case somewhat in his frequent statements to the effect that the loyalists wished to restore the Emperor to "political power." There is little evidence in his more detailed exposition of this idea that power, in the sense in which political scientists use the word, was quite the thing that the loyalists wished the Emperor to possess. Indeed, the author makes it quite clear that in the years when the other articles of the restorationists' program were becoming concrete and realistic, their ideas of what role a "restored" Emperor was to play in the state remained as abstract as before and somehow detached from their plans for political reorganization.

This book is full of excellent things, among them the following: vivid biographical sketches of the obscurantist dissident Takechi Zuizan, of Sakamoto's mentor Katsu Rintarō, of Oguri Tadamasa, who was a last-ditch defender of shogunal power, and of Saigō Takamori; interesting vignettes of the British support of the Satsuma-Chōshū forces and of French aid to the Shogunate; an admirable picture of the last Tokugawa Shogun; and, above all, a treatment of Sakamoto himself that defines exactly his importance to history and also makes him rather appealing as a man.

HERSCHEL WEBB

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Montesquieu: A Critical Biography. By ROBERT SHACKLETON. New York, Oxford University Press; Oxford, at the University Press, 1961.—xvi, 432 pp. $7.20.

The late Fernand Baldensperger, *érudit,* co-founder of the *Revue de la Littérature comparée,* member of the Collège de France and perennial candidate to the Académie française, maintained to the end that Charles de Secondat, baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu, *président à mortier,* was, at the least a conservative, at the most a reactionary, and should in consequence be omitted from all discussion of the Enlightenment. Albert Mathiez, in complete agreement with this position, further asserted that Montesquieu would have heartily disapproved of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the changes brought about by the French Revolution itself.

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It is a point of view that has been held by many. After all, born in 1689 to position and wealth, Montesquieu had firmly believed in the monarchical form of government for France. He had, moreover, long persisted in the hope that Louis XV would accept his proffered services, and he had intimately associated with some of the most aristocractic names of Western Europe. As though this were not enough, he was to die most edifyingly in the Catholic faith, with Pope Benedict XIV taking an exceptional interest in the circumstances of his demise. Then too, as a final cachet of enlightened disapproval, at least one plan to erect a statue in his memory was tabled during the Revolution while his tomb was profaned and his remains lost.

Others have agreed with Emile Faguet that Montesquieu, "l'oeil fixé sur l'Angleterre, a inventé les droits de l'homme." Nor is the statement to be dismissed lightly, for the substance of at least twelve out of seventeen of the articles composing the *Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen* are to be found in the *Esprit des Lois.*

In *Montesquieu: A Critical Biography,* Mr. Robert Shackleton does not dwell on any of these details concerning the posthumous fame or disrepute of his subject. He does, however, conclude in persuasive fashion that, because of the *président's* ideas and work, he was held by contemporaries as a most valued member of the society of the *philosophes* (p. 389) and one of the great men of the age. Mr. Shackleton's study, then, is a sympathetic one; but it is much more than that. Albert Sorel's slim 176-page *Montesquieu* has stood up surprisingly well over the years since its initial appearance in 1887. But the present volume not only has the distinction of being the first full-length biography of the eminent political theorist to be published in the English language, it is also the most complete as well as the most up to date in any language.

Nevertheless, Sorel's assertion that Montesquieu's life had little intrinsic interest and took on meaning only in conjunction with his writings still holds good. Much of the factual detail so painstakingly unearthed by Mr. Shackleton—and it has been supplemented by discovery of the *Spicilège* in 1944—is, to be sure, of considerable interest and value to the eighteenth-century specialist. But it will weigh a bit heavily on the cultured general reader obliged to look elsewhere in the book for ready profit and pleasure. He will, for instance, doubtless enjoy the over-all handling of the *président's* three principal works, the *Lettres persanes,* the *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence,* and, of course, the *Esprit des lois,* along with deft paraphrasing of specific passages drawn from each.

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More particularly, both the general reader and the student of the history of ideas will find their attention drawn to Mr. Shackleton's treatment of a number of themes closely associated with the celebrated political philosopher. Prominent among these is his famous view of the British constitution, which, we are reminded (p. 151), "was to exceed in influence anything else he ever wrote." Another, of almost equal importance, is the theory of climate considered by many to be central to Montesquieu's thought. Mr. Shackleton opens his admirable discussion of the subject by noting that "no doctrine in *L'Esprit des lois* attracted more attention than did that of the influence of climate on mankind . . . and none provoked more surprise" (p. 309). Still a third is Montesquieu's humanistic approach to the question of slavery, which also is the object of careful appraisal.

The task of the conscientious Montesquieu historian is a difficult one. In the Preface to the present study it is even termed "a rash enterprise," encompassing as it does a multiplicity of competences, scientific, philosophic, legal, historical and literary. These might all have fallen—and often did—within the province of the eighteenth-century pantophile. But the twentieth century biographer lives in an age of specialization. That Mr. Shackleton has been able to write such a useful book on a complex subject is a tribute to his tenacity of purpose, meticulous scholarship and judicious enthusiasm.

OTIS FELLOWS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

H. M. Hyndman and British Socialism. By CHUSHICHI TSUZUKI. New York, London, Oxford University Press, 1861.—vi, 304 pp. 35s. $5.60.

Henry Mayers Hyndman (1842–1921) was a Victorian radical who preached an Anglicized Marxism. Despite a wide first-hand knowledge of international socialism, he was often extremely insular in outlook, suspicious of foreign (especially German) influence and intentions, and convinced that England was peculiarly suited to realizing a Socialist Commonwealth. Though he waved the red flag and did not eschew violence in his speeches, he never in practice welcomed prolonged bitter industrial strife nor, for that matter, any manifestation of the class war in its uglier forms. He dismissed Syndicalist doctrine as reactionary rubbish and bemoaned the triumph of the Bolshevists in Russia, describing Lenin in 1921 as "a Communist Ivan the Terrible"

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in a "new pseudo-Marxist Tsardom" (p. 239). Born to wealth, he financed his anticapitalist campaign with money earned from speculation and company promotion. In contrast to most of his fellow socialists, he remained essentially Tory in his attitude toward the Empire, toward defence expenditure, and in his paternalistic feeling for the working classes. It is very difficult to fit him into any niche, and it is one of the merits of this book, the only scholarly and objective biography of Hyndman yet to appear, that it deals with Hyndman as a colorful, disputatious individualist who often seemed to regard the faction-ridden Marxist sect in England as his one-man show.

Sometimes weak in treating background—the broader movements with which Hyndman was associated—the book is especially good toward its end in tracing the varied socialist views on such problems as English foreign policy, the German threat and war-time conscription. Half the book stresses the period from the early socialist agitation of the 1880's down to 1900: the formation of the Social Democratic Federation (the S.D.F.); the unemployment demonstrations of the late 80's; the "new" unionism; the coming of the Boer War. The second half, to Hyndman's death in 1921, examines the response of Hyndman and the S.D.F. to the Labour Party, the suffragettes, the great industrial unrest, World War I, and the Russian Revolution.

There are some errors of interpretation. Hyndman's argument for imperial reorganization in 1879 does not "strikingly anticipate" (p. 29) Chamberlain's proposal for an Imperial Zollverein. Simply by arguing in 1912 that all workers "are consumers *as well as* producers" the Old Guard Hyndmanites were not giving a "remarkable indication" (p. 187) of digression from orthodox Marxism.

Such errors are few, however, while certain widely held misconceptions are here corrected. It is interesting to learn that *England for All,* written by Hyndman in 1881, was not so much the first clear exposition of Marxism for English readers as it was a "text-book of English 'Tory Democracy'" (p. 42), emphasizing England's unique capacity for peacefully attempting changes which on the continent could lead to anarchy and bloodshed. This reviewer had assumed that William Morris boasted publicly that he had never read Marx, but, in fact, he had read *Das Kapital,* enjoying the historical parts but complaining that he "suffered agonies of confusion of the brain" (p. 49) over the pure economics. That Hyndman and some of his colleagues while initially condemning the South African War came to favor a British victory, mainly on the grounds that a Boer defeat would be in the best interests of the African natives, is well worth noting.

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Some unattractive features of Hyndman's character are shown —his anti-Semitism, his bout of hysterical spy-hunting during World War I, his domineering temperament in those squabbling groups which frequently he financed from his own pocket. The main impression left with the reader, however, is that of an untiring, hard fighting, incorruptible optimist, bullishly patriotic, too egocentric to command much affection, towering above most of his close associates. The Marxists never had much of a following in England and produced no leader of stature skilled as both theoretician and organizer. Hyndman was too much of a maverick, too impatient and injudicious to build a party, and one of the paradoxes of his career is that he, in many ways the most English of Marxists, failed so signally to appeal to his compatriots. Part of the answer is that he was of the type, not uncommon in the British left, who love the good fight for its own sake and feel stifled by the compromises and responsibilities of power.

The Social Democratic Federation and its offshoots and regroupings still appear, after one has read this book, outside the main stream of British socialist and labour politics, especially the work of forging a strong socialist-trade union political alliance, and the author is to be commended for resisting any temptation to claim more influence for Hyndman at the center of affairs than he actually possessed. The book is enriched by quotations from a remarkable amount of correspondence between Hyndman and various radical and socialist leaders in America and Europe. The argument is restrained, the style undistinguished but clear and straightforward. There is interesting information in the appendices on S.D.F. membership and finances and a good index.

PHILIP P. POIRIER

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

Essays in American Historiography: Papers Presented in Honor of Allan Nevins. Edited by DONALD SHEEHAN and HAROLD C. SYRETT. New York, Columbia University Press, 1960.—x, 320 pp. $6.00.

Enterprises of this kind inevitably produce papers of widely different merit. While this volume is no exception, it does escape the normal fate of such compilations of appealing only in small measure to each of a wide variety of interests. A single theme is adhered to, and the consequence of the editors' wisdom is a volume which will not merely attract the many admirers of Professor Nevins, but which will also be useful to scholars in the field of American history.

Within the single field of American historiography a wide

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range is covered. It would be impossible to comment on every contribution; but there are several which deserve special mention. Robert C. Black, III, in "Thoughts on the Confederacy," suggests that instead of so often asking themselves whether the Civil War was inevitable, historians should have asked why the Confederacy came into existence. The attempt to answer this question, he argues, reveals the fundamental nature of the Southern cause to be a determination to establish a system of race control which would ensure white supremacy. It follows from this that the defeat of the Confederacy was not the defeat of the South, so long as alternative systems of race control could be maintained. This is a most stimulating and scholarly paper, which achieves what so few historians care to attempt, the straightforward assertion of what is believed to be an overriding basic truth. Jacob E. Cooke's contribution, "The New South," has something of the same quality; in analyzing historians' attitudes to the period after 1877, he shows that until very recently all have assumed Negro inferiority. The assumption of Southern "uniqueness" is criticised with great penetration—a service which might well be performed also for wider spheres of American history.

Hal Bridges examines "The Idea of the Robber Barons in American History," presenting a thoughtful analysis of recent reactions against the "robber baron" school of historians. Joseph A. Boromé presents a most interesting account of "The Evolution Controversy" in which he discusses the immediate impact of Darwinism in the United States, as well as the subsequent literature. Everett Walters in "Populism: its Significance in American History" gives an admirable and lively criticism of different views on this controversial topic. James P. Shenton, writing on "Imperialism and Racism" underlines the antipathy to colored peoples which in general prevailed among Americans (and other "Anglo-Saxons") and which made anti-imperialism in the United States to a large extent a reflection of what to-day would be considered highly illiberal racial attitudes. Harry W. Baehr in "A Cycle of Revisionism between Two Wars" puts forward a number of stimulating ideas—notably that the revisionist thesis of the pre-1939 years has now been totally repudiated as the basis for official foreign policy, and that if the validity of present policies is assumed then the First World War might have been prevented by an assertion by Woodrow Wilson before 1914 that war with the United States would result from the perpetration by the German government of certain specified acts.

Other papers, not necessarily of inferior merit to those discussed, and all reflecting sound scholarship, are Edward N.

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Saveth: "Scientific History in America: Eclipse of an Idea"; Donald Sheean: "Radical Reconstruction"; James A. Rawley: "American Historians and National Politics from the Civil War to the First World War"; Mark D. Hirsch: "Reflections on Urban History and Urban Reform, 1865–1915"; Carlton C. Qualey: "Some Aspects of European Migration to the United States"; Sidney Ratner: "Pragmatism in America"; Louis Filler: "The Muckrakers: in Flower and in Failure"; and, Bernard Bellush: "An Interpretation of Franklin D. Roosevelt."

GEOFFREY SEED

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS

The Burden of Southern History. By C. VANN WOODWARD. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1960.—xvi, 205 pp. $3.50.

Romance and Realism in Southern Politics. By T. HARRY WILLIAMS. Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1961.—xii, 84 pp. $2.50.

In these volumes two distinguished Southern historians have addressed themselves in essay form to interpretations of some of the more elusive aspects of the historical character and political experience of the American South. The first is a collection of eight essays, all but one of which were published separately between 1952 and 1959, that deal with the roots of the South's distinctiveness, the manifestations of this distinctiveness in certain historical events and experiences, and the nature and potential value of the region's heritage. The second is made up of four essays delivered as the Eugenia Dorothy Blount Lamar Memorial Lectures at Mercer University in November, 1960. They are concerned with the dynamics and the rationale of Southern politics, with emphasis on Reconstruction and the modern period. The essays in both books are incisive, well-written, and stimulating.

Two of Professor Woodward's essays, "The Search for Southern Identity" and "The Irony of Southern History," approach more directly than do the others the question of the South's peculiarities. But a major theme throughout *The Burden of Southern History* is the divergence in the ideas and experiences of the Southern states from other parts of the country under the impact of such developments as John Brown's Raid on Harpers Ferry, Reconstruction, and the Populist Revolt. Mr. Woodward does not make the mistake of overemphasizing the South's unity or of forgetting that the Southerner was also an American, and one of the most illuminating results of his juxtaposition of South and

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North during such crises as Reconstruction is the extent to which other Americans are shown to have shared the prejudices and predilections of Southerners. Yet Southerners were Americans with a difference and this brilliant book does as much as any single work since the publication of Wilbur J. Cash's *The Mind of the South* to explain why. It skillfully probes the spirit and the intangibles of the Southern past and in the process throws revealing light on the significance of Southern sectionalism in American history.

Professor Woodward explains the South's distinctiveness largely in terms of its history, by which he means the collective experience of the Southern people. He suggests some of the ways in which the Southern experience has differed from that of other regions: the Southerners' poverty and scarcity as contrasted with America's plenty; their failures on the battlefield and in legislative halls in contrast to the unending success of the larger nation; their awareness of guilt as against the American preoccupation with innocence; and their strong attachment to place in contrast to the average American's "abstraction." With the South in the midst of an economic and social revolution that is uprooting many of the region's old monuments of distinctiveness, Mr. Woodward adjures his fellow-Southerners to view their peculiar heritage as an asset in a world where the common experience of mankind is far different from the American success story.

In his first essay Professor Williams examines those elements that made the South a self-conscious minority. The Southerner, he writes, ". . . is marvelously adept at creating mind-pictures of his world or of the larger world around him—images that he wants to believe, that are real to him, and that he will insist others accept." The Southerner, in short, ". . . is likely to be a romantic and . . . in many situations he almost certainly will refuse to recognize reality" (p. 4). With this characterization in mind, Mr. Williams briefly describes the emergence, by the 1850's, of a "singular oneness" in Southern politics, and in the three succeeding chapters he discusses "The Politics of Reconstruction," "The Politics of Populism and Progressivism," and "The Politics of the Longs." Aside from an abortive "Unification Movement," attempted by Democratic leaders in Louisiana during Reconstruction, and the Southern Populists, the author finds far more romanticism than realism in the South's politics before the 1920's. But in Huey P. Long and his successors in Louisiana, he pictures a unique brand of realism in the region's politics. Long "forcibly introduced a large element of realism into Southern politics. He asked the South to turn its gaze from outside devils and the imagined past and take a long, hard look

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at itself and the present" (p. 79). While conceding that Long's life epitomized a personal and a sectional tragedy, Mr. Williams emphasizes his constructive accomplishments and the formidable obstacles he faced in his efforts to transform Louisiana political life. The book's most original contribution is the evaluation it contains of the Long regime, a subject on which the author speaks with great authority as a result of his extensive research for a biography of Huey P. Long. The other essays are suggestive at many points, and Professor Williams' concept of romanticism versus realism in Southern politics, while merely adumbrated here, is one that is worth further investigation.

DEWEY W. GRANTHAM, JR.

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

The Real Abraham Lincoln. By REINHARD H. LUTHIN. Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960.—xviii, 778 pp. $10.00.

Lincoln's martyrdom procured for him an early and uncritical judgment from history. It fixed in the popular fancy a picture of a poor boy overcoming tremendous obstacles and advancing steadily from moral victory to moral victory until he became the savior of a democracy and the liberator of a race. Universal interest and continuous research, constantly more critical, have been producing a new Lincoln, or to be more exact, have been giving us two Lincolns for one. The first of these is the Lincoln prior to 1861 and the second is the one thereafter.

The first Lincoln really gave little evidence of any capacity to become the second. Viewed dispassionately, he had done little to earn the Presidency. Some smart local politics, a handful of clever sentences and a national accident brought him to the White House; others have gotten there with less. Then under great trial and tremendous pressure he became one of the nation's great.

The author of this comprehensive encyclopedic one-volume life gives a competent summary of the two Lincolns. Certain of the long held pictures are erased. His father was not shiftless. Abraham was not a great reader. He was frugal and acquisitive. He did not like farm life or any hard work. He was a practical lawyer, a conservative, a canny politician who could almost put under the Little Giant.

His nomination to the Presidency came because, as is often the case, a conglomeration of tag-ends wanted to stop the leading candidate, William H. Seward, who lacked a majority of the dele-

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gates. Seward's opponents concentrated on Lincoln and he beat the man they were after. Lincoln, limited by his middle-western preoccupations, concentrated his efforts on building a cabinet and composing an inaugural which he hoped would convince the conservative, Union-loving men, north and south, that he was their leader. Events and fire-eaters did not wait and there was war. Up to this point he did not show any capacity to control destiny.

But he was called upon to fight three wars: with the Confederates, with the Radicals in his own party, and with the Copperheads. It was the measure of his hitherto unused capacity that he could win them all in the midst of domestic sorrow and torture that would have driven most men to distraction. This work stresses the political hazards he must meet and his partisan finesse. We understand more clearly what he believed to be the demands of the conflict and how he sought to meet them. To those whose image of Lincoln is that of the prophet in Gettysburg cemetery, this may be something of a shock and perhaps it is overdone. But the contribution of this book is that it shows Lincoln as several men and not all of them heroic. One was the noble idealist, the other was an introvert who lived alone with himself; another was a chaffering politician who knew how to fight fire with fire, occasionally getting badly burned. Lincoln's four years in the White House were almost unbelievably tragic and the wonder is that any human could have endured the strain, let alone increase constantly in knowledge and power. The work is thorough and honest, if not always polished. Its author has the great advantage of having no illusions about American politics.

ROY F. NICHOLS

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Don't Let Them Scare You: The Life and Times of Elmer Davis. By ROGER BURLINGAME. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1961.—352 pp. $5.95.

Elmer Davis was a man for our time—honest, gifted and sublimely courageous. In him were fused the art of the journalist and the careful research of the scholar. What he wrote gained in clarity and meaning because his powers in the uses of language were extraordinary. What he said in his many broadcasts attracted a wide audience in the United States, despite the unattractiveness of his flat and rasping voice, because he was able to communicate something of importance to his countrymen at a time when few thought it either wise or fashionable to speak

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out. That is why he is gratefully remembered in Roger Burlingame's biography, *Don't Let Them Scare You.*

For in the disgraceful era of the early Fifties, when the McCarthy madness was at its height and even the President of the United States for a time was careful not to offend the rampaging junior senator from Wisconsin, Davis spoke out to a confused and wavering nation:

> The first and greatest commandment is, don't let them scare you. For the men who are trying to do that to us are scared themselves. They are afraid that what they think will not stand critical examination; they are afraid that the principles on which this Republic was founded and has been conducted are wrong. They will tell you that there is a hazard in the freedom of the mind, and of course there is as in any freedom. In trying to think right you run the risk of thinking wrong. But there is no hazard at all, no uncertainty, in letting someone else tell you what to think; that is sheer damnation.

Thus, Elmer Davis: native of Aurora, Indiana, Rhodes scholar, distinguished member of the *New York Times* staff, writer for *Harper's,* broadcaster for the Columbia Broadcasting System, director of the Office of War Information; and, finally, commentator extraordinary for the American Broadcasting System. As Burlingame recounts his life, it is entirely admirable and Davis emerges as a knight of the typewriter and microphone, *sans peur et sans reproche.* That is how his friends choose to remember him. But of course, a biography that is all champagne eventually loses its fizz and becomes a little flat. What is lacking here is the bite and toughness of Davis himself, the last man in the world to approve of a bland prose poem, although he would have appreciated Burlingame's solicitude.

This, however, was closer to the measure of the man—the conclusion of his Phi Beta Kappa oration at Harvard:

> I should perhaps have begun this sermon with a text, a text taken from the fourth chapter of the first book of Samuel, the eighth and ninth verses, the mutual exhortations of the Philistines before the battle of Ebenezer. 'Woe unto us!' they said when they realized that the Israelites had brought the Ark of God with them to battle. 'Woe unto us! Who shall deliver us out of the hands of these mighty gods?' But then, realizing that nobody else was going to deliver them, they said to one another, 'Be strong, and quit yourselves like men, and fight.' And they did fight, and delivered themselves. So may we; but only if we quit ourselves like men. This republic was not established by cowards; and cowards will not preserve it.

JOHN HOHENBERG

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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The Ruling Servants: Bureaucracy in Russia, France—and Britain? By ERIC STRAUSS. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1961.—308 pp. $6.75.

Students of political science are becoming ever more aware of the need for comparative studies of bureaucratic patterns, relating these to other social and political variables. The work of Max Weber and his disciples has been extremely useful, but has been limited either to the discussion of ideal models or to broad-gauged comparisons between traditional and industrial societies. Aside from the efforts of Alfred Diamant and a few others, hardly any material is available which develops really useful comparisons between the bureaucracies of industrial societies. In one sense Strauss' essay is an attempt to fill this gap. It is, however, an attempt which fails dismally.

The volume is divided into two major sections: first, a theoretical discussion of bureaucracy and bureaucratization; and second, a discussion of the development of bureaucracy in France, the Soviet Union and England. Strauss argues that bureaucratization is the natural outgrowth of industrialization and advanced technology. Thus, the extent and complexity of bureaucratic patterns will hypertrophy in the future. Nor is the phenomenon limited to the public sector. Rather, the modern world is of necessity characterized by bureaucratic complexity in all phases of its social life. The problem then is to prevent what Strauss calls "bureaucratic degeneration," that is, the rule of bureaucrats directed to serving their own ends rather than the public weal (in Strauss' terms, the "primary social force"). The danger is an omnipresent one and its consequence is always catastrophic social upheaval, for the natural tendency of bureaucratic rule is toward stasis, and the consequent building up of social tension. Strauss' analysis of Russian, French and English patterns is designed to draw lessons from the experiences of these countries so that we may avoid this dual danger.

If the problem Strauss raises is rather "hackneyed," so the analysis which he develops and the answers which he offers are, to say the least, simple-minded.

First, his theoretical discussion of bureaucracy, while rather loosely derived from Weber and others, reveals a profound misunderstanding of their efforts. Second, while he correctly defines bureaucracy relatively broadly, he moves back and forth between this definition and narrower conceptions without any attempt at systematic analysis of the relationships. Third, his discussion of the countries under consideration involves a rather superficial historical analysis of each, in which recalcitrant facts are squeezed into the "Procrustean" bed of his theory.

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The theory adds up to the simple proposition that bureaucratic rule and consequent bureaucratic degeneration are the result of unresolved social conflict. When a society is characterized by a plurality of mutually antagonistic primary forces, none of which can dominate, then control falls by default to the bureaucracy.

This was true of Tsarist Russia, because of the inability of either Tsar or aristocracy to dominate, and it also was true of France down through the Fourth Republic. Thus the Tsarist regime collapsed in the face of explosive new social forces, and the Soviet regime represents essentially a renewed application of the old inheritance. The collapse of the Fourth Republic is to be explained in the same terms.

If England has escaped this danger thus far it is only because of a peculiar Anglo-Saxon tradition which has permitted compromise among the various primary social forces, and hence rule by those responsible to these forces. However, given the trends of our time, England, too, is moving in the direction of bureaucratic degeneration. The problem stems in part from the bureaucratization of the major political parties which has removed them from the control of primary social forces.

The result of this tendency is the likelihood of a *modus vivendi* between large business and the two parties with a resultant rule by bureaucrats unable or unwilling to perceive mounting social tension until it is too late. While a number of suggested palliatives may be of some help, the ultimate answer lies in a truly radical Labor Party which can serve as a channel for the transformation of social discontent into public policy.

There is an old "saw" to the effect that social theories which explain everything explain nothing. If bureaucratization is a phenomenon of the modern age, how can one legitimately describe nineteenth century Russia and France in these terms? And can one really argue with a straight face that the Soviet regime is merely the continuation of a traditional pattern, or that the similarities between Fourth Republic France and the Soviet Union are more important than the differences?

In arguing for the omnipresence of bureaucracy, Strauss' analysis is curiously akin to that of James Burnham's *Managerial Revolution,* a book which, so he tells us, influenced him profoundly. And the logical structure of the argument may serve as a typical example of the whole volume. The fact of bureaucratic rule is proven, Strauss argues, by the fact that even if individual bureaucrats are dismissed, others must be appointed to take their places. The only trouble is that much the same argument could be applied to plumbers with just as much cogency.

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During World War II, motorists were always asked to consider whether or not the particular trip contemplated was necessary. The same question is one which writers of books might be legitimately requested to ask themselves. In this case the answer to the question should have been obvious.

STANLEY ROTHMAN

SMITH COLLEGE

Negro Politics: The Search for Leadership. By JAMES Q. WILSON. Glencoe, The Free Press, 1960.—x, 342 pp. $5.00.

The current fashion in studies of urban politics and race is to be heavily conceptual and methodological. However, Mr. Wilson's case study of Negro leaders in Chicago is clearly in an earlier tradition. Its rich share of information was secured at firsthand by interviews with the leaders themselves, much of the text consisting of quotations from their responses to unstandardized questions. Thus it is a book that employs the skills of the journalist as much as those of the political scientist. It is true that the narrative reveals some aim at theoretical analysis and at placing the findings of the author in a conceptual frame. But this aim was not pursued very rigorously; at least it does not seem to the reviewer to have affected the presentation very deeply.

It is also true that some effort is made to extend the case study to embrace Negro leadership in other Northern cities; but, if the discussion of New York is a fair standard, these attempts at generalization rest too much upon impressionistic evidence. Indeed, some gain in persuasiveness would have resulted if the conceptual phraseology and the comparative essays had been abandoned in exchange for a systematic effort to bring clearly into view the ways in which, in Chicago, issues are raised, agitated and settled, coupled with an assessment of the sources and distribution of influence and an analytical consideration of the policy-making process in which Chicago Negro and white leaders engage.

As a case report on a city whose politics and race factors have been much studied, this volume adds a full-bodied, richly detailed exploration of the perceptions, aspirations, strategies, victories and frustrations of Chicago's Negro leaders. The presentation is in three main parts: the organization of Negro political life, the organization of Negro civic life, the character of Negro public life. Except for a considerable number of footnote references, there is no bibliography.

The author finds a Negro political machine in Chicago, con-

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fronted as yet by merely incipient internal tensions but existing under more powerful external constraints (one being the Democratic city machine within which the Negro machine operates). This Negro machine is frequently bypassed in race relations issues by the initiatives of other organizations. Negro civic leaders in Chicago, perceiving "the bipolar world of the white civic leader and the white politician," are attempting to follow suit by establishing paid staffs and fund-raising boards and thus "to professionalize race relations much as civic action has generally been professionalized in the city as a whole." The politicians, white and Negro, are a prime target of these Negro civic groups. The Negro press defends the Negro community, but does not often lead it; much less is it a critic of Negro leaders or their strategies. Labor unions and churches, the two mass organizations in addition to the Negro machine, contribute to, rather than close, the gap between civic and machine leaders. With white civic groups the Negro civic groups find cooperation accompanied by tensions, although these are perhaps moderating.

Viewing Negro public life as a whole in Chicago, the author believes that Negro public leaders, civic and machine, have competing goals, contrasting styles, and differing roles. These are, he postulates, two kinds of goals: "race values," highly general, widely-shared race aspirations; "race ends," consisting of "welfare" goals (for instance, better schools) and "status" goals (for instance, school integration). These goals divide Negro leaders as well as white. Two styles of Negro leaders emerge: the "militant" and the "moderate." In Chicago there are more moderates than militants. Among *civic* leaders the author discovers three types: prestige leaders, token leaders, organizers, and a hoped-for fourth type, the "New" Negro, more militant, confident, selfless. This new type of Negro leadership is beginning to show itself in trends toward middle-class leadership, increased emphasis on status ends, the rise of professionally staffed civic groups, broader contacts with white groups, and a possible "new merger" fusing civic action and politics.

WALLACE S. SAYRE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Negro in American Civilization. By NATHANIEL WEYL. Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1960.—ix, 360 pp. $6.00.

Nathaniel Weyl has written a book to prove that the Negro is innately inferior to all the other human races. His book covers a wide sweep of both time and subjects, for it would ap-

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pear that there is no field of learning in which Mr. Weyl does not consider himself an authority and capable of criticizing the best scholars. Thus, Mr. Weyl qualifies himself as an historian, cultural anthropologist, human ecologist, geneticist, political theorist, physiologist, philosopher, psychiatrist, psychologist, constitutional lawyer, ethnologist, physician, criminologist and educationist. Weyl's historical view of the Negro, his problems and the problems he has caused, begins with the Greeks and ends with school integration and Negro migration to our central cities.

In spite of all of the show of wide reading, Mr. Weyl's intellectual progenitors are not hard to discover. They include the pro-slavery writers of the ante-bellum South, the ex-Confederates and their descendants, the sophisticated segregationists of today (for example, Representative James C. Davis), and the "ethnopsychologists" (for example, Dr. Frank C. J. McGurk, Associate Professor of Psychology at Villanova University, who writes the introduction for Mr. Weyl).

Weyl's book is a long brief, dedicated to the proposition that the Negro was, is, and always will be inferior to other races. As would be suspected, it is very difficult to write a brief of such length without peculiar side results. Thus, Weyl reviews something of what most of the great Western political theorists and American thinkers and statesmen have had to say concerning the Negro. What he seeks to prove, with considerable documentation but apparently without having read Frank M. Snowden on the Negro in Greek and Roman Civilization, is that all of the great minds of the West, from the Greeks to the present, have considered the Negro in Africa and elsewhere to be innately inferior. In so doing he presents Radio Moscow with a ready-made script. Those American leaders who in some measure championed the cause of the Negro were, according to Weyl, fanatics, revolutionists, dupes, hypocrites or crooks (see p. 95), or privately thought differently from their public utterances. This in some measure is the fate bestowed by Mr. Weyl upon Jefferson (pp. 38–47), Lincoln, Stevens, Sumner, Grant, Garfield (p. 329), Theodore Roosevelt (p. 119) and Taft (p. 120). Mr. Weyl asserts that privately even Karl Marx was a racist (pp. 127, 128).

Since the volume has the nature of a long brief, it is characterized by contradictions, omissions, the perverted and glancing reference and the *non sequitur*. Evidently, Weyl is enough of a scholar not to want to omit well established facts, and this may in part explain the contradictions. At any rate on pages 168 and 246 he takes exactly opposite points of view toward the concept of race. After demonstrating that the retreat from Recon-

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struction and the establishment of the new South were highly justifiable, he seems to bemoan both historical movements as a victory of attrition over law on p. 278. After proving that the newly freed Negro was not ready for the vote and was given it in order to prevent the party of rebellion, the Democratic Party, from immediately assuming political power (p. 85), he condemns the Negro for not making anything of his "opportunity" (p. 106). On pages 130 and 131 there is a masterpiece of twisted interpretation regarding Communist Party relations to the NAACP and vice versa during World War II.

Mr. Weyl believes that if the Negro and the South had been left to the direction of industrial leaders of the North and Wade Hampton, Alexander H. H. Stuart and General Robert E. Lee—the best of both sections—we would have avoided poor white rule and terror, the NAACP, the Northern immigration of the Negro, the welfare state, egalitarianism and integration. In order to justify his heroes he carefully omits any reference in his book to the Wormley House Agreement (cf. pages 101–102), although he claims to have read Vann Woodward's *Reunion and Reaction*.

Many writers will be surprised to note how and to what purpose their works have been used unless they remember the old saying about the Devil and Scripture. In addition to Vann Woodward, the author has made incidental and twisted references to the works of Rayford Logan, Alfred H. Kelly, E. Franklin Frazier, W. E. B. DuBois, Gunnar Myrdal, Otto Klineberg and others.

Perhaps the only good thing that can be said about Weyl's book is that it does highlight current problems that more well wishing commentators may ignore. He is certainly correct when he says that integration alone is not going to solve the problem of educating lower-lower-class Negro children. It is also true that the aid-to-dependent-children program will never result in the provision of a family capable of socializing such children.

JOHN A. DAVIS

THE CITY COLLEGE OF NEW YORK

The Religious Factor. By GERHARD LENSKI. New York, Doubleday and Company, 1961.—ix, 381 pp. $5.95.

The thesis of this book is that religion continues to exert an important influence on the secular institutions of American society. In an age when many social scientists have come to treat religion as a residual variable or not to consider it at all, the thesis is indeed provocative and, within the frame of reference used, the author presents a strong case in its support.

The book takes its point of departure from Max Weber's

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classical work on the historical significance of religion for the rise of capitalism. It asks, in effect, whether the differences in economic values of Protestants and Catholics which Weber noted in post-Reformation Europe are still visible in contemporary society. The answer is a resounding yes, and the author adds that religion makes a difference not only in economic values but in political behavior and family life as well.

The book is based on 656 interviews collected from a sample of the population of Detroit as part of the 1958 Detroit Area Study. These interviews were supplemented by interviews with 127 clergymen serving a sample of the churches attended by the respondents.

The form of the analysis is to consider religion as an independent variable and to examine its effect on a number of dependent variables. Much of the analysis is based on comparing the attitudes and behavior of Roman Catholics, Jews, and Protestants, with white and Negro Protestants considered separately. Four other indicators of religiosity are also employed. A measure of associational commitment distinguishes respondents in terms of the frequency of their attendance at worship services. A measure of communal involvement distinguishes them according to the extent to which "primary relations of an individual (that is, his relations with friends and relatives) are limited to persons of his own faith." In addition, respondents are ordered on a scale of doctrinal orthodoxy and a scale of devotionalism; the former refers to the acceptance of prescribed church doctrine, the latter to the importance of "private or personal communion with God."

These different measures of religiosity are then examined to assess their significance for three broad classes of dependent variables: one, economic values (for example, mobility, aspirations and ambition, attitude towards work); two, political behavior (for example, party preference, voter turnout, attitudes toward the welfare state); and, three, family life (for example, kin group loyalty, child rearing practices, use of leisure time). A separate chapter analyzes the social background, the theological commitments, and the social values of the clergy.

It is impossible in a short review to convey more than a sense of the study's many detailed findings or of the author's genuinely rich interpretation of them. Religion, however measured, is found in almost all cases to have a profound influence on all of the dependent variables. Jews and white Protestants, for example, are found to identify themselves with the economic values historically associated with the Protestant Ethic more than Cath-

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olics and Negro Protestants. This identification is increased among Protestants the greater their associational involvement, and among Catholics, white Protestants, and Negro Protestants the greater their devotional attachment to religion. The association is negative for communal involvement, and there is no consistent relationship for doctrinal orthodoxy.

The book, impressive as it is, is not entirely convincing. As the author himself points out, the effects he discovers are more a measure of a heritage from the past than a measure of an informing contemporary religion. While documentation of the fact that cultural values are inherited from generation to generation is important, it is questionable whether the phenomenon being examined is appropriately designated as religious in the sense that the values in question derive their authority from transcendental belief.

Other characteristics of the book which give the reader pause are the failure to consider the factors associated with differential commitment, the lumping together of all white Protestants, and the author's inability to control for possible intervening variables. Presumably, knowing what leads people to different degrees of religious commitment is a prerequisite to understanding the effects of commitment. Differences among members of different Protestant denominations (see Appendix Table 55) turn out to be greater than differences between Protestants taken together and Catholics. The size of the sample precluded analysis by denomination; yet the power of the argument is reduced by this necessity to overlook denominational differences. Finally, while the author does control for generational and socioeconomic differences in religious group membership, he ignores the possible intervening effect of such variables as sex and age which other studies have shown to be highly related to the different measures of religiosity used here. The possibility exists, for example, that older people are more associationally involved than young people, and that the relationship between that religious index and economic values is explained by differences in the economic outlook of different age groups.

Flaws of this kind are almost inevitable in studies based on small samples. It is to the author's great credit that he has made what amounts to a major contribution with data that are less than adequate for his purposes.

CHARLES Y. GLOCK

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (BERKELEY)

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BOOK NOTES

In *An Immortal Commonwealth: The Political Thought of James Harrington* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1960; xiv, 342 pp., $6.00), Charles Blitzer has presented us with the first book-length study of Harrington as a political theorist, exercising the exciting privilege which falls to those who undertake an initial exploration of a field with sober restraint. The Harrington that emerges bears a strong resemblance to a modern moderate of liberal persuasion. To begin with, "Harrington most strongly commands our attention" as an advocate of the "distinctively modern form of constitutionalism" which insists upon the need for a "system of restraints upon the arbitrary and invasive use of the power of government" (p. xii). Harrington is also modern and nondoctrinaire in his method: he rejects the "abstract, deductive reasoning" of Hobbes (p. 90) to embrace "the principles of induction and empiricism" (p. 95). This empirical and pragmatic temper (p. 89) with its respect for facts and practical problems saves Harrington from "procrustean system[s]" (p. 133) and other evils. However, Harrington becomes immoderate and extremist when, in his major contribution to political theory—his "theory of the economic base of political power" (p. 133)—he raises to an absolute principle a generalization which only has limited validity (p. 133). But Harrington quickly redeems himself: "he is constantly obliged to admit the importance of noneconomic factors" (p. 133) and in so doing he "turns out to have been something less of a rationalistic system-builder than one suspected at first, . . . and is now seen to have been a better empirical scientist" (p. 133). The distinction between "rationalistic system-builder" and "empirical scientist," with the accompanying implication of an antithesis between the pair, is one of several sets of distinctions which Blitzer employs as the basic mode for his exposition and interpretation of Harrington. He finds the key to Harrington's method and his concept of the relation of theory to action in the pair artist-scientist (pp. 102–104), while the related pairs of fact-value (pp. 133–135), description-prescription, and science-ethics (p. 108) are used to analyze and evaluate Harrington's general political theory. Blitzer's emphasis tends to fall on the distinct and separate, sometimes mutually exclusive, or downright antithetical, nature of the relation of the members of each pair. But he does not seem to contend that Harrington himself makes these distinctions and employs them in this way. Then what is the justification for imposing them on Harrington? Does it help or hinder an under-

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standing of Harrington's theory, an enterprise necessarily preliminary to the evaluation of the theory, to interpret it in terms of categories and distinctions alien to it? Thus, when Blitzer concludes that the fact that "the Commonwealth of Oceana was at the same time the form of government best suited to England's economic condition and the most ethically desirable of polities . . . [was] a happy coincidence, the significance of which Harrington never examined too closely" (p. 108) it is difficult for this reader to escape the conclusion that the categories which Blitzer employs prevent him from examining Harrington's theory to see whether or not an explanation may be found which is more adequate than the appeal to "happy coincidence."—MARTIN FLEISHER, Brooklyn College.

The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries remain the *terra incognita* of English constitutional history. The valuable work done on this period is small in quantity, and as yet there is no certainty in answering the two fundamental problems: Was parliament a quasi-independent institution which exercised effective control over the executive, or was parliament, and particularly the commons, a mere tool in the hands of aristocratic cliques in whom all the real power lay? And how can we fully account for the apparent extensive breakdown in the hitherto effective edifice of local government and law? The 385 page collection, *Select Documents of English Constitutional History, 1307–1485*, by S. B. Chrimes and A. L. Brown (New York, Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1961; xxiv, 398 pp., $7.00), is the first collection devoted to the later middle ages in constitutional history to be published in the past three decades. It is apparently intended to serve the needs of English undergraduates. The documents are published at length, which is a good policy; they are given without translation and almost no notes. There are twenty-two previously unpublished documents, but of these twenty are merely formularies and only one is important (no. 183). The editors have, however, performed the service of collating a large number of the published documents with the manuscripts, and the extensive index will prove useful to scholars in the period. It is disappointing to find that the book is organized, and the documents selected, on the very limited principle of various supposedly important 'crises' in relations between parliament and executive. This question-begging Victorian methodology is not going to advance our knowledge of the leading problems of late medieval constitutional history. How can we judge the importance of a parliamentary crisis,

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which in many cases appears to have been managed from behind the scenes by an aristocratic faction, if we remain in the dark as to the regular workings of government and law? Strangely, S. B. Chrimes has been very critical of B. Wilkinson, a leading historian of fourteenth-century England, for following the same dubious approach as adopted in the selection and organization of these documents. The editors make their due apologies for the almost total exclusion of whole areas of vital importance—law, local government, and church-state relations—from their book. It is a sad comment on the narrow way in which constitutional history is taught in England nowadays.—NORMAN F. CANTOR, Columbia University.

Locke on War and Peace, by Richard H. Cox (New York, Oxford University Press; Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1960; xii, 220 pp., $5.60), is a useful but exasperating book about Locke's political thought. It is useful because it propounds a sound thesis: in Locke the state of nature is a state of war, and international relations are but a reflection of this dismal condition; peace is an "artifice of men," a move away from man's original plight. In a word, Locke is much closer to Hobbes than his rhetoric might indicate and than he is commonly supposed to be. To be sure, this view is by no means new: political theorists who have read Locke closely have long held it. The late Franz Neumann, for example, argued long ago in an essay on "Types of Natural Law" that Locke's second Treatise, for all its opposition to Hobbes, was practically Hobbesian in its estimate of human nature, and in its provision for adequate political authority. At the same time, Cox adduces a depressing array of scholars who continue to insist on Locke's "optimism"; hence it might fairly be argued that his thesis deserves re-emphasis. But this is also an exasperating book, for it is much too long, and its methods obviously owe much to Leo Strauss' principle that it is more rewarding to read between the lines than to read the lines themselves. Of course, this principle is a helpful caution: in all ages, writers have suffered persecution and concealed their thoughts, or rather, worded them so as to reveal their thoughts to an alert elite. But, at least as practiced by Cox, this method is at once excessively psychological and not psychological enough. Cox notes that "Locke, a man of great intelligence and learning, went to enormous pains to refute the most absurd of the arguments of a second-rate political thinker"—that is, Filmer (p. 4). But in 1680, when Filmer's *Patriarcha* was published posthumously, even its most "absurd" arguments had considerable influence,

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and deserved to be refuted by an Exclusionist like Locke. On the other hand, while Cox neglects political for psychological considerations, his psychology is superficial, concentrating on the conscious desire to "conceal" thoughts. But Locke would have been secretive in the most libertarian situation: he was suspicious to the point of paranoia, and loved mystery-mongering for its own sake. This dimension the Straussian method is singularly ill-equipped to understand, for it is both too suspicious and not suspicious enough. Yet, for all the "incredibly tedious technique of a word-by-word analysis" with which Cox charges Locke (p. 2), and with which we may charge him, it is a pleasure to have Locke read closely once more, and to have him understood. Locke, like the philosophers who worshiped him, had a far sounder appreciation of the dangers and miseries of this world than he has been given credit for.—PETER GAY, Columbia University.

Since Ghana's independence in 1957, literature on the politics of contemporary Africa has continued to inundate the bookshelves. Generally, this literature may be classified as follows: (a) tribal, country or regional monographs; (b) elite studies and biographies; (c) functional-structural analyses of the area; (d) introductory surveys by specialists (such as Carter's *Independence for Africa* and Wallerstein's *Africa: The Politics of Independence*); and, (e) introductory accounts by journalists. There has yet to appear a study of comparative African politics such as the orthodox *European Political Systems,* edited by Taylor Cole, or the analytical *Patterns of Government* by Samuel H. Beer and others. But it is doubtful that a work on African political systems can follow the classic approaches found in the European field. An author would need to apply anthropological and sociological knowledge as well as employ with discrimination the recent contributions of political sociologists such as Deutsch, Apter and Almond. *The African Revolution,* by James Cameron (New York, Random House, 1961; 297 pp., $3.95), fits in the journalist category. Readers of this review may remember two earlier works by this perceptive British journalist, *1914* and *Mandarin Red.* His African book is suitable for the general reader rather than the specialist. The author successfully and lucidly conveys the "spirit" of the African revolution, although with frequent errors. Mauritania is not a republic in the Congo; white residence in Angola is not discouraged; the scramble for Africa came in the nineteenth, not the eighteenth, century; Bismarck did not compete with France for Tunisia; the Somali National

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League won twenty, not thirty-two, seats in the Legislative Council; the Turks did not introduce Islam to Ethiopia, and so on. Disturbing, too, is the author's offhand, almost incidental, treatment of the former French and the Portugese territories. In tackling North Africa in addition to Tropical Africa, the author also overextended himself. Since the book was not revised for American publication, it suffers the further liability of being somewhat dated. However, for those who have not read recent works on African affairs and who would like a rapid, nonacademic and simple guide to the forces underlying political change in Africa, the book may prove worthwhile reading. This was the author's aim. As he says, "This is the simplest of guides to the most complex of contemporary happenings: the African Revolution."—A. A. CASTAGNO, Queens College.

In *The Relation Between International Law and Municipal Law in the Netherlands and in the United States: A Comparative Study* (Leyden, A. W. Sythoff; New York, Oceana Publications, 1961; 510 pp., $11.00), L. Erades and Wesley L. Gould—a Netherlands judge and an American political scientist—present and analyze a mass of data on the significance attributed to international law by the judicial and other legal authorities of the two nations, with much attention to historical development. The picture that emerges is a mixed one in both countries, and no general conclusions are drawn, although the sympathies of the authors appear to lie with the monistic interpretation of the relation between international law and municipal law. The study is on an ambitious scale, with more than two hundred pages being devoted to a general comparative survey of the political and legal institutions of the Netherlands and the United States. This survey will be useful to students of comparative government as well as of law. There are some weaknesses. Professor Gould, for example, seems to overlook the problem of the applicability of the doctrine of *Erie* v. *Tompkins* to customary international law and the significance, in this connection, of the case of *Bergman* v. *De Sieyes*. He also fails to draw adequate distinction between public international law, "general maritime law," and mere maritime usage, with the strange result that the widespread practice of carrying liquor as part of a ship's sea stores appears to be elevated to the status of a rule of customary international law. The discussion of constitutional limitations on the treaty-making power in the United States lacks depth. Despite these and other defects, the authors are to be congratulated on the accomplishment of a difficult task.—O. J. LISSITZYN, Columbia University.

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Studies in World Public Order, by Myres S. McDougal and Associates (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1960; xx, 1058 pp., $15.00) is a collection of previously published articles which are brought together to make a book aiming at "contextual policy-oriented jurisprudence postulating as its overriding goal the dignity of man in an increasingly universal public order" (p. ix). In the judgment of the reviewer, the book successfully realizes its purpose. It deals both with general theory and specific problems, all discussed in the light of the authors' main objective and with adequate attention to the complexity of "world social and power processes" and to the "factors which affect particular decisions within such processes." Especially deserving of attention is the significant essay on the interaction of international law and national law. So is the article in which the "myth" that states are the sole objects of international law is exploded. There is also a long, well-documented and carefully analyzed chapter arguing that congressional-executive agreements and treaties are equivalent and that from a policy viewpoint, the former instruments are preferable to the latter. A more modest position, however, is taken with regard to presidential agreements. This is not an obsolete issue since the Eisenhower administration apparently took the position that an executive agreement concluded by one President does not bind his successor—an erroneous view forcefully refuted by Professor Oliver Lissitzyn in a recent editorial comment in the *American Journal of International Law.* The problem of "Strategies for Management of Shareable Resources" is illuminated by a series of articles on the international law of the sea and outer space. It is noted that the test of reasonableness under community criteria must be applied in order to strike a balance between conflicting sets of principles. One of the articles in this series refutes the argument that the United States violated international law by its explosion of thermonuclear weapons in the Pacific. The concluding section of this enormous volume contains essays under the general heading "Strategies for Optimum Order," by which is meant a public order with "the minimum of coercion and the maximum of persuasion," one that will best produce and spread "human dignity values among all peoples." Both optimum and minimum plans to realize this goal are suggested. This is a volume that will be found stimulating both by lawyers and political scientists.—GUENTER WEISSBERG, New York City.

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

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